Brewer v. Brewer

KRAUSER, Judge. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted appel-lee, Gretchen K. Brewer, an absolute divorce from appellant, Lawrence J. Brewer, Jr. It then divided the parties’ assets, awarded Mrs. Brewer indefinite alimony, and granted her a monetary award—all to the parties’ mutual dissatisfaction. Indeed, the only action taken by the court of which the parties appear to approve was the grant of the divorce itself. And their cross appeals reflect their displeasure.

In his appeal, Mr. Brewer challenges the trial court’s award of indefinite alimony, its grant of a monetary award, and various aspects of the court’s division of the parties’ property. His challenges are contained in four questions he presents for our review. Stripped of argument and reworded, they are: 1 I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding indefinite alimony of $1,500.00 per month to Mrs. Brewer?

II

Did the trial court err in granting Mrs. Brewer a monetary award of $175,000.00? ⁸⁴ III. Did the trial court err in failing to decree Mr. Brewer’s ownership interest in the furniture that he inherited from his parents and in failing to order Mrs. Brewer to return that property to Mr. Brewer?

IV

Was the trial court’s finding, that Mr. Brewer had given Mrs. Brewer jewelry that he inherited from his mother, clearly erroneous? In her cross-appeal, Mrs. Brewer also challenges the alimony award, the monetary award, and aspects of the court’s division of the Brewers’ property. But she takes the dispute one step further and questions the court’s failure to award her counsel fees. Her objections are contained in the four questions she poses.

Edited for swift apprehension, they are: V. Did the trial court err in failing to make an award of counsel fees to Mrs. Brewer?

VI

Did the trial court err when it granted Mr. Brewer’s motion for reconsideration and reduced its monetary and alimony awards?

VII

Did the trial court err in finding that Mr. Brewer did not give the furniture he had inherited to Mrs. Brewer?

VIII

Did the trial court err in failing to impute a higher rate of return to Mr. Brewer’s investment assets? For the reasons set forth below, we shall vacate the trial court’s grant of indefinite alimony and a monetary award and remand this case to that court for reconsideration as outlined by this opinion. We shall also vacate the trial court’s denial of counsel fees so that it may reconsider that denial in light of any changes it may wish to make to the alimony or monetary award on remand. Background The parties were married on September 24, 1966.

They have two children, Mark and David, who are now adults. In December 2000, after almost thirty-five years of marriage, Mrs. Brewer moved out of the marital home. Two months later, Mrs. Brewer filed for an absolute divorce. ⁸⁵ At the time of the trial, Mr. Brewer was sixty-three years old. He has a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering and has completed course work for a master’s degree in industrial administration.

During the marriage, Mr. Brewer was, in the words of the trial court, the “primary breadwinner” of the family. From 1973 to 2000, he worked for BAE SYSTEMS North America. And, in December 2000, he retired from his position as a “project manager” for that company- At retirement, Mr. Brewer was earning approximately $85,000 per year. He now receives, monthly, $1,381 in Social Security benefits; $1,832 in pension benefits from BAE SYSTEMS; and $833 per month in investment income, for a total of $4,046 per month.

Apart from his monthly income, Mr. Brewer has substantial assets, having recently inherited, upon the death of his mother a little more than a year before the parties separated, three quarters of a million dollars. Mrs. Brewer is two years younger than her former husband. She was sixty-one years old at the time of the trial. She has a bachelor of science degree from Columbia University and a master of science degree in human behavior from the University of Maryland.

Both of these degree programs included training in the field of nursing. When the parties married, Mrs. Brewer was working full-time as an instructor in a nursing program. But, after the birth of the parties’ first son in 1969, Mrs. Brewer stayed at home for a year and a half to care for him. Thereafter, she worked part-time as a visiting nurse.

