Bright v. Myers

ALPERT, Judge. This is an appeal from an automobile negligence action that was filed against the appellant, Matthew Lynn Bright, by appellee, Ida Patricia Myers, on September 14, 1989, seeking damages stemming from the automobile accident occurring on May 5, 1987. The case was tried before a jury on April 30 and May 1, 1990, in the Circuit Court for Washington County. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of appellee on the ²⁹⁸ issue of liability.

Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict awarding thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to appellee. Appellant asks us to consider whether: I. Under Maryland law, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of appellee on the basis of the boulevard rule, in light of facts and reasonable- inferences therefrom which would indicate that the appellee was proceeding unlawfully or was inattentive at the time of the incident.

II

Under Maryland law, the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s pre-trial discovery motions and in permitting prejudicial evidence to go before the jury when that evidence was not made available to the appellant prior to the trial, despite appellant’s efforts to obtain that information in the discovery process. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The automobile collision giving rise to this suit took place at approximately 3:45 p.m. on May 5, 1987, in Hagerstown, Washington County, Maryland. Myers was driving south on Pennsylvania Avenue (U.S. Route 11), a highway; Bright was driving in the northbound lane of Pennsylvania Avenue. 1 Bright stopped to make a left turn into the parking lot of a Burger King restaurant. An unidentified driver in the inner southbound lane stopped and motioned Bright to proceed with the left turn.

As Bright made the turn, he collided with Myers’s vehicle. Myers testified at the trial that she saw Bright’s vehicle crossing into her lane “[m]aybe a split second” before the accident. She “stood up on [her] brakes,” i.e., “[p]ressed on them as hard as [she] could,” in her attempt to avoid the collision, but was unsuccessful. Myers stated that she was unsure how fast she had been driving; she estimated that it was “[s]omewheres around thirty, thirty-five mile an hour.” On cross-examination, she reiterated that she was traveling ²⁹⁹ “[sjomewheres between thirty and forty” miles an hour.

She believed that the speed limit at the location of the accident was thirty or thirty-five miles an hour. Myers acknowledged that nothing had obstructed her view of Bright’s vehicle. Nonetheless, its sudden imposition into her lane of travel precluded her from avoiding the accident. Myers further testified that at the time of the accident, she was taking medications for prior injuries that she had sustained.

Specifically, she was having back problems, for which her physician, Dr. Allen Ditto, had prescribed Naprosyn and Norflex. Although she had taken the medications that morning, she denied feeling any effects therefrom that afternoon. According to Myers, her head, neck, shoulders, back, and knees hurt after the accident. An ambulance transported her from the scene of the accident to Washington County Hospital for an emergency room visit.

The following day, she visited Ditto and began a long course of treatment for her injuries. Ditto testified that he determined “that she was suffering from post-traumatic headache syndrome, whiplash injury to the neck and low back pain due to the auto accident.” This testimony was contradicted by Bright’s medical expert, Dr. Howard Moses, who determined that “Ms. Myers did not have any objective evidence of any neurological injury as a result of her accident.” Because Myers continued to experience recurring, severe headaches, Ditto referred her to Dr. Mehrullah Khan, a neurologist. During this period, Myers was also seen by neurologists at the Johns Hopkins Hospital Neurology Clinic. Myers took numerous prescribed medications during her treatment such as Tegretol and Amitriptyline.

Although these medications caused unpleasant side effects, they were deemed necessary to control her severe head pain. Khan testified in his videotaped de bene esse deposition, which was admitted at trial, that Myers had sustained permanent head injuries. He noted that “I don’t see any ³⁰⁰ thing in the near future that we will be able to stop her medication and so her symptoms will disappear.” Further testimony established that Myers missed time from her full-time employment, lost her part-time job, and suffered a decrease in her job performance because of the injuries that she suffered from the accident. At the close of all the evidence, appellee’s counsel moved for a directed verdict (motion for judgment) on the issue of liability.

Counsel argued that there was “clear evidence that Mr. Bright did take away the right of way of M’s [sic] Myers in violation of the boulevard rules.” Relying on the boulevard rule, the court granted the motion, finding as a matter of law that Bright had been negligent because he failed in his duty to yield the right-of-way to Myers. The court further found that no evidence had been produced from which “any reasonable jury could find [that there] was any negligent act by [Myers] which contributed to the cause of the collision.” The jury then awarded Myers thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00). THE LAW I. Appellant contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to rule, based on Maryland’s boulevard law, that appellee was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of liability. Appellant reasons that the facts and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom indicated that appellee was not proceeding lawfully and was inattentive at the time of the collision, thus precluding the directed verdict.

We agree that the trial court’s reliance on the boulevard rule was misplaced. We explain. The Maryland boulevard rule has evolved from judicial construction of statutory requirements 2 relevant to yielding ³⁰¹ the right-of-way in various situations. See Tippett v. Quade, 19 Md.App. 49, 58 , 309 A.2d 481 (1973).

The rule’s objective is to expedite the flow of boulevard traffic by allowing boulevard drivers to travel without decelerating at every intersection. See Dean v. Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 147 , 374 A.2d 329 (1977); Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 125 , 8 A.2d 888 (1939). Under the original formulation of the rule, a driver approaching a “through highway” 3 from an unfavored road was obligated to stop and yield the right-of-way to drivers already in or about to enter the intersection during the time that the unfavored driver was attempting to enter the boulevard. See Creaser v. Owens, 267 Md. 238, 239-40 , 297 A.2d 235 (1972). “This duty continue[d] as long as he [was] in the intersection and until he bec[a]me[ ] a part of the flow of favored travellers or successfully traverse[d] the boulevard.” Id. at 240 , 297 A.2d 235 .

The unfavored driver’s duty to stop and yield the right-of-way was judicially regarded as “mandatory, positive, and inflexible.” Dean, 280 Md. at 147 , 374 A.2d 329 . Accordingly, “[w]here suit [was] brought by the favored driver against the unfavored driver, the unfavored driver [was] negligent as a matter of law.” Kopitzki v. Boyd, 277 Md. 491, 495 , 355 A.2d 471 (1976); see also Creaser, 267 Md. at 243-44 , 297 A.2d 235 . In this scenario, the unfavored driver avoided liability only in the infrequent case in which he could “convince the jury that the favored driver’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident,” i.e., that the favored driver was contributorily negligent. Kopitzki, 277 Md. at 495 , 355 A.2d 471 . ³⁰² Maryland courts thus adhered to a rigid application 4 of the boulevard rule until 1977, when the Court of Appeals decided Covington v. Gernert, 280 Md. 322 , 373 A.2d 624 (1977), which abrogated the absolute right-of-way.

In Covington , the Court reevaluated the boulevard rule in light of the changes that had been made to the statutory definition of “right-of-way.” Id. 280 Md. at 323-25, 373 A.2d 624 . Before the motor vehicle law was revised in 1970, see Act of 1970, ch. 534, 1970 Md. Laws 1308 , the definition of “right-of-way” had been “[t]he privilege of the immediate use of the highway.” Md.Ann.Code art. 66V2, § 2(a)(45) (1957). Under the new definition, see Md.Transp.Code Ann. § 21-101(r) (1987), 5 ‘[r]ight-of-way’ means the right of one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner on a highway in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian. Id.

(emphasis added). Based on the statutory change, the Court concluded that the boulevard rule is inapplicable where the favored driver had not been