Braxton v. State

HOLLANDER, Judge. On April 30, 1996, Mark Williams and Charles Carroll were robbed in Baltimore City by two men; one robber brandished a .25 caliber handgun and the other wielded a .38 caliber weapon. After the robbers fled the scene, the victims informed a police officer of what had occurred. Later that evening, the police apprehended the robber who had allegedly carried the .38 caliber weapon.

Further investigation led the police to suspect that Arnold Braxton, appellant, was the robber who had used the .25 caliber firearm. Subsequently, Detective Alvin Gwynn obtained Braxton’s photograph and included it in a photo array that he displayed to Mr. Williams. After the victim identified appellant as one of the robbers, the detective obtained appellant’s address from his arrest record, and then procured a search warrant for that address: Apartment 203, 4310 Seminole Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. Several officers joined Detective Gwynn in executing the search warrant; the search led to the discovery of a .25 caliber weapon matching the description of one of the guns used in the robbery.

Ballistics tests also linked the weapon to the murder of Melvin Alexander, Jr., whose body was found in his car on April 26, 1996. Consequently, appellant was ⁶⁰⁹ charged with the armed robbery of Mr. Williams and Mr. Carroll, as well as the murder of Mr. Alexander. 1 The legality of the search warrant issued for appellant’s residence was a central issue below, as it is here. At a hearing held prior to the murder trial, the court (Alpert, J.) denied appellant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the search. Thereafter, at two successive jury trials commencing in July 1997 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of Mr. Alexander (“Trial I” or the “murder trial”), the armed robbery of Mr. Williams and Mr. Carroll (“Trial II” or the “robbery trial”), and related offenses. 2 At a joint sentencing hearing held on September 3, 1997, the court sentenced twenty-one year old Arnold Braxton to a total of life imprisonment plus 20 years. 3 Appellant timely noted his appeal in each case.

Although these appeals present a host of unrelated questions, we shall consider the appeals together, because they present identical ⁶¹⁰ challenges to the search warrant. 4 Braxton presents the following questions for our consideration, which we have condensed and reformulated: I. With respect to Trial I and Trial II, did the court err in denying the motion to suppress evidence recovered during the execution of the search warrant issued for appellant’s residence? A. Was the search warrant supported by probable cause? B. Even if the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, does the good faith exception apply? C. Was the affidavit tainted due to police misrepresentation regarding the witness’s identification in the photo array?

II

In Trial I, did the court err in permitting an expert witness to testify that the gun admitted into evidence met the statutory definition of a handgun under Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 36B?

III

In Trial I, did the court’s erroneous submission to the jury of the attempted carjacking charge improperly influence the jury with respect to the first degree murder charge?

IV

In Trial I, was the evidence sufficient to convict appellant of first degree premeditated murder? V. In Trial II, did the court improperly deny two unrelated motions for mistrial, each of which concerned objectionable testimony from two police officers?

VI

In Trial II, was the evidence sufficient to support the robbery conviction? ⁶¹¹ I. THE MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS A. Factual Summary With respect to both the murder and robbery trials, appellant moved to suppress the tangible evidence recovered during the search of Braxton’s residence, including a .25 caliber handgun recovered from under the pillow of the bed located in appellant’s bedroom. At the suppression hearing, appellant contended that the search was not based on probable cause, because the affidavit failed specifically to identify the subject premises as appellant’s residence, and it did not indicate how the police knew appellant resided at the particular premises. As the content of the warrant is critical to our resolution of the probable cause issue, we shall begin by setting forth the text of the affidavit appended to the search warrant application: 5 Persons/Premises to be Searched: Arnold Braxton, Jr. [6] M/B/10-31-75 BPI# 440-492, 4310 Seminole Ave. Apt.

A three story brick apartment building with the numbers 4310 affixed. Apt. 203 has a white door the numbers 203 on same. Property to be Seized: One mens [sic] leather Nautica Jacket, one Motorola Cellular phone w/ black case, one Pagenet Pager w/ black case and one chrome handgun .25 cal. As well as any other evidence related to the commission of the crime of robbery. ⁶¹² Your Affiant Det.

Alvin Gwynn has been a member of the Baltimore Police Department for seven years. During this tenure Your Affiant has worked in both uniformed and plainclothes capacities. Your Affiant has made over fifty arrest [sic] for felony offenses where handguns have been used and has written over fifty search and seizure warrants for various offenses. Your Affiant has received training in the area of robbery through roll call training as well as the Baltimore Area Robbery Conferences.

Your Affiant Does Attest to the following: On 30 April 1996 Mr. Mark Williams was standing in the 700 block of Kevin Road. While conversing with his friend Mr. Charles Carroll they were approached by two black males who produced handguns and demanded currency. Mr. Williams and Mr. Carroll complied giving the suspects a total of $40.00 currency. The suspects also took a Nautica jacket leather coat, motorola cellular phone and pager from Mr. Carroll.

Additionally, the suspects searched the vehicles of both Mr. Carroll and Mr. Williams, during which time Mr. Williams’ small children were in his vehicle. The suspects fled the scene on foot with the property. A uniformed officer on patrol was flagged down by Mr. Williams and Mr. Carroll and advised of the robbery which had just occurred. The officer spotted the suspects in the 1000 block of Kevin Rd.

A chase ensued and shots were exchanged between one of the suspects and the officer; the officer was injured as a result. After a lengthy standoff the suspect was apprehended and identified as Nathaniel Powell M/B/6-22-78. Further investigation by Your Affiant revealed the name of a possible second suspect in the robbery as Arnold Braxton M/B/10-31-75. A photograph of Mr. Braxton was obtained from the Baltimore City Identification Section and a photo array consisting of six photographs similar in nature was compiled.

The photo array was shown to Mr. Mark Williams who positively identified the photograph of Arnold Braxton, BPI# 4440492 as the individual who robbed him on 30 April 1996. A warrant was obtained for Mr. Braxton under warrant number 1B00130712. ⁶¹³ It is common for persons who have committed armed robberies to store the fruits of their crimes in the place of their residence as well as the weapons used to commit these offenses. It is for this reason that Your Affiant prays that a search and seizure warrant be issued for the above named persons and premises. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued: [Tjhere is nothing whatsoever in the affidavit that states why this particular premises was sought to be searched.