After the birth of the parties’ second son in 1973, she again stayed at home, this time for two years, to care for both children. When she returned to the workforce in 1975, she worked part-time as a nurse so that she could attend graduate school. Upon completing her master’s degree in 1979, Mrs. Brewer took a full-time position at the National Institutes of Health, where she worked as a “clinical educator.” She held that position for approximately five years, before accepting a position in 1984 as a “project director” with a consulting firm. ⁸⁶ The “tremendously demanding” hours of that job caused her to seek an alternative form of employment after working there only a year and a half. The parties agreed that Mrs. Brewer would “do something perhaps from home” where she could supervise the parties’ then-teenage sons.

That led to a job with Mary Kay Cosmetics. Although Mrs. Brewer began selling Mary Kay Cosmetics on a part-time basis, she eventually assumed a full-time position with Mary Kay. For the last seventeen years she has worked for Mary Kay and presently serves that organization as a full-time sales director. She is technically classified as an independent contractor, and her salary is based on commission.

She earns, according to her financial statement, $1,054.92 per month. But that is not her only source of income. Having reached the age of sixty-two during these proceedings, she is now eligible for social security benefits. The marriage was troubled almost from the start.

Mrs. Brewer testified that Mr. Brewer physically abused her throughout the marriage. That abuse began, she maintained, as early as her pregnancy with the parties’ second son in 1973 and continued until 1999, a year before the parties separated. Indeed, Mrs. Brewer claimed that she left Mr. Brewer because of the physical abuse, fearing that it would only increase after his retirement. At trial, Mr. Brewer “accepted] responsibility for the acts of violence.” In fact, he conceded: “I think [Mrs. Brewer] left because of the physical abuse and the fact that we were incompatible.” On December 13, 2000, the parties separated.

On that date, Mr. Brewer arrived home to find the house empty and Mrs. Brewer gone. She left, taking with her $17,000 from the parties’ Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund and drawing down $74,000 from the their home equity line of credit. The Proceedings After leaving the marital home, Mrs. Brewer filed a complaint for absolute divorce, alleging voluntary separation and constructive desertion, and seeking a resolution of all disputes ⁸⁷ between the parties with respect to ownership of property, a division of the parties’ pension and retirement funds, pendente lite and permanent alimony, counsel fees, health insurance coverage, and a monetary award. The trial court granted Mrs. Brewer an absolute divorce from Mr. Brewer on the grounds of constructive desertion, explaining that “the living conditions were made virtually unbearable by the way Mr. Brewer, by his own admission, treated his wife during the years of a long, long, marriage.” It then awarded Mrs. Brewer indefinite alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month.

In granting that award, the trial court stated: The first thing the Court must consider is the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting. The Court finds that Mrs. Brewer, the plaintiff in this case, is clearly capable. She is capable of being self-supporting, but clearly not at this juncture. The Court does not sit in a vacuum.

The Court is not isolated from the rest of society. The Court realizes—and I find it appropriate for judicial notice—that there are great disparities between the genders with respect to the opportunity in the employment market. The trial court then observed: [T’Jhe notion that a woman in her 60s could simply step out, so to speak, and be gainfully employed in a career at this juncture, it is possible. People do it, but it will be difficult to do, and so I do find that while on the one hand she is capable of being self-supporting, that is not something that she will imminently be able to.

Turning to the question of how much time Mrs. Brewer would need to gain sufficient training or education to enable her to find suitable employment, the court stated: ⁸⁸ The second factor is the time necessary for the parties seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment. Well, the education and training factor is also an area that there is great gender disparity in our country, particularly with—I hesitate to characterize what the 60s are. I am not going to say whether it is old or young. I am rapidly approaching that myself, but we know that it is— many things in life that were easier when we were younger become more difficult when we are older, and that is a factor that the court certainly must consider.

