Bradley v. Bradley

BERGER, J. On February 17, 2011, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County awarded judgment in favor of Dara Lawrence Bradley, appellee, and against Ronald L. Bradley, Jr., appellant. The combined monetary judgment totaled $469,000 in compensatory and punitive damages for the torts of intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and two counts of battery. This timely appeal followed. Appellant presents four questions for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether the circuit court erred by failing to dismiss appellee’s claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation.

II

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

III

Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to order a mistrial. ²⁵⁴ IV. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance of the trial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Appellant and appellee met in November 2003 at appellee’s place of employment, the Kennedy Krieger Institute (“KKI”).

Appellee was part of a team responsible for the care of appellant’s son, and had frequent contact with appellant. At the time, appellant was married and had three children. In June or July of 2004, after appellant’s son was discharged from KKI, appellant told appellee that he had been separated from his wife for several years and that he had instituted divorce proceedings. A courtship ensued between appellant and appellee.

In fall of 2004, appellant moved in with appellee, apparently upon appellant’s request. On December 31, 2004, appellant proposed to appellee, but asked her to keep the proposal a secret so as to not prolong the divorce proceedings. In 2005, appellant told appellee that he had hired a new lawyer to handle his divorce proceedings. At appellant’s request, appellee quit her job at KKI in order to assist with caring for appellant’s children.

Appellant made various representations to appellee regarding problems with his divorce proceedings, such as difficulties with his wife, and that his purported attorney had a heart attack. In September 2006, appellant announced that his divorce was finalized. He produced a plaque that contained a “Judgment of Absolute Divorce,” which included the circuit court’s gold seal, the typed name of a judge, and the forged signature of the clerk of court. In October 2006, appellant again proposed to appellee, this time in public.

On April 11, 2007, the couple was married at a wedding chapel in Las Vegas, Nevada before about 30 of appellee’s friends and family who traveled to Las Vegas for the wedding. ²⁵⁵ In 2008, after two incidents of battery, appellee searched the Maryland Judiciary Case Search website to research previous domestic violence cases involving appellant. Appellee then discovered that appellant’s divorce was not listed in the database. Appellee hired an attorney, who confirmed that appellant was not divorced. Appellee confronted appellant, who eventually confessed that he was still married to his first wife.

The two separated, and appellee began therapy with a psychiatrist. Appellee was diagnosed with anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and adjustment disorder. Appellee’s psychiatrist prescribed several medications and therapy for her treatment. In April 2008, appellee secured a part-time job as a nurse, working 28 hours per month.

Thereafter, appellee sought to reconcile with appellant, and indicated her desire that appellant divorce his first wife, annul appellant and appellee’s marriage, reimburse the wedding guests for their expenses, and “re-marry” appellee. Appellant moved back into appellee’s house briefly. Appellant filed for divorce from his first wife, but did not fulfill appellee’s other requests. In May 2008, appellant moved out of appellee’s house.

Appellee filed a complaint for annulment of the marriage on May 23, 2008. Appellee and two other witnesses testified that after filing the complaint, appellant attempted to make verbal and written contact with appellee, followed appellee in his vehicle, drove his vehicle past appellee’s house, sat in his vehicle in appellee’s driveway and a neighbor’s driveway, flickered his vehicle lights on and off near appellee’s house in the middle of the night, and stared at appellee from behind a fence near her house. In August 2008, the police responded to an altercation that occurred between the parties. Thereafter, appellee obtained a protective order against appellant, but he continued to make contact with appellee until the summer of 2010.

In August 2008, appellee amended her complaint for annulment to include various tort claims. The first trial date in appellee’s case was scheduled on December 7, 2009. The case ²⁵⁶ was postponed twice. The third and final trial date was set for February 7, 2011.

Daniel J. Hanley, Esquire (“Mr. Hanley”) entered his appearance on behalf of appellant on July 1, 2008. He completed all discovery in the case in preparation for appellant’s defense. On July 13, 2010, Mr. Hanley wrote a letter informing appellant that he was no longer willing to continue as appellant’s attorney in the case. The letter advised appellant to either notify the circuit court clerk in writing of his intention to represent himself, or have another attorney enter his or her appearance to represent him.

