Boyd v. State

KARWACKI, Judge. We granted certiorari in both of these cases to review the identical narrow question: is it an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse a party’s request that the judge ask on voir dire whether any of the prospective jurors has a physical impairment hindering his or her performance as a juror? Under the common law of this State this Court will prescribe the juror voir dire process only as much as is necessary to establish that jurors meet minimum qualifications for service and to uncover disqualifying bias. Because Maryland statutory law requires that a thorough assessment of a juror’s physical ability to serve take place at earlier stages in the jury selection process, we hold that such a question is not necessary and therefore not mandatory when requested at the voir dire stage.

The refusal of the trial judge in each of the instant cases to ask such a question was not an abuse of discretion. I Zayde Boyd, one of the petitioners, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of attempted armed robbery and related offenses and sentenced to four fourteen-year terms and one five-year term of imprisonment, all to be served concurrently. Trevor Brooks, the other petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second-degree murder and handgun offenses and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of thirty and fifteen years. During both trials, the defendants’ attorneys requested the judges to ask the jurors on voir dire: “Does any member of the jury have a physical impairment or ailment that would hinder them in performance as a juror (i.e., bad eyesight, poor hearing)?” In both trials, the judges refused to ask the question.

In Boyd’s case, Judge David Ross gave no explana ⁴³⁴ tion for his refusal to ask the question. Judge Thomas Ward, who presided at Brooks’ trial, explained his refusal: “THE COURT: All right, Counsel. Question 15, I have already covered that. Denied.

Question 16, denied. Question 17—well, if a person has a problem with respect to eyesight or hearing, we’ll have to make arrangements to help them because people who are disabled have a right to serve on juries. “MR. GASTON: I understand. I just— “THE COURT: I don’t even know that I—how much I can ever inquire into that. “MR.

GASTON: Well, you can only—you can ask the jurors if anyone has any, did anyone have any difficulty in hearing me and my questions on voir dire. That will take care of the hearing. And is there anybody that can’t read a document that may be introduced into evidence, and that might take care of the other questions. “MR. FLANNERY: Your Honor, I’m certain, and you preside over so many jury selections, every other one someone says, I can’t hear, I can’t hear. “THE COURT: Well, I make an observation that everyone here does seem to [see] and everyone seems to hear.

I feel very—I feel that if somebody cannot hear or see and they’re selected, then in that event I will have to make arrangements to make sure that they, that we provide services for them to the best of our ability. People have a right to serve on juries who have poor eyesight and bad hearing, and other disablements. “MR. GASTON: I understand, Your Honor— “THE COURT: So the question is denied.” Both defendants appealed their convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the judges’ refusal to ask the requested question concerning potential jurors’ physical infirmities constituted reversible error. The defendants theorized that they could have been deprived of minimally qualified jurors, each with full physical faculties necessary to see and hear the evidence, as a result of the judges’ refusal to ask the ⁴³⁵ question on voir dire.

There was no evidence to suggest that any juror who was impaneled on either trial actually had any physical impairments whatsoever. Our intermediate appellate court rejected the defendants’ arguments and affirmed both convictions in separate unreported opinions. We granted defendants’ petitions for certiorari to consider their contention that they have a right, upon request, to have the specific question on physical impairments posed to potential jurors on voir dire. We disagree.

II Our analysis of the instant cases requires a brief review of the evolution and requirements of the voir dire process in Maryland. Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article XXI of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee to criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. The process of voir dire of potential jurors has been developed to ensure juror impartiality: “Undergirding the voir dire procedure and, hence, informing the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding the conduct of the voir dire, is a single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: ‘to ascertain “the existence of cause for disqualification.” ’ “Thus, the purpose of the voir dire examination is to exclude from the venire those potential jurors for whom there exists cause for disqualification, so that the jury that remains is ‘capable of deciding the matter before [it] based solely upon the facts presented, “uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations.” ’ ” Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 279 , 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995) (citations omitted). See also Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993); Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659 , 566 A.2d 111 (1989); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595 , 143 A.2d 627 (1958); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133 , 88 A.2d 556 (1952). ⁴³⁶ The task of the trial judge is to impanel an impartial jury, and thus we have emphasized many times before that “the scope of voir dire and the form of the questions propounded rest firmly within the discretion of the trial judge.” Davis, 333 Md. at 34 , 633 A.2d at 870-71 , citing Casey, 217 Md. at 605 , 143 A.2d at 631 (1958); Bedford, 317 Md. at 670 , 566 A.2d at 116-17 ; McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58 , 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959); Adams, 200 Md. at 140 , 88 A.2d at 559 .

Despite the broad discretion of the trial judge, however, we have defined a limited arena of mandatory questioning on voir dire: “[Tjhus, the mandatory scope of voir dire in Maryland only extends to those areas of inquiry reasonably likely to reveal cause for disqualification. There are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service, see Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol., 1992 Cum.Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-207; or (2) ‘ “an examination of a juror ... conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.” ’ ” Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36 , 633 A.2d at 871 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In other words, we have held that the well-settled “right” to examine potential jurors, inherent in the constitutional right to a fair trial and an impartial jury, translates into a defendant’s right to have certain questions propounded to the jurors where the proposed questions “concern a specific cause for disqualification.” Hill, 339 Md. at 280 , 661 A.2d at 1166 . In virtually all our previous cases, however, the proposed questions concerning specific cause for disqualification were related to the biases, such as racial or religious interests or prejudices, of the prospective jurors.