Notwithstanding that, there was no testimony given that Mrs. Brewer plans with respect to going back to school or anything of that nature. The court then considered the standard of living of the parties and their respective contributions to the well-being of the family: Now, the standard of living the parties have established during the marriage, the third factor the Court must consider, the parties in this case lived nicely. They did not live lavishly. Mr. Brewer was the primary breadwinner, to use that phrase, and Mrs. Brewer, during the times that she was working, contributed to the economic well-being of the family.

The duration of the marriage, this is a long marriage, and it is sad that it ends, but it is a long marriage, from 1966. The contributions, monetary and non-monetary that each party made. Now, our Court of Appeals has told us that we must consider those factors, but they don’t tell us how to do it. How do you put a value on the non-marital [sic] contribution that a party makes in a marriage?

It is difficult, but we are required to do that, and the Court will consider that. ⁸⁹ [Mr. Brewer] said that [Mrs. Brewer] was essentially a good mother. That is a non-monetary contribution, even though it does have monetary consequences. If you take good care of your family, it saves the family money. If you manage the home well, it puts the family in a better economic position, and Mr. Brewer had no compunctions about doing that.

As for the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties, the court opined: Well, there has been enough said during the course of this case regarding the conduct of Mr. Brewer with his perhaps frustrations with his job, frustrations and difficulties of doing a very difficult job, that is being the head of a family, raising a family. Mr. Brewer didn’t handle those frustrations very well. That is not a criticism of Mr. Brewer. That is simply a finding of fact, and the way he handled problem-solving in the family largely contributed to the estrangement of the parties.

The court then addressed the age of the parties, compared their financial resources, and determined whether any agreement existed between them as to those resources: The age of the parties, I suppose we could say in the words of the poet, when we reach this point in our lives, our days are in the yellow leaf, but fall is certainly a long time, and that certainly factors into alimony, and will certainly inure to the benefit of Mrs. Brewer. The ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet the needs while meeting his or her own needs. If I might just go forward very quickly there is some disparity between the way [Mrs. Brewer] assesses the value of the property that [she] and [Mr. Brewer] get in this case, but the one thing that the [parties] do agree on is that there is great disparity between the value of the property—that is, ⁹⁰ when you look at the splitting of the marital property, and the value of the property that the parties have that is non-marital. There is a great disparity between Mr. Brewer and Mrs. Brewer.

After going over the property—and I am not jumping out of the alimony part of the opinion, I am just parenthetically, if you will, mentioning how the property and the money that the parties have, value that the parties have, fits into the alimony equation. All of the assets of Mr. Brewer after the division of the marital property, plus the non-marital property that he has, will yield him $811,742.50. Mrs. Brewer, after the splitting of the marital property, and the adding of the property that she has that is non-marital, which isn’t very much, her assets are going to be worth $115,101.50. So you can see that is a great disparity.

So the ability of Mr. Brewer to make alimony payments, and to take care of his own needs, is clearly there. He has that ability. There is no agreement between the parties, and that is often an interesting factor why the legislature included this in. If there was an agreement between the parties, we wouldn’t have had a trial.

But that is a factor that the Court must consider. The Court considers there was no agreement. The financial needs and resources of each party, including all income and assets, all income and assets, not just necessarily liquid assets, but all the income and assets that the parties have, including property that does not produce income. The Court must also consider any award under Section 8-205.

There will be a monetary award in this case, and I say that with respect to—so the parties can see the adjustment the court made. The court considered the right of each party to receive retirement benefits: ⁹¹ The retirement benefits of the parties in this case will be dealt with by QDROs which will be submitted by counsel at the appropriate time for the Court’s consideration. I will mention that again, but the parties have already agreed with respect to the BAE pension of Mr. Brewer that that is going to be divided by QDRO, on a 50-50 basis, and that counsel will certainly submit the QDROs, which are the last things that are submitted in these cases. Having considered the statutory factors for making an award of alimony, the court awarded Mrs. Brewer indefinite alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month.

Turning its attention to the parties’ marital home, which they owned as tenants in common, 2 the trial court declared: The property will be sold. The Court will order that the house be sold. I am not going to appoint a trustee. The parties will be able to do that.