Mr. Hanley’s letter also expressly instructed appellant to provide the clerk with a current mailing address. One month later, Mr. Hanley filed a motion to strike his appearance with the court, which was ultimately granted on October 20, 2010. Mr. Hanley’s appearance was stricken on October 22, 2010, and the clerk mailed the required notice to appellant’s last known address that same day. The notice was returned as undeliverable.

On January 12, 2011, January 19, 2011, and January 29, 2011, appellant filed motions seeking a continuance of the trial. The basis for each motion was to allow time for appellant to sell his home and use the proceeds to hire an attorney. The circuit court administrative judge denied all three motions for lack of good cause. On the first day of trial, appellant orally raised a fourth request for a continuance to obtain counsel for the same reasons previously cited.

The trial judge indicated that appellant must present his request to the administrative judge, but noted that the administrative judge was on the bench, and therefore, unavailable. Appellant did not seek a continuance with the administrative judge. Trial commenced, and appellee presented her case to the jury over a period of four days. Appellant did not move for judgment on any counts at the close of appellee’s case in chief.

After appellant presented his defense, the court asked the parties if there were any motions. Neither party presented any motion, and the trial judge gave jury instructions after closing arguments. On February 14, 2011, the jury returned a ²⁵⁷ verdict in favor of appellee in the amount of $287,000 in compensatory damages, aggregated for the misrepresentation counts and the count for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury also awarded $1,000 each for two counts of battery, and $180,000 in punitive damages.

The trial court further granted appellee an annulment and denied appellant’s claim for a marital award. On March 4, 2011, appellant filed a “Motion for New Trial, Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, and to Alter or Amend Judgment” through newly retained counsel. Appellee timely responded. The trial court denied all relief.

Appellant noted this appeal. DISCUSSION I. Validity of Misrepresentation Claims Appellant argues that the intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims are simply a refitting of the abolished action for breach of promise to marry. The appellant further contends that the trial judge erred by failing to sua sponte dismiss the claims. Appellee argues that the misrepresentation claims constitute independent causes of action.

Further, appellee maintains that this issue is not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised at trial, and because the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) was invalid. We hold that this issue is arguably ripe for our review, and that the trial judge did not err in failing to sua sponte dismiss the claims. A. Waiver First, we consider whether this argument is preserved for appellate review. In our view, the breach of promise to marry issue is arguably preserved for our review because it was decided by the trial court.

This case involves a relatively unique situation in which the trial judge appropriately raised and decided various issues sua sponte, primarily due to appellant’s pro se status. We normally will not address an issue “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in ²⁵⁸ or decided by the trial court.” Md. Rule 8-131(a). Our review of the trial court record shows that although appellant himself did not raise the breach of promise to marry argument, it was nevertheless “decided by the trial court.” 1 The trial judge expressly considered which of appellee’s claims could properly serve as the basis for misrepresentation actions, and which claims were more appropriately construed as statutorily-barred actions for breach of promise to marry. The trial judge cited case law in support of her ruling, and both parties had an opportunity to address and challenge this ruling.

The trial judge continually referred to the distinction between misrepresentation and breach of promise to marry claims throughout the trial, and on that basis carefully distinguished which evidence could be presented to the jury. In particular, the trial judge initially addressed the distinction between breach of promise to marry and the other tort claims during pre-trial proceedings: Some of these are going to be legitimate claims ... but some of them are going to have some significant legal hurdles.... On the breach of promise to marry issues ... the Maryland Statute under Family Law 3-102 is broad and it has been broadly construed. The case of Miller v. Ratner makes that abundantly clear, which is at 114 Maryland App. 18 [ 688 A.2d 976 ].

What Miller v. Ratner also does though is says that there may be claims where the issue is precisely the issue in this case, there is not so much the breach of a promise to marry but a fraud relating to the ability to enter into a valid marriage[,] and if those are the circumstances, which is the allegation here, some of those causes of actions [sic] may survive a motion, but not all. ²⁵⁹ At trial, the judge ruled that certain evidence was barred because it pertained only to the statutorily-barred cause of action for breach of promise to marry: THE COURT: All of their plans and what they intended to do, there are certain things that are legitimate in your cause of action[,] but broken expectations of not getting married is an overbroad area of damages[,] which is what I alluded to yesterday. THE COURT: ... you can’t as an element of damage in those, get into what are essentially breach of promise to marry damages. [The cases] recognize ... a distinction in the type of damages. The intentional infliction of emotional distress, it’s fair game. The reaction to her when she finds out that she’s not legitimately married and that this is a sham or a fraud, completely fair game.

