Briscoe v. Prince George's County Health Department

ELDRIDGE, Judge. The petitioners are clinical social workers employed by the State of Maryland. The principal issues in the case are whether the State violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Maryland Code (1957, 1988 ⁴⁴² Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 64A, § 27, 1 by paying the petitioners less than psychiatric nurses employed at the same facilities. I. The original claimants were twelve clinical social workers employed by the State of Maryland at Community Mental Health Centers administered by the Prince George’s County Health Department.

These claimants filed an administrative grievance against the County Health Department and the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, alleging that the clinical social workers had the same responsibilities and performed essentially the same duties as psychiatric nurses at the Community Mental Health Clinics but were paid at a lower grade than the nurses. 2 They argued that under equal protection and due process principles, as well as under the State Merit System Law (Art. 64A), persons in positions involving comparable duties, experience, responsibilities and authority must be paid comparable salaries. The claimants requested that their salaries be upgraded to a level equivalent to that of the nurses and that they be awarded back pay. After unsuccessfully pursuing their grievance through the initial steps of the State Employee Grievance Procedure, ⁴⁴³ Art. 64A, §§ 52-57, the claimants appealed to the Department of Personnel. At a hearing before the Department of Personnel hearing officer, there was testimony from clinical social workers, psychiatric nurses, and other personnel at the Prince George’s County Community Health Clinics.

There was also testimony from other State-employed witnesses. Following the hearing, the Department of Personnel hearing officer issued her decision denying the grievance. The hearing officer found that, at the Prince George’s County Community Mental Health Clinics, a clinical social worker “functions basically the same as the psychiatric nurses.” The hearing officer pointed to testimony that “cases are randomly assigned based on the availability of the therapist, who could be a psychiatric nurse, social worker or psychologist.” The hearing officer also referred to testimony that a psychiatric nurse at the Prince George’s County facilities spends only one percent of her time administering medication. The hearing officer, however, indicated that this situation was limited to Prince George’s County facilities and did not exist elsewhere in the State.

As part of her findings of fact, the hearing officer quoted extensively from a study commissioned in 1986 by the Appropriations Committee of the House of Delegates and conducted by the Department of Personnel’s Division of Salary Administration and Position Classification. The study focused on multi-disciplinary teams in use at Department of Health and Mental Hygiene facilities in order “to determine whether a single classification of Clinical Mental Health Therapist was appropriate for all persons performing clinical mental health therapy.” The study concluded that at facilities across the State, other than the Prince George’s County Mental Health Centers and the Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents in Rockville, Maryland, clinical social workers, psychiatric nurses, and psychologists “function[ed] within the boundaries of their discipline.” The hearing officer further quoted from the study: ⁴⁴⁴ “ ‘To the extent, then, that there is a commonality of function of the professionals in the mode of operation in the outpatient clinic and Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents, it is reflective of psychologists and nurses performing duties related to social services rather than reflection of social workers performing duties of nurses or psychologists, or reflective of functions (such as psychotherapy) which have been common to all these professionals. “ ‘Under this circumstance, we do not recommend creating a single classification of Clinical Mental Health Therapist spanning all three professions. A new Clinical Social Worker classification may however be helpful in securing an applicant with background particularly relevant for clinical work as described above.’ ” 3 The Hearing Officer also noted: “In the expert opinion of the classification analysts, the social workers were not being overutilized or undercompensated; the psychologists and nurses were being underutilized and overcompensated.” The hearing officer stated that the Classification Study “in no way supports an additional salary adjustment for the” claimants. The hearing officer concluded that “the grievants had the burden of proving that management violated a law or regulation or acted arbitrarily in denying a ... salary adjustment for the [claimants] to establish equity with the ...

Nurse series,” and that the claimants had failed to meet their burden. The hearing officer also indicated that, to the extent that the claimants’ request for a salary adjustment might involve an amendment to the State Pay Plan under Art. 64A, § 27, such an amendment would relate to an ⁴⁴⁵ entire class and must be approved by the Governor. 4 The claimants then filed this action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to obtain judicial review of the Department of Personnel’s decision. Shortly thereafter, seven clinical social workers employed at the Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents in Rockville moved to intervene as additional plaintiffs, asserting that they were situated similarly to the original twelve plaintiffs. Over the objection of the defendants, the circuit court granted the motion to intervene.

The circuit court, after a hearing, reversed the Department of Personnel’s decision. The court ordered the Secretary of Personnel to reclassify the plaintiffs either to an existing or a new classification equivalent in salary to that of the psychiatric nurses. In addition, it was ordered that the plaintiffs be paid salaries equivalent to those of the Community Health Nurse IV classification, that the Secretary of Personnel consider awarding back pay, and that the defendants pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. The circuit court issued no written opinion, and the remarks of the circuit judge at the hearing do not make the basis for his ruling entirely clear.

It would appear from his remarks that the circuit judge agreed with the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument. The Prince George’s County Department of Health and the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene filed an appeal, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed. Prince George’s County v. Briscoe, 79 Md.App. 325 , 556 A.2d 742 (1989). In response to petitioners’ constitutional ⁴⁴⁶ arguments, the intermediate appellate court held that the difference in pay scale between the social workers and the nurses had a rational basis and, therefore, did not constitute a denial of equal protection or of due process.