There’s nothing in there that indicates what the alleged connection is between Mr. Braxton and the premises at 4310 Seminole Avenue. I think they have to have something in the affidavit that indicates that this is, in fact, his premises and there’s nothing in the affidavit whatsoever to indicate that this is, in fact, Mr. Braxton’s premises. [I]t doesn’t say he lives there, Your Honor. What the affidavit says — it doesn’t say anywhere that he lives there. What the affidavit says about the premises is precisely this.

It says, “Person/premises to be searched: Arnold Braxton, Jr., M/B,” male/black, “10/31/75, BPI No. 440-492. 4310 Seminole Avenue, apartment, a three-story brick apartment building with the numbers 4310 affixed. Apartment 203 has a white door with the numbers 203 on same.” It doesn’t indicate in any way — that’s the one and only reference in this affidavit to that dwelling, to that address. But it does not say anywhere that this residence is, in fact, Mr. Braxton’s residence. It doesn’t say anywhere that this address is Mr. Braxton’s residence, I should say.

All it has is that conclusory statement about what people keep at their ⁶¹⁴ residences. As I say, the only reference to that address is in the heading where it says “persons to be searched,” “places to be seized.” It might be possible to infer from that, maybe, that that address is Mr. Braxton’s address since it’s under his name and his BPI number. It’s also possible to infer from that equally — it’s equally reasonable to infer from that simply that that is, in fact, the place to be searched and that it doesn’t necessarily have any connection with Mr. Braxton since what it says — it’s under the heading “persons/places to be searched.” We have a person, Mr. Braxton. We have a place, the address on Seminole Avenue.

Even if it said somewhere in the warrant that this is Mr. Braxton’s address, that still wouldn’t make the warrant— the affidavit any less deficient because the determination as to whether there’s probable cause to believe that this particular address is related to Mr. Braxton has to be made by the magistrate to whom the affidavit was presented and not by the police officer, the affiant presenting the affidavit. * ❖ ❖ It would have been easy enough if the police had that kind of information to have put in this affidavit that “These premises on Seminole Avenue are the residence of Arnold Braxton and that that is known to be true because we checked with the rental office. We went to that location and his name was on the mail box. We checked with gas and electric records and his name was on there,” or “We did surveillance. We saw him going in and out,” any one of a million different things.

None of that is in there. All the magistrate presented with this affidavit could do would be to speculate that, number one, these premises are, in fact, connected with Mr. Braxton and (b) that the police have some evidence that makes them think that the premises are connected with Mr. Braxton. There is nothing in here from which the magistrate could make an independent determination that proba ⁶¹⁵ ble cause existed connecting these premises with Mr. Braxton and, therefore, while there was probable cause to search the person of Mr. Braxton based on this affidavit, there was no probable cause to search the dwelling. The prosecutor responded that the affidavit described the premises with sufficient particularity and no “connection” had to be shown.

Moreover, based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the State argued that suppression was not required in any event, because the police officer had an objective, good faith belief that he had probable cause to conduct the search. The defense disagreed, but the matter of good faith was not pursued because the court expressly indicated that it was not relying on Leon . Thus, the trial court did not reach the merits of the good faith claim. Although the trial court agreed that the affidavit should have been “much more articulate,” it denied the motion to suppress.

The court reasoned: The Supreme Court [and] Maryland cases [have] spoken most convincingly about the preference for warrants, especially for the search of premises.... [T]hese are judges trained in the law and presumed to know the law. In reading the affidavit, on the first page, it is stated “Arnold Braxton, Jr.; premises, 4310 Seminole Avenue, Apartment 203.” I have no difficulty deciding that the judge that signed this search warrant inferred that this was the residence of Arnold Braxton, Jr. The judge making the decision that this should comply with the law must use some modicum of common sense. I mean, when you look at the address and when you look at the closing paragraph, it states, “It is common for persons who have committed armed robberies to store the fruits of their crimes in the place of their residence.” It defies common sense to hold that the judge did not infer that this was his residence and that’s the basis of my ruling. That’s my ruling.

Your motion is denied. ⁶¹⁶ In its ruling as to probable cause, it is apparent that the court considered only appellant’s contention that the warrant failed to indicate that the targeted premises was appellant’s residence. The court did not address appellant’s claim that the affidavit lacked a factual basis showing the reason for the affiant’s belief that appellant resided at the subject premises. After the court ruled on other matters, the State proceeded to trial in the homicide case. Following the murder trial, the State called the robbery case for trial.

Before commencement of that trial, appellant unsuccessfully renewed his motion to suppress the fruits of the search. In addition, the court heard testimony from Mr. Williams and Detective Gwynn regarding appellant’s motion to suppress the pretrial photographic identification on the ground that it was impermissibly suggestive. Braxton also argued for the first time that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was tainted, because Detective Gwynn misrepresented the character of Mr. Williams’s identification of appellant. As a result, the court heard additional testimony from Detective Gwynn.

The testimony of Detective Gwynn and Mr. Williams showed that Mr. Williams selected appellant’s photograph from a photographic array presented by Detective Gwynn. At that time, the victim stated: “[T]his is the individual. Looks very close to the guy that robbed me.” Detective Gwynn then wrote that statement, verbatim, on the back of the photograph of appellant, which Mr. Williams signed. Nevertheless, when Detective Gwynn prepared his affidavit for the search warrant, he did not quote the witness’s precise comments.

Instead, he characterized the identification in the following words: The photo array was shown to Mark Williams who positively identified the photograph of Arnold Braxton, BPI # 440492 as the individual who robbed him on April 30,1996. Detective Gwynn explained that identifications are ordinarily categorized as either positive or negative. Further, he explained that he considered the witness’s degree of confidence with respect to the identification when he stated in his ⁶¹⁷ affidavit that the witness made a “positive” identification. Detective Gwynn said: “[I]t’s a matter of semantics as far as the words are concerned....

If I would have had an inkling of doubt, then I would not have allowed [Mr. Williams] to sign the photo array.” After considering the detective’s testimony as to the taint issue, as well as the earlier testimony of the detective and the victim regarding the photo array, the judge ruled that the detective’s use of the words “positive identification” did not taint the affidavit. The judge reasoned: I do not find that the use of the word positive was untruthful. I think it is a question of semantics, and in a sense it meshes with the question of bad faith. I do not believe from what I’ve heard that Detective Gwynn used the word positive in order to induce the Judge that signed [the warrant] to issue the search warrant rather than using the words expressed on the back of the photograph because he thought those words were too weak.