As a result, in discussing what type of questions must be asked on voir dire, we have defined the proper focus of the voir dire examination to be only “the venireperson’s state of mind and the existence of ⁴³⁷ bias, prejudice, or preconception, i.e., ‘a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification....”’ Hill, 339 Md. at 280 , 661 A.2d at 1167 , citing Davis, 333 Md. at 37 , 633 A.2d at 872 . Although we did make a general statement in Davis that the minimum statutory qualifications for jurors would be included in the mandatory scope of voir dire, that case pertained solely to possible biases the venirepersons might have had in favor of law enforcement personnel, and our analysis and application of the rules of voir dire involved primarily the search for bias. The voir dire question requested by the defendants in both Boyd and Brooks is unrelated to bias or a venireperson’s state of mind; defendants maintain nonetheless that their proposed question concerns “a specific cause for disqualification,” and therefore under the case law, particularly Davis and Casey , trial judges do not have the discretion to refuse to ask the question. The cases sub judice present us with the opportunity to apply our holdings in Casey, Davis, and other cases concerned with the voir dire process to a requested inquiry concerning the minimum physical qualifications of venirepersons.

Ill In Casey , the plaintiff sustained serious injuries when, while praying at her parish church, she slipped and fell on a waxed floor. She sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese for negligence, and at trial requested a voir dire question regarding any particular bias a venireperson might have for or against the Roman Catholic Church or a member of the Church. The trial judge refused to ask the specific question and instead asked a general question on religious corporations. We held, in reversing the trial judge, that the general nature of the question was not sufficient to identify the specific bias the plaintiff sought to uncover and, indeed, given the facts of the case, was not specific enough to secure an impartial jury.

Casey, 217 Md. at 607 , 143 A.2d at 632 . Casey stands for the proposition that, as to bias, a party has the “right” to have a bias question asked on voir dire only when the party has a ⁴³⁸ specific concern related to the facts of the case and when failure to ask the question might prevent the impaneling of an impartial jury. Casey is only of limited help to our analysis in the instant cases and does not support the defendants’ cause. As we have already noted, the petitioners were probing generally the minimum qualifications of their prospective panels rather than seeking to uncover bias, while Casey is only concerned with the search for impartial jurors.

Nevertheless, we can examine our holding in Casey and extract certain relevant reasoning which can be applied in the instant cases. For example, critical to our decision in Casey was the close connection between the plaintiffs requested question and the specific facts of the case, because a specific bias for or against the Roman Catholic Church was indeed possible, and an affirmative answer to the question would have exposed undue prejudice to the plaintiffs case and would have been cause for disqualification. The question proposed by the defendants in the instant cases, on the other hand, did not relate to the facts of their cases, nor did either defendant register on the record concerns about the physical limitations of any particular potential juror. Also, an affirmative answer to a question as to physical impairments, as we discuss further below, would not even have been automatic cause for disqualification.

Moreover, the inquiry requested in Casey was not one that was or could be made at any other point in the juror selection process; if one of the jurors did harbor a bias against the Catholic Church, voir dire was the one and only time to uncover it. As we discuss extensively in Part IV, statutory law in Maryland requires the exact inquiry requested by both Boyd and Brooks to be conducted at several earlier points in the juror selection process, rendering the requested questions unnecessary on voir dire. Davis is also concerned with questions which might reveal bias rather than a failure to meet minimum statutory qualifications. Our holding in Davis , however, is important to our analysis in the instant cases.

Davis, on trial for dealing drugs, ⁴³⁹ sought to have the judge ask prospective jurors if any of them were law enforcement personnel or related to law enforcement personnel on the theory that a member of the law enforcement establishment could be biased toward the prosecution. The trial judge refused to ask the question, and we affirmed his refusal. Davis, 333 Md. at 38 , 633 A.2d at 873 . We held that, unlike Casey , asking the question would not reveal any particular bias for or against the defendant, for a juror’s profession or the profession of his relations would not be good evidence of his state of mind or prejudices.

Id. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872 . Moreover, we rejected Davis’ argument that even if an affirmative answer to a question would not be grounds for immediate disqualification, it might combine with other observations the judge had made of the juror to persuade the court to excuse the individual for cause; we found that Maryland law did not support such “fishing.” Id. at 38 , 633 A.2d at 873 . In Davis , as we have already discussed in Part II of this opinion, we acknowledged that some voir dire inquiries would be mandatory upon request by one of the parties. We also clarified how to determine if a proposed inquiry is mandatory, noting two areas of inquiry which generally fall into the scope of mandatory voir dire questioning: minimum statutory qualifications and bias.

Davis, 333 Md. at 35-36 , 633 A.2d at 871 , quoted supra, Part II. The key factor is not, however, simply whether the question falls into one of the two categories of questioning we mentioned in Davis , but most importantly whether such an inquiry, even within those two categories of questions, would be “reasonably likely to reveal cause for disqualification.” Id. If the question is not reasonably likely to reveal cause, such as the question Davis proposed, it will not be an abuse of discretion for the judge to refuse to ask it; if the question would be reasonably likely to reveal something disqualifying, such as plaintiff Casey’s proposed question regarding biases towards or against the Roman Catholic Church, the judge who refuses to ask the question will abuse his discretion and commit reversible error. ⁴⁴⁰ In the cases before us, a question on physical infirmities would not be reasonably likely to lead to cause for disqualification of a juror. First, as the exchange between Judge Ward and the attorneys points out, the identification of someone with a physical disability in no way automatically leads to the individual’s disqualification.

As the prosecutor noted, many persons may attempt to avoid jury service by claiming they cannot hear, but the judge cannot afford to excuse each juror based on such a claim, unverifiable as it is at that moment. Moreover, even if the judge believes a claim of physical impairment, he will likely attempt to accommodate the juror rather than excuse him. 1 While there may be merit in exploring what accommodations impaneled jurors need to evaluate evidence most effectively, voir dire is not the proper