But I thought I would be married and have three kids and live on the Eastern Shore, those are the types of damages that that line of cases specifically says aren’t recoverable. [APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: I disagree with Your Honor. THE COURT: You may disagree but that’s my ruling. THE COURT: The statements of what things talked about when people are in an early dating relationship, none of that, I mean every divorce case has a breakdown of expectations based on what people talked about as their plans for their future. These cases recognize that those are not compensable elements of damages.

That, that the dismay, the destruction of her, you know, image of where she was, the breakdown afterwards when she finds out it’s a sham, those are what Vance and the other cases recognize are compensable. THE COURT: ... the fraud is when he says ... that his divorce is final and he marries her[,] and that’s a sham. Elements of damages from there[,] and her discovering[,] and the intentional infliction of emotional distress based on those things, fair game. But my life didn’t turn out the way ²⁶⁰ I thought it was with a man that when we said we’re going to do those things in dating, that’s a whole different thing and it’s not compensable. * * * THE COURT: I’m ruling that the representation that he made that was false and fraudulent was [‘]I’m divorced!’] That’s what you’ve shown.

There’s nothing to show that this other stuff was intent to defraud, in fact the witnesses say to the contrary, they were happy in love making these plans together. Accordingly, we hold that this is a rare situation in which the appellant did not raise the issue at trial, but it was nevertheless decided by the trial court. On that basis it was preserved for appellate review. 2 B. Standard of Review The appropriate standard of review is de novo, because the trial court decided that the misrepresentation claims were not barred under Maryland case law. See Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006) (“[W]here an order [of the trial court] involves an interpretation and application of Maryland ... case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.”).

C. Discussion The elements for negligent and intentional misrepresentation claims are well-established under Maryland law. ²⁶¹ “[A] cause of action for negligent misrepresentation exists where one relies on the statements of another who negligently volunteers an erroneous opinion, intending that it be acted upon; the defendant must either know or should know that loss or injury likely will result if the erroneous representation is acted upon.” Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 496 , 408 A.2d 728 (1979). The elements of the “cause of action in what is variously known as fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation” are: (1) [Tjhat a representation made by a party was false; (2) that either its falsity was known to that party or the misrepresentation was made with [] reckless indifference ...; (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding some other person; (4) that that person not only relied upon the misrepresentation but had the right to rely upon it with full belief of its truth, and that he would not have done the thing from which damage resulted if it had not been made; and (5) that that person suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresentation. B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 149 , 538 A.2d 1175 (1988) (citing Suburban Properties Mgmt. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460 , 204 A.2d 326 (1964)). False statements regarding marital status in a bigamy context are actionable as the tort of misrepresentation.

Varice, 286 Md. at 498-501 , 408 A.2d 728 (affirming judgment for negligent misrepresentation in bigamy case). Misrepresentation damages may include emotional and psychological distress. See id. at 498-501 , 408 A.2d 728 (holding that spontaneous crying, difficulty sleeping and socializing, and depression constituted damages resulting from misrepresentation). Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for a breach of a promise to marry.

See Md.Code Ann. (1984, 2009 Repl-Vol.), § 3-102(a) of the Family Law Article (“[ujnless the individual is pregnant, 3 an individual: (1) has no cause of action for breach of promise to marry....”). This prohibition ²⁶² bars “any claim predicated upon [a] defendant’s alleged failure to live up to his promises of marriage.” Miller v. Ratner, 114 Md.App. 18, 45 , 688 A.2d 976 (1997). The policy is to protect the “pure ‘change of mind’ case[s]” where a defendant promises to marry but later changes his mind and refuses to marry. Id. at 46, 688 A.2d 976 .

This Court, in Miller v. Ratner, contemplated the particular distinction between breach of