It would not have been my choice of words, but I certainly do not believe that if he merely said identify, that that would have been a mistake in any way. Based on the evidence I have heard, he identified Mr. Braxton’s photograph. He saw him in court here today and he identified him. That’s, it’s outside of the scope of this motion, I realize that.

But Mr. Williams’ words, he chooses certain words. Detective Gwynn chooses certain words. I don’t think they were the best choice, but I really believe and do find that goes to the weight of the identification. Further to the extent it’s necessary, and I doubt that it is, I don’t find any bad faith on the part of the detective.

If the application for search and seizure warrant had come to me based on the information in the affidavit.... ⁶¹⁸ And it said that the photo array was shown to Mr. Mark Williams who stated that Mr. Braxton’s photograph looked very close to the guy that robbed me, I would have issued a search warrant. I would have found probable cause. I find no taint in the identification. Accordingly, the judge reaffirmed his ruling denying the motion to suppress the search warrant.

B. Discussion 1. Was the Search Warrant Supported by Probable Cause? 7 The overlapping issue in both the murder and robbery cases concerns the legality of the search warrant for appellant’s residence. Appellant posits that the warrant was not based on probable cause. because the supporting affidavit failed to specify that the targeted apartment actually was appellant’s residence. Even if the affidavit implied that the subject premises was appellant’s place of abode, Braxton contends that the affidavit was defective because it lacked any factual foundation to substantiate that assertion. 8 Specifically, Braxton complains that the affidavit was devoid of facts particularizing the basis for the affiant’s belief that the targeted ⁶¹⁹ premises was actually appellant’s residence.

Consequently, appellant insists that the trial court erred in failing to grant his suppression motion. The State counters that the common sense, non-technical review of affidavits commanded by both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals supports the trial judge’s decision. The State insists that the issuing judge could “clearly infer” from the affidavit that the premises named in the affidavit was the residence of appellant. Moreover, it characterizes appellant’s argument as “hypertechnical.” Relying on the recent case of State v. Ward, 350 Md. 372 , 712 A.2d 534 (1998), the State asserts: “ ‘Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.’ ” Id. at 376 , 712 A.2d 534 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)).

Our inquiry with respect to probable cause thus has two prongs. First, we must resolve whether the affidavit adequately identified the targeted premises as appellant’s residence. Second, even if the affidavit indicated that the subject premises was appellant’s residence, we must decide whether it was nonetheless legally deficient because it failed to articulate any facts demonstrating that appellant lived at the targeted premises. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), proscribes the issuance of any warrant “but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST, amend IV.

To be sure, “[a] judicially authorized warrant is the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment....” Wiegmann v. State, 118 Md.App. 317, 347 , 702 A.2d 928 (1997), aff'd, 350 Md. 585 , 714 A.2d 841 (1998). “Article 26 of the Maryland Constitution is in pari materia with the Fourth ⁶²⁰ Amendment.” Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 700 , 566 A.2d 488 (1989) (citations omitted). Accordingly, absent certain exceptions not applicable here, the police must obtain a search warrant before conducting a search; that warrant must be based upon “sufficient probable cause to justify its issuance as to each person or place named therein.” Ward, 350 Md. at 387 , 712 A.2d 534 (quoting People v. Easley, 34 Cal.3d 858 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 671 P.2d 813 (1983), aff'd on reh’g, 46 Cal.3d 712 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 759 P.2d 490 (1988)); see Connelly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 726 , 589 A.2d 958 (1991). Probable cause is defined as a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); see State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 326 , 624 A.2d 492 (1993); Birchead, 317 Md. at 700 , 566 A.2d 488 . The Supreme Court has long recognized that common sense must guide a judge who is asked to grant a warrant request.

In United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 108 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , the Supreme Court said: If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants ... must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense [sic] and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.

More recently, in the seminal case of Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 , the Supreme Court reiterated that “the central teaching of [its] decisions bearing on the probable-cause standard is that it is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception.’ ” Id. at 231 , 103 S.Ct. ⁶²¹ 2317 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). Thus, the issuing judge is simply [making] a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 . Adhering to the preference for a practical approach, the Court of Appeals has advised that in reviewing affidavits on a probable cause determination, “when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense [sic], manner.

Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Valdez v. State, 300 Md. 160, 169 , 476 A.2d 1162 (1984) (quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109 , 85 S.Ct. 741 ) (citations omitted). In determining whether probable cause exists, “the issuing judge is confined to the averments contained in the search warrant application.” Birchead, 317 Md. at 700 , 566 A.2d 488 (citations omitted). Moreover, wholly conclusory statements in a warrant application ordinarily will not suffice. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 , 54 S.Ct. 11 , 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)).

To effectuate the preference for warrants, however, great deference is accorded to the issuing judge’s determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; see McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467 , 701 A.2d 675 (1997), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1173 , 140 L.Ed.2d 182 (1998); Connelly, 322 Md. at 727 , 589 A.2d 958 ; Birchead , 317 Md. at ⁶²² 701, 566 A.2d 488 . Nevertheless, the issuing judge should not function as a mere “ ‘rubber stamp for the police.’ ” Grimm v. State, 7 Md.App. 491, 493 , 256 A.2d 333 (1969) (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 ). To the contrary, there are limits “beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant”, Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , and “[djeference to the magistrate ... is not boundless.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

Thus, even a generous, non-technical review of a warrant cannot be used to scuttle the protections of the Fourth Amendment. As the reviewing court, our task is “ ‘to make a practical common-sense decision whether probable cause exists.’ ” McDonald, 347 Md. at 467 , 701 A.2d 675 (quoting Birchead, 317 Md. at 701 , 566 A.2d 488 ). This means that we must determine if the judge who issued the search warrant had “a substantial basis for concluding that the evidence sought would be discovered in the place described in the application and its affidavit.” Lee, 330 Md. at 326 , 624 A.2d 492 ; see Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 , 104 S.Ct. 2085 , 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (reiterating that “the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable-cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant”); McDonald, 347 Md. at 467 , 701 A.2d 675 ; Birchead, 317 Md. at 701 , 566 A.2d 488 ; State v. Amerman, 84 Md.App. 461, 471 , 581 A.2d 19 (1990). Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 551(a) is also relevant.