Now, there was an argument about what the value of the home is, and I don’t know what the value of the home is. That was argument or suggestion by both counsel. The house clearly will have to be valued. The parties will cause that to happen, and I find that the parties at this point in this case, they will be able to do that by agreement.

Now, there was $10,800 of that that went into that house that was non-marital money that Mr. Brewer put in [from his inheritance]. 3 He is obviously entitled to that money back upon the sale of the marital home, and the parties will then divide the proceeds form the sale of the marital home equally. Parenthetically, we note that the trial court later appointed a trustee to handle the sale of the parties’ home, which had an ⁹² appraised value of $496,000. Mrs. Brewer purchased the house for $505,000. The net proceeds from that sale left the parties with $192,025.00 each.

As for the parties’ remaining property, that is, Mr. Brewer’s pension, the parties’ IRAs, various accounts, jewelry, furniture, and other items, the court stated: Now, with respect to the furniture, the parties agree that the furniture is marital property valued at $4,500. The furniture should be sold, and the proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties. Counsel commented parenthetically regarding the appointment of trustees and sale of property, and it perhaps may have been off the record that the lawyers will make sure they don’t have to get trustees involved in that. :{: * * Business furniture, the parties agree that the business furniture is marital property valued at $200. That furniture will be sold.

The proceeds shall be divided equally, unless of course one of the parties buys the other out. Office computer, the parties agree that the office furniture and computer is marital property. With respect to the jewelry that the parties agree to be marital property, the parties disagree as to the value of the property. [Mrs. Brewer] asserts the value of the property to be $3,000. [Mr. Brewer] asserts the value to be $8,100. The Court, at the risk of any allegations of gender bias, I am going to accept the value as asserted by [Mrs. Brewer], and that property likewise, if the parties can’t agree, would be sold and divided equally.

The SEP IRA account, that account will be dealt with by way of a QDRO. The Vanguard IRA account also will be dealt with by way of a QDRO which the parties will submit at the appropriate time. ⁹³ Likewise, the rollover IRA Vanguard account will be dealt with by QDRO. The pension BAE account, the parties have agreed that it would be divided and dealt with by QDRO. They have agreed on the dispersion of that.

With respect to the Century Bank checking account, the parties agree that the Century Bank checking account is marital property. With respect to the Vanguard money market fund, [Mrs. Brewer] asserts a value of $40,230. There was no other value given by [Mr. Brewer]. Therefore, the Court will accept the value of [Mrs. Brewer], the value being $40,230 divided equally between the parties.

There is another Vanguard money market fund. The parties agree that it is marital property, $8,632—and by the way, disregard that. That will be divided equally between the parties. The Vanguard Prime money market fund, the parties agree that it is marital property on their joint property statements, that the value is $23,870. [Mr. Brewer] asserts on his statement that the value is $21,128.

The Court finds that the value of the prime money market fund to be $22,499. That shall be divided equally between the parties. The Scudder Gold Fund proceeds, the parties agree that that is marital property valued at $2,926. The value of the account shall be divided equally between the parties.

The Potomac Valley Bank proceeds, the parties agree is marital property valued at $4,306. The value of the account is $4,306. Needs to be divided between the parties. With respect to the Potomac Valley Bank account, the parties agree the bank account is marital property, $1,906, the value of that account, shall be divided equally.

Let me say parenthetically with respect to these accounts, the interest of which and so forth is being computed on a daily basis. ⁹⁴ The Court and counsel will instruct their clients that these exact figures may be slightly off, but what the parties should get is if it is marital property, regardless of what the amount is at the entry of this judgment, that it is to be divided equally. In other words, if for example the Potomac Valley account, which had $4,306 in it at the time of filing is now down to $2,000, it is marital. The parties simply divide it equally. That is what you should take from this, and not get hung up on the exact figure that is in the account, and I am sure you understand that.

