Brady v. State

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On June 23, 1980, the Court of Appeals reversed our September Term, 1978 unreported opinion, No. 1226, wherein we had affirmed the conviction of Willie Frederick Brady. The reversal appears to have been predicated upon our "refusing to apply the normal balancing test triggered by the presumption of prejudice,” and substituting therefore a "single factor” approach. Brady v. State, 288 Md. 61, 69 (1980), Sl.

Op. at 9. The case was remanded for us to apply the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). We are perplexed in that we thought we had. The length of delay we had found to be 14 months; the reasons for delay we had assessed entirely against the State weighed by its neglect (but neither purposefully, intentionally nor motivated by bad faith); the failure of the appellant to assert his right to a speedy trial we excused because, in this rather unique case appellant was not aware he was charged with the commission of the crime, and he asserted his right immediately upon being apprised of the charges against him.

In assessing prejudice we found that there was no "actual” prejudice averred, demonstrated or apparent. In light of the three interests identified in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532 , which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, viz-. "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”, any "presumed” prejudice we found to be "elusive” at best. There was neither incarceration nor could there have been anxiety or concern in the absence of knowledge.

As to the third — impairment of defense — we noted that the trial ⁵²⁰ judge had sought in vain for any suggestion that the defense had been impaired. " 'COURT: Alright, I have a question, Mr. Legum. Any other prejudice? MR.

LEGUM [appellant’s trial counsel]: Well, Your Honor, the