It provides that a judge may issue a search warrant if the supporting affidavit shows the basis for probable cause. Further, it requires that the search warrant “describe, with reasonable particularity, ... the grounds for such search” of a particular premises. Art. 27 § 551(a). In this case, it is clear that the affiant did not specifically identify the targeted premises as appellant’s residence.

Using a common sense, non-technical, and generous construction of the affidavit, however, we are satisfied that it was reasonable ⁶²³ to infer from the affidavit that appellant lived in Apartment 203 at 4310 Seminole Avenue. First, the affidavit identified that address immediately after appellant’s name and date of birth. Second, the affiant posited that “[i]t is common for persons who have committed armed robberies to store the fruits of their crimes [and their weapons] in the place of their residence____ It is for this reason that Your Affiant prays that a search and seizure warrant be issued for the above named persons and premises.” That particular statement, when coupled with the address mentioned at the outset of the affidavit in conjunction with appellant’s name and date of birth, reasonably implied that the affiant sought a warrant for 4310 Seminole Avenue because appellant resided there. In that way, the affidavit also showed a connection between appellant and the targeted address.

It is equally apparent, however, that the affidavit failed to include any facts demonstrating the basis for the affiant’s belief that appellant lived at 4310 Seminole Avenue. The question we must answer is whether a police officer’s mere assertion as to the suspect’s place of occupancy is, standing alone, sufficient to permit a search of that location. In the context of these appeals, we must determine whether the warrant was supported by probable cause even though the affidavit did not contain any factual foundation for the officer’s conclusory assertion as to Braxton’s place of residence. In their discussions of the probable cause issue, neither party has provided us with any decisional law that elucidates the issue that we grapple with here.

In our research, we have not uncovered any Maryland cases directly on point, but we have found a handful of cases from other jurisdictions that have considered the issue, largely in the context of the good faith exception. We pause to consider one of the cases at this juncture, and we shall discuss others in the context of good faith. In United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137 (9th Cir.1988), the court considered the legality of a search warrant for which the supporting affidavit failed to connect the suspect to the target ⁶²⁴ ed premises. The appellant, Kimberly Hove, was suspected of sending threatening letters to her ex-husband.

Id. at 138 . An investigation led the police to 2727 DeAnza Road, the residence of appellant’s father and the place where the suspect was temporarily living. Id. at 139 . There, a police officer observed toys in the DeAnza yard and a car in the parking lot; the toys were identified as those of the suspect’s child and the car was the suspect’s.

Id. When the affidavit was prepared, however, the law enforcement officer’s observations were inadvertently omitted. Id. Although the exact text of the affidavit is not included in the court’s opinion, it appears that the affidavit set forth ample facts implicating Ms. Hove in criminal wrongdoing.

Nevertheless, the affidavit “never linked Kimberly Hove or any suspected criminal activity in any way with the 2727 DeAnza residence.” Id. The court observed that the error went unnoticed by the prosecutor who reviewed the affidavit and the magistrate who ultimately approved the search warrant request. Id. A panel of the Ninth Circuit, dividing two to one, concluded that the search warrant was not based on probable cause, because the affidavit “simply lists the DeAnza address as a location to be searched.” Id. at 140 .

Moreover, “the affidavit ... did not explain the significance or relevance of searching this particular location,” id. at 139 , nor did it offer any “hint as to why the police wanted to search this residence.” Id. at 139-40 . In reaching its decision, the court focused on the affidavit’s failure to “link” the targeted location to Ms. Hove, and its failure to provide “an explanation of why the police believed they may find incriminating evidence there.” Id. at 140 . The court said: “It is critical to a showing of probable cause that the affidavit state facts sufficient to justify a conclusion that evidence ... will probably be found at the premises to be searched.” Id. While Hove is facially similar to this case, it is also factually distinguishable in a subtle but important respect.

The affidavit in Hove merely recited the targeted address, while the ⁶²⁵ affidavit here recited the address and also impliedly identified the address as appellant’s residence. To that extent, the affidavit here linked appellant to the subject premises. In addition, the Hove affidavit omitted any explanation as to why the police believed they would recover evidence from the subject premises. In this case, the affiant asserted generally that robbers often store fruits and instrumentalities of crime at their places of occupancy.

What the affidavit here did not do is explain why the police believed the particular premises was appellant’s residence. Whatever the differences between Hove and the case sub juAice, Hove clearly suggests to us that this case does not concern a mere technical glitch. Moreover, in our view, this case is not governed by those in which courts have upheld search warrants in the face of rather conclusory assertions that fruits and instrumentalities of crime are ordinarily kept in a suspect’s residence or car. See, e.g., Ward, 350 Md. 372 , 712 A.2d 534 ; Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 280 , 363 A.2d 491 (1976)(upholding search of suspect’s residence when weapon was not found on suspect at time of arrest; the residence “was a probable place for secreting [weapon used in commission of crime].”); United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727 (4th Cir.l988)(finding probable cause because one could reasonably infer that such evidence would be hidden at suspect’s home); United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.l983)(holding it reasonable for magistrate to conclude that articles of clothing could be found at suspect’s residence); United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.l975)(concluding that people who own weapons generally keep them at home); United States v. Rahn, 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.)(finding it reasonable to assume that individuals store their weapons at home),cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 , 96 S.Ct. 41 , 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975).

The distinction between this case and the ones we have just mentioned cannot be overlooked; the affidavits in the cases cited above provided a factual basis showing how the suspects were connected to the places that were the objects of the searches. We turn to consider the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Ward, 350 Md. 372 , 712 A.2d 534 . There, the ⁶²⁶ affidavit appended to the search warrant application did not include specific information connecting the particular items sought to be recovered with the places to be searched. In analyzing the legality of the search warrant, the Court focused on the items sought to be seized, and whether the affidavit adequately connected them to the targeted premises.