The parties agree that there was a savings bond. It was marital property. Neither party provided a value of that property. The savings bond have [sic] any value at this point, it shall be divided equally.

Jewelry. The parties agree that the particular jewelry is [Mrs. Brewer’s], which was acquired by inheritance. [Mrs. Brewer] asserts the value of $11,000. There was no other value given by [Mr. Brewer]. Therefore, the Court will accept the value given by [Mrs. Brewer].

The Court finds that the jewelry valued at $11,000 is non-marital and [Mrs. Brewer’s]. Now, with respect to the money that was placed in the Vanguard account that was inherited by Mr. Brewer, at the time some $702,239, [Mr. Brewer] asserts that that money is non-marital. The Court finds that it is non-marital. The amount at this point totals to be some $690,417.

That is non-marital, ⁹⁵ and that of course is Mr. Brewer’s, and remains in Mr. Brewer’s column. Now, I have already indicated that the retirement accounts will be dealt with by way of a QDRO on an i[f], as and when basis. Those QDROs will be submitted at the appropriate time by counsel. Also at issue were several items that Mr. Brewer inherited from his mother upon her death in 1999.

Among the things she left him were certain items of jewelry. Although Mr. Brewer claims that he never gave that jewelry to Mrs. Brewer, Mrs. Brewer testified otherwise. She asserted that, after Mr. Brewer’s mother died, “[Mr. Brewer] handed the jewelry to [her], and said, ‘[h]ere. I want you to have the jewelry.

Feel free to use it, Wear it. Enjoy it.’ ” She further stated that her mother-in-law was “like a second mother” to her and the two were “very close.” As for this jewelry, the trial court declared: The Court accepts the testimony of all the witnesses who testified regarding the relationship between Mrs. Brewer and Mr. Brewer’s mother, her mother-in-law. It was very clear during this trial that Mrs. Brewer, notwithstanding the difficulties that she and Mr. Brewer were having, that did not spill over and taint the relationship between Mrs. Brewer and Mr. Brewer’s mother. That relationship to the very end continued to be a good relationship.

The jewelry that Mr. Brewer inherited, the Court finds, based upon the testimony, that at that point in time, because of the relationship that Mr. Brewer knew that his wife had with Mr. Brewer’s mother, I believe that his mother would have wanted Mrs. Brewer to have that jewelry, and he gave it to her, and he cannot now at the time of divorce take it back and claim that it is non-marital. Mr. Brewer also inherited from his mother a substantial amount of furniture. Mrs. Brewer testified that this furniture replaced “literally everything in the house ... [the] [b]eds we slept on, living room furniture, dining room furniture, family ⁹⁶ room [furniture], [and the] kitchen [furniture].” Although Mrs. Brewer argued that Mr. Brewer made a gift of the furniture to the marriage, the trial court disagreed and found that, unlike the jewelry, there was no evidence that Mr. Brewer ever intended to make such a gift. It concluded that the property was non-marital and belonged to Mr. Brewer.

The trial court granted Mrs. Brewer a monetary award of $250,000, explaining: The law provides that to balance or to prevent any inequities between the parties upon the dissolution of a marriage, the court can grant a monetary award, and the court will grant a monetary award in this case. This is a two stage process. The Court must first value the property and assets that the parties have, and then after that, the court must consider certain relevant factors in granting the monetary award. In issuing a monetary award, the Court must necessarily consider the ability of the person who is going to be ordered to pay the monetary award, the ability of that individual to pay the monetary award.

The court in this case finds that Mr. Brewer clearly has the ability in this case to pay a monetary award. The Court also considers in granting a monetary award—and here is that factor again—the non-monetary factors that the party who is going to be granted the award, what did they contribute to the marriage over the duration of a marriage. The marriage lasted since 1966, and as I said with respect to alimony, the Court of Appeals tells the court that we must consider the non-monetary contribution but they don’t tell us how to do that. Essentially, you have to place a value on an individual’s contribution during the course of the marriage.

