Briggeman v. Albert

E.O. WEANT, Judge, Specially Assigned. On the afternoon of June 8, 1985 at the intersection of Philadelphia Avenue and 123rd Street in Ocean City, Maryland, Betty L. Briggeman, a pedestrian, was seriously injured when she was struck by an automobile driven by Phillip K. Albert, Jr., a Howard County resident. A police officer who was called to the scene filled out an accident report and issued a citation to Albert for a violation of Trans.Code of Md.Ann. § 21-504. In 1985, if an accused chose not to stand trial for a traffic violation, the penalty that was assessed by the Maryland District Court, M.A.T.S. Division, was $30.

Albert decided not to return to Ocean City to stand trial and, instead, in July of 1985 sent the $30 to M.A.T.S. in Annapolis. Briggeman sued Albert in the Circuit Court for Howard County for injuries sustained as a result of the accident. She sought to introduce evidence of the fact that Albert had paid the $30 fine. Briggeman reasoned the payment of the fine was tantamount to a guilty plea, and, therefore, an admission of a party-opponent.

The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible; a jury returned a verdict for Albert and judgment was entered accordingly. The sole question presented to us is whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the evidence. We have found no reported Maryland case addressing this issue. The United States Court of Appeals in Kent J. Romine v. Bruce M. Parman, 831 F.2d 944 (10th Cir.1987) considered ⁴⁸⁴ an allegation that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a fine paid as a result of a traffic citation issued at the time of an accident.

In that case, the Court stated that: [w]hile a plea of guilty to a traffic offense is in theory no different from a plea of guilty to other offenses, recognition that people plead guilty to traffic charges for reasons of convenience and without much regard to guilt and collateral consequences has led to some tendency to exclude them from evidence. Romine at 945, quoting C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, § 265 at 783 (E. Cleary, 3rd Ed., 1984). The Court then went on to say, “[w]e conclude that the better view, however, is to admit the evidence and allow the driver who received the citation to explain why he or she paid the fine.” Id. at 945-946. It seems to us that this abrogates the original purpose of allowing for the payment of a fine rather than standing trial.

We recognize that there are many reasons a person may choose to follow the fine forfeiture route as opposed to following other expensive and inconvenient routes. The payment of a fine and the assessment of violation points are sufficient sanctions placed upon the payor. The payor should not have the additional burden of having to show why he or she elected to pay the fine in a subsequent civil proceeding. The plaintiff in a civil suit does not merit being given a running start in his suit merely because the defendant has seen fit to take advantage of a provision that the law affords him or her.

It is conceivable that a jury may confuse the issue of why a fine was paid as opposed to whether the defendant actually admitted having done the act complained of. In Reynolds v. Donoho, 39 Wash.2d 451, 456 , 236 P.2d 552, 555-56 (1951), the Supreme Court of Washington, however, discussed the question of whether “bail and forfeiture” after a charge or “ticket” amounted to an admission which could be used against a defendant in a civil action. That court said: ⁴⁸⁵ Like the plea of nolo contendere (Honaker v. Howe, [19 Grat. 50, 60 Va. 50 ]) or the absence of the accused from his home during the period immediately following the accident (Tomasko v. Raucci, [ 113 Conn. 274 , 155 A. 64, 651 ]), the forfeiture of bail by the appellant was an incident unique in itself. Some analogies may be drawn favoring admissibility.

However, the bail forfeiture here involved falls in the category of one of those tubs that must stand on its own bottom. This is particularly true in an automobile accident criminal action. It is common knowledge that, upon the receipt of a traffic ticket, the average motorist pays and then forfeits his bail; the action is thus concluded. It cannot be said that such an act is a general admission of responsibility.

Often, it is but a convenient method of concluding the criminal action, convenient both to the person charged and to the administrators of traffic law enforcement. It is our opinion that the evidence relating to the appellant’s “forfeiture of bail” was not admissible. We view