The Court did not address the sufficiency of the link between the suspect and the places to be searched, however, because the affiant articulated a factual basis connecting the suspect to the places to be searched. The affiant averred: “ ‘The suspect Gary Ward gave the address of 163k Darley Ave as his home address [when he was questioned by the Homicide Unit], The vehicle a 1983 Olds Cutless Maryland Tag ZWH075 is listed to Mr. Ward at the 163k Darley Ave address.’” Ward, 350 Md. at 375 n. 2, 712 A.2d 534 (emphasis added). The affidavit also set forth a clear factual basis linking the suspect to a murder. The affiant in Ward then averred: ‘“Your affiant believes that probable cause exists to believe that there is evidence relating to the crime of Murder being stored at 1634 Darley Ave and the 1983 Olds Cutless Maryland Tag # ZWH-075.’ ” Id.

It was that assertion that was the centerpiece of the dispute regarding probable cause. Dividing four to three, the Court upheld the search warrant. The majority found a sufficient nexus between the murder weapon and the places to be searched (the suspect’s residence and car) when it considered the reasonable inferences that it believed the magistrate was entitled to draw from the facts that were alleged. Id. at 377-78 , 712 A.2d 534 .

Yet even the majority conceded that it was “not a clear cut case and, obviously, it would have been much more helpful had the affidavit contained more detail.” Id. at 389 , 712 A.2d 534 . Writing for the majority, Judge Rodowsky explained: It is self evident that the murder weapon was not found at the crime scene. The fact that the first of the witnesses who telephoned the police would not identify themselves is significant. These witnesses knew Ward by sight and name.

There was no information from any caller that the murderer was a ⁶²⁷ person other than Ward ... [who] had an arrest record that included two or more handgun “[violations.” All of this information permitted the magistrate to infer that these witnesses were unwilling to identify themselves because they feared Ward. The affidavit described Ward, not in terms but in reasonable inference, as a person to whom a handgun and ammunition are items of utility and value. Consequently, the magistrate could infer a reasonable probability that, between the murder and the application for the warrant, Ward had not disposed of the murder weapon ... The magistrate could further infer that the weapon was not on Ward’s person when he was brought in for questioning less than forty-eight hours after the murder ... [T]he police were still looking for the murder weapon when they applied for the warrant.

Apparently Ward was accosted when he was in or about his automobile, inasmuch as the police towed that automobile to headquarters while Ward was transported to headquarters by other means. Thus, the weapon was not in plain view in Ward’s automobile when the police towed it. [T]he magistrate had probable cause to believe that the murder weapon and associated evidence of the crime ... could be found in Ward’s home and/or in his automobile Id. at 877, 712 A.2d 534 . Arguably, the affidavit here did not adequately particularize the fruits and instrumentalities or connect them to appellant’s residence. As appellant has not challenged the affidavit on that basis, however, that issue is not before us.

Instead, appellant attacks the affidavit on the ground that it only contained a “bare bones” assertion that the subject premises was appellant’s residence, and it failed altogether to include any facts demonstrating why the affiant believed that appellant resided at the targeted premises. In our view, this case is also unlike those that have upheld search warrants, notwithstanding the alleged “staleness” of the probable cause. See, e.g., Connelly, 322 Md. 719 , 589 A.2d ⁶²⁸ 958; Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309 , 379 A.2d 164 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 945 , 98 S.Ct. 1528 , 55 L.Ed.2d 542 (1978); State v. Edwards, 266 Md. 515 , 295 A.2d 465 (1972). Relying on Edwards , the Peterson Court determined that, without regard to time, an affidavit in support of a warrant request may nonetheless indicate “a present violation.” Peterson, 281 Md. at 316 , 379 A.2d 164 .

Later, in Connelly , which concerned an illegal lottery and staleness gambling operation, the appellant urged the Court to reject the application of the good faith exception under Leon , on staleness grounds, because the affidavit and application for search warrant were made in November 1988, based on events that had occurred in February 1988. Moreover, the affidavit failed to include the dates of the observations. In analyzing good faith, the Court accepted the determination that the warrant was not based on probable cause. The Court considered the staleness issue in the context of whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal, notwithstanding the approval of the warrant request.

It observed that there is no requirement “that the facts alleged in the application to establish probable cause must result from observations made within any particular time before the issuance of the warrant.” Connelly, 322 Md. at 731 , 589 A.2d 958 (citing Peterson, 281 Md. at 315 , 379 A.2d 164 ). Discussing both Edwards and Peterson , the Connelly Court also recognized that the “ ‘passage of time’ ” is not always dispositive, because an affidavit may set forth “ ‘facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature____’ ” Id. at 731 , 589 A.2d 958 (quoting Peterson, 281 Md. at 318 , 379 A.2d 164 ). Thus, “the failure of the affidavit to state the time of the events relied upon to show probable cause is not conclusive.... ” Id. In contrast to the staleness cases, the deficiency that is of concern here is not one that can be cured even when the affidavit is “taken as a whole.” Peterson, 281 Md. at 321 , 379 A.2d 164 .

Furthermore, the pertinent factors to assess staleness, delineated in Peterson and reiterated in Connelly , have no application here. These include “whether the criminal ⁶²⁹ activity was regenerating, the criminal entrenched, and the thing to be seized, while easily transferable, was just as easily replaced.” Connelly, 322 Md. at 732 , 589 A.2d 958 . As we see it, the affidavit in this case is akin to one that fully describes the commission of a crime, but then baldly asserts that the suspect committed the offense, without including any facts showing the basis for that conclusion. See Collins v. State, 17 Md.App. 376, 382 , 302 A.2d 693 (1973).

Manifestly, an affidavit that accuses a suspect of a crime without including the facts supporting that assertion would not demonstrate probable cause to arrest the suspect. Id. at 383 , 302 A.2d 693 . Similarly, an affidavit supporting a search warrant request must show some basis for the belief that the suspect occupies or is otherwise connected to the targeted premises. This is because “probable cause must be shown on the basis of facts rather than mere conclusions.” W.R. La-fave, 2 Search and Seizure § 3.2.(d), at 57 (3rd ed.1996); see Connelly, 322 Md. at 726 , 589 A.2d 958 (stating that “the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing sufficient to comprise probable cause”).