Now, when I say that, I say that—that has to be done within the context of what is available for the issuance of a monetary award. Clearly, we don’t sit here and value people’s worth. You can’t do that, but the value is considered in the context of what is available to pay a monetary award. ⁹⁷ The Court in this case considers the assets that are available, the vast disparity between the assets of the two parties as they get this judgment of divorce, which the court will sign effective today’s date. Having gone through the value of the property with respect to the parties’ assets, having determined that there is a great disparity between those of [Mr. BrewerJ, Mr. Brewer and Mrs. Brewer in this case, having determined that there is the ability to pay a monetary award, having determined that the non-monetary contributions made by Mrs. Brewer during the course of this marriage were substantial, the court will award a monetary award in the amount of $250,000.

After these findings and rulings were memorialized in a written Judgment of Absolute Divorce, Mr. Brewer filed a motion to alter or amend that judgment. Granting that motion in part, the court reduced Mrs. Brewer’s indefinite alimony award from $2,000 to $1,500 per month and her monetary award from $250,000 to $175,000 without explanation. It also ordered the parties to evenly divide Mr. Brewer’s pension and their respective IRA accounts and to pay their own attorney’s fees. In the end, according to our calculations, excluding the BAE pension, Mrs. Brewer received approximately $500,000 of the marital property, while Mr. Brewer received approximately $170,000 of the marital property.

As for non-marital assets, however, at the time of the divorce, Mr. Brewer had approximately $700,000 in non-marital assets, while Mrs. Brewer had only $18,500 in non-marital assets. After the court divided the marital property, Mr. Brewer was left with a net worth of approximately $870,000, comprised mostly of the monies he had inherited from his parents, while Mrs. Brewer’s net worth rose, according to our calculations, to approximately $518,000, comprised almost entirely of what was marital property. 4 ⁹⁸ I Mr. Brewer contends that the trial court’s award of indefinite alimony, in the amount $1,500.00 per month to Mrs. Brewer, is fraught with error. That award, he maintains, was made in the absence of any “findings regarding [Mrs. Brewer’s] income, the time necessary for [Mrs. Brewer] to become self-supporting, the income that [Mrs. Brewer] could potentially obtain, and whether an unconscionable disparity existed” as required by FL § ll-106(c). Even if the court had made the required findings, he adds, the court’s award of alimony is unsustainable “because there was no unconscionable disparity and [Mr. Brewer] does not have the ability to pay alimony.” Although, in reviewing an award of alimony, we “deferí ] to the findings and judgments of a trial court,” we may disturb an award of alimony if we conclude that in making that award “the trial court abused its discretion or rendered a judgment that is clearly wrong.” E.g., Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. 207, 246 , 752 A.2d 291 (2000) (quoting Digges v. Digges, 126 Md.App. 361, 386 , 730 A.2d 202 (1999)).

The evidence supports such a conclusion here. We begin our review of the award at issue by noting that FL § 11—106(b) provides that, in determining whether to make an alimony award, the trial court shall consider twelve factors. With respect to those factors, this Court has stated: In making an award of alimony, the trial court is required to consider all of the factors set forth in F.L. § ll-106(b). To be sure, the court “need not use formulaic language or articulate every reason for its decision with respect to each factor.

Rather, the court must clearly indicate that it has considered all the factors.” If the court fails to make clear that it has considered all of the factors, then the record, as a ⁹⁹ whole, must reveal that the court’s findings were based on a review of the statutory factors. Digges, 126 Md.App. at 387 , 730 A.2d 202 (citations omitted) (quoting Doser v. Doser, 106 Md.App. 329, 356 , 664 A.2d 453 (1995)); see also Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md.App. 575, 591 , 565 A.2d 361 (1989). The twelve factors are: (1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement between the parties; (11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and ¹⁰⁰ (12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur. FL § ll-106(b).

