Boyer v. State

¹⁰³ GILBERT, Chief Judge. Maryland State Trooper Robert C. Titus approached a car driven by Richard Milton Farrar while it was stopped at a red light on southbound Route 301. Titus, suspecting that Farrar was' driving while intoxicated, instructed him to pull off the road. Farrar, however, ignored that request and sped away.

Joined by deputies from the Charles County Sheriffs Department, as well as by additional state troopers, Titus pursued Farrar at high rates of speed for a distance of seven miles along Route 301. The pursuit ended when Farrar crashed into an automobile occupied by Mary and Joseph Boyer. The Boyers died as a result of the injuries sustained in the collision. Andrew, David, and Alexander Boyer, the surviving sons of Joseph and Mary Boyer, filed an eleven count complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against Trooper Titus, the State of Maryland, the Charles County Sheriff’s Department, the County Commissioners of Charles County, and Richard Farrar.

The complaint alleged that all of the defendants were negligent in that they participated in the high speed pursuit. The complaint additionally stated that the State of Maryland and the County Commissioner of Charles County, as well as the Charles County Sheriff’s Department, negligently hired and trained the employees who were involved in the chase. Besides compensatory damages, punitive damages were also sought from each of the defendants. The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Charles County, which granted summary judgment in favor of all of the defendants except Richard Farrar.

The hearing judge, acting pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), determined that there was no just reason for delay in bringing an appeal and certified the summary judgment orders as final judgments. In this Court, Andrew Boyer and his brothers contend that the judge erred in granting the summary judgment motions. We have an entirely different point of view. ¹⁰⁴ The Court of Appeals, in Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529 , 40 A. 104 (1898), declared that it is important to shield a public officer from liability where the officer’s alleged negligence arose from the performance of his job in a manner which involved judgment and discretion. Keeping that principle intact, the Court, since Cocking , has held that a governmental representative will be relieved of liability for his non-malicious tortious acts where: “(1) he is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties.” (Emphasis in original.) Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617 , 510 A.2d 1078 (1986) (quoting James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 323 , 418 A.2d 1173, 1178 (1980)).

Officer Titus, in the case sub judice, was a “public official” acting while within the scope of his law enforcement function. That a police officer is a public official is no longer open to challenge. Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 302 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979); Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 262 Md. 342, 346-47 , 278 A.2d 71 (1971); State v. Baltimore County, 218 Md. 271 , 146 A.2d 28 (1958); Harris v. Baltimore, 151 Md. 11 , 133 A. 888 (1926). Nowhere in the complaint is it alleged that Titus acted with malice.

Thus, in deciding whether Titus is immune from suit, we narrow our inquiry to whether he acted in a discretionary or ministerial capacity. The ministerial-discretionary distinction was addressed in James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. at 326, 327 , 418 A.2d 1173 , quoting Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213 , 58 P. 707, 708 (1899). There, the Court stated: “Where [a public officer’s] duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task— in other words, is simply ministerial — he is liable in damages to anyone specially injured