Thus, “[s]uffieient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his actions cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 . In construing the affidavit here, the issuing judge first had to infer that the targeted premises was appellant’s residence, based on the street address on the face of the affidavit, coupled with the general assertion that criminals typically store fruits and instrumentalities of crime in their residences. Yet the affidavit contained absolutely no clue as to why the police believed appellant lived at the particular location identified in the affidavit and warrant application; the affidavit failed to provide a factual basis for the claim that the targeted premises was the suspect’s residence. Thus, it did not guard against an unfounded intrusion into one’s sanctuary.

As the State candidly conceded at oral argument, we may not uphold a warrant merely because the premises turned out to be the ⁶³⁰ suspect’s home. In other words, the ends cannot justify the means. Accordingly, we hold that the mere identification in the affidavit of appellant’s address, without even a single predicate fact showing the basis for the belief that appellant resided at that address, did not establish probable cause to search that location. This is so even if there was otherwise every reason to believe that appellant committed the armed robbery and harbored the fruits and instrumentalities wherever he may have lived.

Cf. State v. Lee, supra, 330 Md. at 327 , 624 A.2d 492 (stating “the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant clearly remain relevant to a probable cause determination”) (emphasis added). What Chief Judge Bell said in his dissent in Ward resonates here: [P]robable cause does not equate to speculation, suspicion, a hunch, or gut-feeling; rather, it is a test of reasonable probabilities based upon the specific facts and information set forth in the warrant ... “[i]f there is one bright star in the Fourth Amendment heaven, it is that probable cause must be shown on the basis of facts rather than mere conclusions.” Ward, 350 Md. at 396 , 712 A.2d 534 (Bell, J., dissenting) (quoting LaFave, supra, § 3.2(d) at 57); see also Lee, 330 Md. at 326 , 624 A.2d 492 . Given the urgency that is often associated with matters such as this one, we acknowledge that a police officer cannot always prepare the kind of detailed statement that would serve as a textbook example of a model affidavit.

But the quantum of facts needed to show the connection between the suspect and the purported place of occupancy is hardly daunting. Typically, an affidavit includes an averment tying the suspect to the targeted location on the basis of surveillance, a check of utility records, verification with a landlord, an address from the phone book, or the like. Were we to uphold the finding of probable cause in this case, we would cast a long shadow over the Fourth Amendment. To affirm the trial judge’s finding of probable cause, ⁶³¹ we would have to determine that so long as a street address is specified in the affidavit as the place of residence, that makes it so.

Apart from the advantage of hindsight, there is nothing in this affidavit that demonstrated any basis for the belief that appellant resided at 4310 Seminole Avenue. Therefore, we conclude that the affidavit did not comport with the Fourth Amendment’s hallmark objective of protecting our citizenry from unreasonable, arbitrary, governmental intrusion. 2. Does Good Faith Save This Search Warrant? Our conclusion that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause does not end our inquiry.

We must next determine whether the tangible evidence recovered during the search was nevertheless admissible because the “executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on the warrant.” McDonald, 347 Md. at 467 , 701 A.2d 675 ; see Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); Connelly, 322 Md. at 729 , 589 A.2d 958 . At the motion hearing, the State advanced a good faith claim based on Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , as an alternative ground to uphold the search warrant. Because the trial court found probable cause, however, it declined to consider the good faith issue. Therefore, no evidence was ever presented below as to the matter.

Surprisingly, on appeal, the State has not renewed the good faith contention that it asserted below. In State v. Lee, supra, 330 Md. 320 , 624 A.2d 492 , the Court deemed waived the question of the good faith exception with respect to evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant, because the State did not raise the issue on appeal. Id. at 327 n. 1, 624 A.2d 492 . The Lee Court did not indicate whether, as in this case, the good faith doctrine was invoked below.

Even though the trial court did not reach the merits of the good faith claim, we would be able to consider the good faith claim if it were raised on appeal. This is because the question of good faith is a legal one. McDonald, 347 Md. at ⁶³² 470 n. 10. In Connelly, supra, 322 Md. 719 , 589 A.2d 958 , the Court recognized that because the “application of the good faith exception to the allegations of the affidavit presents an objectively ascertainable question, it is for the appellate court to decide whether the affidavit was sufficient to support the requisite belief that the warrant was valid.” 9 Id. at 735 , 589 A.2d 958 ; see State v. Darden, 93 Md.App. 373, 397 , 612 A.2d 339 , cert. denied, 328 Md. 447 , 614 A.2d 974 , and cert. denied, 508 U.S. 957 , 113 S.Ct. 2459 , 124 L.Ed.2d 673 (1992).

Accordingly, when the record does not contain a finding as to the good faith question, “we are confined to the language of the affidavit in reviewing the applicability of the good faith exception.” Darden, 93 Md.App. at 397 , 612 A.2d 339 . Notwithstanding the State’s failure to renew its good faith claim, we are satisfied that, in our discretion, we may consider it. Maryland Rule 8-131(a) confers discretion upon the appellate courts to decide issues raised on appeal but not raised below. It also seems to extend to circumstances when the parties have not even raised the issue on appeal.

The rule provides, in pertinent part: Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal. There are a number of examples of cases in which our appellate courts have resolved an appeal on the basis of a legal issue that was never raised by the parties. Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439 , 463 A.2d 819 (1983), is instructive. There, the appellant, a scientist, was convicted of failing ⁶³³ to provide proper veterinary care to six monkeys during the course of his research.

Upon reviewing the convictions, the Court concluded that Maryland’s animal cruelty statute did not apply to a facility conducting medical research pursuant to a federal program. In reaching that conclusion, the Court acknowledged that its decision was based on an issue that was not raised by the parties. It was, however, discussed at oral argument. Id. at 441 , 463 A.2d 819 .

Relying on what was then Md. Rule 813, the Court acknowledged that it occasionally decides cases on the basis of issues “not raised previously.” Id. It reasoned: “Because our conclusion as to this issue is completely dispositive of the case, we shall consider it.” Id. at 442 , 463 A.2d 819 . That an issue was discussed at oral argument, even though not raised by the parties on appeal, was also significant in Meyer v. Gyro Transport Systems, Inc., 263 Md. 518 , 283 A.2d 608 (1971). There, in resolving a question concerning attorney’s fees, the Court recognized that a particular legal point had not been raised either below or in the appellate briefs.