Factor eleven provides that the court shall consider “the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including all income and assets....” Id. § (ll)(i). In so doing, the trial court must “make specific findings of fact with regard to the income of the recipient spouse.” See Reuter v. Reuter, 102 Md.App. 212, 229 , 649 A.2d 24 (1994). Otherwise, as this Court has previously noted, we are unable to determine whether the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. C.f. id. at 236 , 649 A.2d 24 .

After considering the twelve factors, the trial court must then decide whether to grant rehabilitative or indefinite alimony. A court may award the latter if it finds: (1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate. FL § ll-106(c). But “the purpose of alimony,” the Court of Appeals reminds us, “is not to provide a lifetime pension.” Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992).

It is designed “to provide an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting.” Id. (quoting the Report of the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations 2 (1980)). However, “[i]n cases where it is either impractical for the dependent spouse to become self-supporting, or in cases where the dependent spouse will be self-supporting but still a gross inequity will exist, a court may award alimony for an indefinite period.” ¹⁰¹ Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md.App. 132, 141 , 740 A.2d 125 (1999). As Mr. Brewer claims, the trial court failed to make any finding as to Mrs. Brewer’s current income, or as to when she might become self-supporting, or, as to whether, once that occurred, there would be an unconscionable disparity in living standards.

After discussing the difficulties that a woman in her sixties would face in becoming “gainfully employed in a career,” the court noted that, at her age, Mrs. Brewer would have difficulty obtaining additional education and training. But it did not find that Mrs. Brewer had made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected. In fact, it opined only that she would not “imminently” become self-supporting without expressing any view as to when that might be or what future income she might make or concluding that, at her age, full time employment for any significant period was not a reasonable expectation. As for the last point, the court seemed to suggest that, at her age, full time employment is not an option but then fails to make that finding. 5 Nor did the trial court make any findings with respect to Mrs. Brewer’s present income, as required by FL § 11— 106(b)(ll).

See Reuter, 102 Md.App. at 229 , 649 A.2d 24 . According to Mrs. Brewer’s financial statement, her gross monthly income at the time of the divorce was $1,054.92. She confirmed that figure at trial, testifying that the statement “fairly and accurately reflect[ed] [her] income.” While Mr. Brewer does not challenge the accuracy of that figure, he ¹⁰² points out that it is unclear whether the trial court considered Mrs. Brewer’s eligibility for social security benefits or her receipt of half of Mr. Brewer’s pension. And the record supports his concerns.

At trial, the court admitted into evidence a copy of Mrs. Brewer’s Social Security benefits statement, which indicated that at age sixty-two—an age that she would reach within one year—Mrs. Brewer would be entitled to receive, based on her earnings alone, $496 per month in benefits. But, as Mr. Brewer points out, she may be entitled to more. Under the Social Security regulations, Mrs. Brewer can reject the $496 per month, in favor of receiving an amount equal to one half of Mr. Brewer’s benefits, or $690.50 per month, once she reaches her full retirement age, which, in her case, is sixty-five and a half years old. 6 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.333 , 404.409. If she elects to receive benefits before that age, she would receive a little less. 7 20 C.F.R. § 404.410 .

Moreover, her employment does not preclude her from receiving these benefits, although it may result in a small reduction in benefits as her income of $12,648 exceeds the $11,240 annual income limit set by the Social Security Administration. See Social Security Administration, Exempt Amounts Under the Earnings Test, at www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLA/rtea.html. For every two dollars above that limit, the Social Security Administration reduces benefits by one dollar. Id.

On the other hand, this small reduction will not, in this instance, last long. Beneficiaries have no limit ¹⁰³ on their earnings after they reach their full retirement age. Id. In addition to these benefits, Mrs. Brewer will also be receiving half of Mr. Brewer’s BAE pension, which will pay her $919 per month, as well as the $86.83 in monthly dividends from her own investments.