With regard to the plaintiffs’ reliance upon the provision of Art. 64A, § 27(a)(l)(i), stating that “all positions in the service involving comparable skills, knowledge, effort, responsibility, and working conditions shall be paid comparable salaries,” the Court of Special Appeals initially indicated that this provision is part of the section relating to the State Pay Plan. The appellate court then held that the Pay Plan related to statewide classes and not individual positions, that any changes in the Pay Plan must be approved by the Governor, and that the hearing officer had no power to effect a modification in the Pay Plan. As to the plaintiffs’ reliance upon Art. 64A, § 16(b), which authorizes the Secretary of Personnel to take corrective action when a position is inappropriately classified, the Court of Special Appeals held that plaintiffs had failed to argue at the administrative level that they were entitled to reclassification under § 16(b). 5 The ⁴⁴⁷ appellate court alternatively held that the plaintiffs had not shown at the administrative hearing that they had been misclassified or that they should be reclassified. Lastly, the Court of Special Appeals held that permitting the intervention of the Rockville social workers had been improper because they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and that the award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs had been erroneous.

Thereafter, we granted the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari.

II

The plaintiffs’ principal argument in this Court is that the State’s classification scheme which pays clinical social workers such as the plaintiffs less than psychiatric nurses constitutes a denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In a case such as this, the standard of review for equal protection analysis is the rational basis test. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 416-422 , 529 A.2d 1372, 1377-1380 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 , 108 S.Ct. 753 , 98 L.Ed.2d 766 (1988); Broadwater v. State, 306 Md. 597, 604-608 , 510 A.2d 583, 586-588 (1986); Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 595 , 510 A.2d 573, 581 (1986); Attor ⁴⁴⁸ ney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 706-707 , 426 A.2d 929, 942 (1981); Board v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279, 286 , 396 A.2d 1033, 1037 (1979); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 439 , 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). The plaintiffs, in fact, concede that the rational basis test is appropriate here. As we have stated, “[a] statutory classification tested by the rational basis standard enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality and a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it.” State v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 299 Md. 310, 328 , 473 A.2d 892, 901 , appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802 , 105 S.Ct. 56 , 83 L.Ed.2d 7 (1984).

See, e.g., Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, supra, 310 Md. at 423 , 529 A.2d at 1380 ; Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 352 , 499 A.2d 178, 185 (1985); Board v. Goodsell, supra, 284 Md. at 286 , 396 A.2d at 1037 . The rational basis test was summarized in Attorney General v. Waldron, supra, 289 Md. at 707 , 426 A.2d at 942 , as follows: “Using [the rational basis] approach, a statutory classification is struck down, in the oft-expressed words of the Supreme Court, only if the means chosen by the legislative body are ‘wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.’ McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 [1105], 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 , 89 S.Ct. 1404 [1408-09], 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). The Supreme Court, in applying this test, has been willing to uphold the constitutionality of an enactment when ‘any state of facts reasonably, may be conceived to justify it.’ McGowan v. Maryland, supra at 426 [1105]. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 , 99 S.Ct. 383 , 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978); Kotch v. Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 , 67 S.Ct. 910 , 91 L.Ed. 1093 (1947).

This deferential review of state legislative classifications operates, at least in the sphere of economic regulation, ‘quite apart from whether the conceivable “state of facts” (1) actually exists, (2) ⁴⁴⁹ would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has ever been urged in the classification’s defense by those who either promulgated it or have argued in its support.’ ” See also United Wire v. State Deposit Ins. Fund, 307 Md. 148, 158-159 , 512 A.2d 1047, 1052 (1986); Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 412-413 , 474 A.2d 191, 201 (1984); Board v. Goodsell, supra, 284 Md. at 286 , 396 A.2d at 1037 ; Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., supra, 279 Md. at 439 , 370 A.2d at 1118 ; Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 241 , 335 A.2d 679, 686 (1975). Furthermore, “[t]he test is not whether the statute, as applied to the individual plaintiff, relates to a legitimate governmental interest, but rather whether the classification created by the statute which encompasses the plaintiff is so related.” Peed v. Cleland, 516 F.Supp. 469, 476 (D.Md.1981). Legislation which creates different classes of public employees, and treats each class differently, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless “the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 525 , 336 A.2d 97, 111-112 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 , 96 S.Ct. 1091 , 47 L.Ed.2d 306 (1976).

See Abbott v. Administrative Hearing Bd., 33 Md.App. 681, 688 , 366 A.2d 756, 760 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 727 (1977). Turning to the present case, it is clear that there is a rational basis for the classification drawn by the State between the psychiatric nurses and the clinical social workers. Thus, the classification does not violate equal protection principles. As the Department of Personnel hearing officer noted, the Appropriations Committee of the Maryland House of Delegates commissioned a study to evaluate the validity of the distinctions drawn between clinical social workers and psychiatric nurses.

The study concluded that: (1) except in the facilities at issue, psychiatric nurses and ⁴⁵⁰ clinical social workers in in-patient facilities across the state functioned within the characteristics of their job classifications; (2) psychologists and psychiatric nurses at the Prince George’s Mental Health Clinics and the Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents were performing social services tasks; (3) clinical social workers at these facilities were not performing tasks unique to the psychiatric nurse or psychologist classification; and (4) clinical social workers at the facilities at issue were not being overutilized or underpaid, but, rather, psychologists and psychiatric nurses were being underutilized and overpaid. State employee classifications have traditionally been drawn on a state-wide basis. Moreover, in Ball v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 251 Md. 685, 691 , 248 A.2d 650, 653-654 (1968), this Court held that the “classes” and “classifications” contemplated by Art. 64A mean a “statewide classified service system” which is the same whether the employment is “performed at Morgan State College, Frostburg State College, the Maryland House of Correction or elsewhere.” The record in this case clearly shows that clinical social workers and psychiatric nurses generally perform different functions in facilities across the State. The fact that in one county, and in one facility in another county, the psychiatric nurses perform basically the same functions as clinical social workers does not deprive the classification of a rational basis.

Additionally, clinical social workers and psychiatric nurses have different qualifications. Because the nurses are qualified to perform patient care services, the