Nevertheless, because the Court raised the matter during oral argument, it did “not deem it to have been waived.” Id. at 533 , 283 A.2d 608 . Pope v. Board of School Com’rs, 106 Md.App. 578 , 665 A.2d 713 , cert. denied, 342 Md. 116 , 673 A.2d 707 (1996), also provides authority for an appellate court to consider an issue that has not been raised by the litigants, based on the seminal principle that an appellate court may affirm the trial court “if it reached the right result for the wrong reasons.” Id. at 591, 665 A.2d 713 ; see also State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178 , 638 A.2d 107 (1994); Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498 , 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 , 100 S.Ct. 680 , 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). We expressly said in Pope that an appellate court may uphold the lower court even by considering a ground that the circuit court did not rely upon “or one that the parties have not raised.” Pope, 106 Md.App. at 591 , 665 A.2d 713 . In this case, we raised the matter of good faith at oral argument in regard to the robbery case; the parties waived ⁶³⁴ argument as to the murder case.

Moreover, good faith was clearly raised, though not decided, in the lower court. In addition, given our determination that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, consideration of the issue of good faith may yet result in a conclusion that the trial court reached “the right result for the wrong reasons.” Pope, 106 Md.App. at 591 , 665 A.2d 713 . Therefore, we shall exercise the discretion conferred upon us by Rule 8-131(a) and consider the legal question of whether the good faith exception is applicable. The good faith exception was first announced in 1984 in United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , and the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 .

Leon modified the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule by providing for the admissibility of “evidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid ... if the executing officers acted in objective good faith with reasonable reliance on [a facially valid] warrant.” McDonald, 347 Md. at 467 , 701 A.2d 675 (citations omitted); see Connelly, 322 Md. at 721 , 589 A.2d 958 . Notwithstanding the importance of the exclusionary rule to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court determined that “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ; McDonald, 347 Md. at 468 , 701 A.2d 675 . In Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989-90 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , the Court added: “[W]e refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him ... that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.” To be sure, Leon made clear that there are circumstances when exclusion of evidence remains the appropriate sanction, even if an officer “has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 . This is because “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination ... must be objectively reasonable, and it ⁶³⁵ is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” Id. at 922-23 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The Leon Court recognized four situations when the sanction of exclusion is an appropriate remedy. Two of them may be applicable here. The Supreme Court indicated that an officer does not “manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 923 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citations omitted). Further, the Court said that executing officers cannot reasonably presume that a warrant is valid if it is “so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized .... ” Id.

As a corollary, we note that mere presentation of a warrant to a judicial officer does not necessarily protect a police officer from civil liability. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Malley is illuminating in regard to its analysis of Leon . It is also instructive in understanding what is required of a police officer who prepares an affidavit for a warrant.

In Malley , a state judge signed arrest warrants presented by a State trooper. Id. at 338 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 . After the grand jury failed to return indictments, the arrestees brought suit in federal court, alleging that the trooper violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution when he applied for the arrest warrants. Id.

The Supreme Court determined that the objective reasonableness standard enunciated in Leon applies when an officer’s request for a warrant results in an unconstitutional arrest and a subsequent damages action instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Id. at 344, 106 S.Ct. 1092 . It reasoned that a qualified immunity defense adequately protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” id. at 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , and it gives “ample room for mistaken judgments.” Id. at 343 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 . On the ⁶³⁶ other hand, if “the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable”, then no immunity is available.

Id. at 344-45 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 . The Court further explained that police officers “will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Id. at 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 . Significantly, the Malley Court squarely rejected the contention that so long as the officer believes that the facts alleged in the affidavit are true, and presents the warrant application to a judicial officer, “the act of applying for a warrant is per se objectively reasonable,” id. at 345 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , thereby shielding the officer from liability. The Court characterized such an argument as an effort to “excuse [the officer’s] own default by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.” Id. at 346 n. 9, 106 S.Ct. 1092 .

Recognizing that the important “question ... is whether a reasonably well-trained officer ... would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant,” id. at 345 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , the Court reasoned that a police officer ultimately is responsible for his or her own actions, regardless of the error of a magistrate in approving the warrant request. The Malley Court explained: It is true that in an ideal system an unreasonable request for a warrant would be harmless, because no judge would approve it. But ours is not an ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should. We find it reasonable to require the officer applying for the warrant to minimize this danger by exercising reasonable professional judgment.

Id. at 345-46 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 . The Court further stated: “[A] damages remedy for an arrest following an objectively unreasonable request for a warrant imposes a cost directly on the officer responsible for the unreasonable request____” Id. at 344 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 . ⁶³⁷ In Minor v. State, 334 Md. 707 , 641 A.2d 214 (1994), the Court of Appeals relied on both Malley and Leon in its consideration of the good faith exception. It recognized that “the question is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known ‘that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause....”’ Id. at 715, 641 A.2d 214 (citation omitted). As the Minor Court explained, it is not a matter of a police officer’s “second guess[ing]” the judge.

Id. Rather, the officer has a duty “to withhold from presentation an application for a warrant that a well-trained officer would know failed to establish probable cause.” Id. Accordingly, notwithstanding “authorization” from a judge to conduct a search, good faith does not apply if a “reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal.... ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 . It is also noteworthy that when, as here, many officers actually participated in the search, but not all participated in obtaining the warrant, the search cannot be upheld merely because some of the officers who executed the warrant had no knowledge of its legal deficiencies.

The objective reasonableness test is applied only to the officers who actually procured the warrant; it is measured as of the time of the warrant application. LaFave, supra, 1 Search and Seizure § 1.3(f), at 90. As LaFave points out, “ “when the Court speaks of the good faith of the police, it is talking about their good faith before going to the magistrate and not about their good faith after they have received the warrant____’” Id. n. 115 (quoting Bradley, “The Good Faith Exception” Cases: Reasonable Exercise in Futility, 60 Ind. L.J. 287 , 297 (1985)).