Thus, assuming that Mrs. Brewer elects to receive only $496 in benefits based solely on her earnings history, Mrs. Brewer’s monthly income, according to our calculations, would be approximately $2,500. Her income could, however, be higher than that amount if she waits to begin receiving her Social Security benefits until she reaches full retirement age. But regardless of her exact entitlement, it is not clear, as Mr. Brewer asserts, that the trial court considered these other sources of income, as it made no findings as to her present or future income. In contrast to Mrs. Brewer, Mr. Brewer earns $3,130.89 per month.

That means, according to our computations, that Mrs. Brewer’s monthly income, less the alimony awarded by the trial court, is almost 80% of Mr. Brewer’s. But, as noted above, it could be even greater than that. This is hardly a gross disparity. Although admittedly a mathematical comparison of income is only the starting point for finding an unconscionable disparity in living standards, Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 71-72 , 646 A.2d 413 (1994), it is worth pointing out that there are no reported Maryland decisions that have upheld an award of indefinite alimony when such a small disparity in the parties’ incomes exists. 8 ¹⁰⁴ And it is noteworthy that in cases in which this court upheld an indefinite award of alimony despite a relatively small disparity in income—such as in Crabill v. Crabill, 119 Md.App. 249 , 704 A.2d 532 (1998), in which the wife’s income was 62% of the husband’s—the trial court did not grant, as the trial court did here, a monetary award.

Id. at 252, 255 , 704 A.2d 532 . Without making the findings we have outlined, the trial court awarded Mrs. Brewer indefinite alimony, citing the “great disparity” in the parties’ respective assets. The trial court found that “all of the assets of Mr. Brewer after the division of the marital property, plus the non-marital property that he has, will yield him $811,742.50,” whereas Mrs. Brewer would be left with $115,101.50. But this finding understates Mrs. Brewer’s assets.

It ignores the $175,000 monetary award which she received, her proceeds from the sale of the marital home, and her share of the parties’ IRAs. Indeed, after dividing the IRAs and the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, Mrs. Brewer’s assets will equal, according to our calculations, approximately $518,000 compared to Mr. Brewer’s assets, which will equal approximately $870,000. This is a substantially smaller disparity than that relied upon by the trial court in awarding Mrs. Brewer alimony. Moreover, even assuming that the trial court correctly found that there was a “great disparity” in the parties’ assets, that is not a sufficient basis for awarding indefinite alimony.

FL § 11—106(c)(2) requires that, in order to award a spouse indefinite alimony, the court must find that “the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably ¹⁰⁵ disparate.” (Emphasis added). Here, the trial court did not take the next necessary step and conclude that a “great disparity” in assets would translate into an unconscionable disparity in their respective standards of living. Moreover, such a finding requires the trial court to also consider the parties’ income, which, as previously discussed, it failed to do. For all of these reasons, we must vacate the alimony award so that the court can make the required findings and to determine whether it wishes to award Mrs. Brewer indefinite alimony and if it does, in what amount.

Because we are vacating the court’s alimony award, we must also vacate its monetary award, as any significant change in alimony requires the court to reassess its monetary award. Benkin v. Benkin, 71 Md.App. 191, 208 , 524 A.2d 789 (1987). We shall nonetheless address the merits of that award to guide the trial court on remand. II Mr. Brewer contends that “[tjhe trial court’s determination and valuation of marital property was clearly erroneous, and its monetary award of $175,000 was legally incorrect and an abuse of discretion.” Although the law does not require a court to divide marital property equally between parties, the division of such property must be “fair and equitable.” Long v. Long, 129 Md.App. 554, 577-78 , 743 A.2d 281 (2000) (citations omitted).

To achieve that result, a trial court may grant a monetary award “to correct any inequity created by the way in which property acquired during the marriage happened to be titled.” Doser, 106 Md.App. at 349 , 664 A.2d 453 . The decision to grant such an award “is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 , 629 A.2d