LaFave notes: Were it otherwise, an officer or agency possessed of facts insufficient to establish probable cause could circumvent the Fourth Amendment by the simple device of directing or asking some other officer or agency to make the arrest and search. LaFave, § 3.5(b) at 255-56. With these principles in mind, we turn to explore the undergirding question of whether a reasonably well-trained ⁶³⁸ officer would have known that the affidavit in issue here was legally deficient because it did not include any facts to show that the targeted premises was appellant’s residence. We pause to ascertain what is meant by the phrase “a reasonably well-trained officer.” In United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.1986), the Ninth Circuit recognized that a reasonably well-trained officer is required to know “well-established current law.” Similarly, in United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 , 106 S.Ct. 153 , 88 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), the Court suggested that a reasonably well-trained officer would be aware of relevant court decisions.

In much the same way, in his dissent in Minor , Chief Judge Bell posited, inter alia, that such an officer is “chargeable ... with knowing what the Fourth Amendment prohibits: both unreasonable searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants except on probable cause.” Minor, 334 Md. at 724 , 641 A.2d 214 (Bell, J., dissenting). He also suggested that a reasonably well-trained police officer must know that wholly conclusory assertions in an affidavit are insufficient to constitute probable cause. Id. at 725 , 641 A.2d 214 . We do not quarrel with any of these descriptions of a reasonably well-trained police officer.

In light of these concepts, we next consider whether a reasonably well-trained police officer would know that an affidavit in support of a search warrant application must contain a factual foundation to support an assertion that the suspect occupies or is otherwise connected to the targeted premises. As we noted earlier, we have found only a few cases that discuss the question of whether an affidavit must show such a factual predicate. Arguably, the lack of decisional law suggests that it is elementary that an affidavit must contain the requisite factual foundation, and therefore only a few reported cases have considered such a rudimentary concept. Stated otherwise, even a rookie officer would know that, to justify the search of a suspect’s residence, an affidavit must set forth some factual basis showing that the suspect resides at the purported residence.

Conversely, the decisional void ⁶³⁹ might support the view that even a well-trained officer would not know that an affidavit must include a factual basis demonstrating how the suspect is connected to the targeted premises. The case of United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21 (1st Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 1008 , 136 L.Ed.2d 886 (1997), is particularly helpful in our analysis of the issue we confront. There, three defendants were convicted of various offenses arising out of the armed robbery of an armored truck, in which $1.2 million in cash was stolen. On appeal, two of the defendants complained, inter alia, about the search of one defendant’s residence at 81 Intervale Street in Brockton, Massachusetts, because the police had erroneously obtained a search warrant for 79 Intervale Road.

Id. at 28. When the police went to the address indicated in the warrant, they discovered that it was incorrect. Id. As a result, a federal agent on the scene asked another agent to prepare a new warrant application for the correct address.

Id. In the second affidavit, the affiant indicated that she had talked to the agent on the scene, who was at the suspect’s address at 81 Intervale, and she was advised that “the correct address for [the defendant’s] residence was 81 Intervale Road, Brockton, MA. rather than 79 Intervale Road as listed in the original application and warrant.” Id. Nevertheless, the warrant application failed to include any specific information as to the correct address, even though, through surveillance, the agent at the scene saw the suspect in an apartment at 81 Intervale. The First Circuit noted that “the only omission was the failure to explain how the agent — who had ample basis for the contention — knew that ’81 Intervale’ was ‘[the suspect’s] address.’ ” Id.

Because the deficiency in the Procopio affidavit is comparable to the flaw in the affidavit here, what the First Circuit said is particularly pertinent: The focus in a warrant application is usually on whether the suspect committed a crime and whether evidence of the crime is to be found at his home or business. That hardly makes the address unimportant; to invade the wrong location is a serious matter. But so long as the affidavit itself ⁶⁴⁰ asserts a link between the suspect and the address, it is easy to understand how both the officer applying for the warrant and the magistrate might overlook a lack of detail on a point often established by the telephone book or the name on the mailbox. Procopio, 88 F.3d at 28 .

Notwithstanding the factual omission, the Procopio court concluded that the good faith exception applied, because the defect was “hardly blatant” and there was no suggestion of bad faith. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court observed that the agent on the scene advised that he was at the suspect’s address at 81 Intervale. “Thus, the affidavit included the agent’s assertion that the address to be searched (81 Intervale) was that of the suspect ... as to whom probable cause had been shown.” Id. The case of United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908 , 108 S.Ct. 1084 , 99 L.Ed.2d 243 (1988), is also instructive, because the content of the disputed affidavit there is comparable to the one at issue here.

The defendant in Brown challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, complaining that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to search because it failed to indicate “how the police knew that the Westminster Apartment was truly one of [the defendant’s] addresses.” Brown, 832 F.2d at 994 . On its face, the affidavit listed the defendant as the lessee, but the Seventh Circuit agreed that it was deficient because it failed to reveal how the police knew that the defendant was the lessee of the targeted address. Id. at 995 . The court acknowledged that if the “affidavit had shown that this address was truly [the defendant’s] and had been one of his mail-drops, there of course would have been probable cause.” Id. at 994 .

Notwithstanding the lack of probable cause, however, the court concluded that the police officers reasonably relied on the warrant. Id. at 995-96 . Thus, it held that the good faith exception applied. In reaching that decision, the court considered, inter alia, that the affidavit incorporated an earlier, exhaustive affidavit that had been offered in connection with a search warrant for a different ⁶⁴¹ location.

Id. at 995 . Moreover, there was no evidence that the magistrate had been purposefully misled by the police. 10 Id. State v. Varnado, 675 So.2d 268 (La.1996), is also noteworthy. There, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant, because the affidavit failed to indicate that the targeted location was actually the defendant’s residence.

The defendant also complained that the warrant application did not provide a specific factual basis linking the residence to the items sought in the search. The Vamado court recognized that the police had probable cause to search the defendant’s residence. But, sounding a now familiar chord, the court found “a critical omission in the warrant application,” because it failed “to identify the targeted premises as the defendant’s residence.” Id. at 270 . Nonetheless, because the exclusionary rule is intended to deter police misconduct, not to punish the mistakes of judges, the court concluded that, “under the particular circumstances of this case, application of the exclusionary rule would serve no remedial purpose.” Id.

The court reasoned that “[t]he officer had no apparent purpose for omitting the information linking the defendant to the residence ....” Id. at 271 . Indeed, the court believed that another officer in the same position “would not have noticed the defect .... ” Id.