Broadwater v. State

SMITH, Judge. We shall here hold constitutional as applied the provisions of Md. Const, art. I, § 12 providing that one entering upon the duties of an elective office created by or pursuant to the provisions of the Maryland Constitution must be a registered voter. 1 In an earlier trip of this controversy to this Court we remanded for a declaration of the rights of the parties. Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461 , 494 A.2d 934 (1985).

Appellant, Tommie Broadwater, Jr., brought a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. His amended complaint averred that he is a former Senator from Prince George’s County in the General Assembly of Maryland; that he “was indicted and found guilty of conspiracy, unauthorized acquisition of food stamps, aiding and abetting, etc., in the United States ⁶⁰⁰ District Court for the District of Maryland”; that he “has served the custodial time pronounced by the court and is presently on probation”; that he was obliged to give up his seat in the General Assembly; that he is anxious to place his name before the voters as a Senator from Prince George’s County; and that present Const, art. I, § 12 makes one ineligible to run for office if said candidate is not a registered voter in the State on the date of the person’s election or appointment to that office. The complaint further stated that Maryland Code (1957, 1983 Repl.Vol.) Art. 33, § 3-4(c) provides that no person shall be registered as a qualified voter if he has been convicted of theft or other infamous crime unless he has been pardoned, or in connection with his first said conviction only, he has completed any sentence imposed pursuant to that conviction, including any period of probation by virtue of parole or otherwise in lieu of a sentence or part of a sentence; and that prior to the November 1984 referendum by which Const, art.

I, § 12 was adopted by the people he “had already submitted to the proper State Election Board a petition signed by approximately 7% (seven percent) of the electorate of his election district which is more than the 3% (three percent) of the electorate in a district acquired [sic] in order to be eligible to run as an independent.” Broadwater claimed that Const, art. I, § 12 violates the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Md. Declaration of Rights art. 24; that the proposed constitutional amendment “was drafted for the sole purpose of preventing this Plaintiff from presenting himself as a candidate to the electorate in his district”; and that Const, art. I, § 12 “should not be applied to the Plaintiff if he decides to run in the 1986 State Senate race for the 24th legislative district as the Plaintiff had already complied with all rules and regulations necessary to place his name in the 1986 ballot prior to the passage of said Constitution [sic] amendment.” Accordingly, he sought a declaration “that Article 1, section 12 of the Maryland Constitution is unconstitutional as it violates the [equal] protection clause of the United States’ Constitu ⁶⁰¹ tion, or alternatively, the [sic] Article 1, section 12 of the Maryland Constitution should not apply to the plaintiff if he elects to run as a State Senator in the 1986 election of the 24th legislative district.” The matter came on for hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial judge in his opinion said in part: “Thus if Article I, § 12 disqualified only convicted felons from seeking office, it would clearly be constitutional.

Or if Broadwater only had standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 12 as it applied to disqualified voters like himself, his suit would be clearly groundless. Section 12, however, makes all ‘unregistered voters’ ineligible for election to a constitutionally created office. It is on this basis, as a member of the class of unregistered voters, that Broadwater challenges the amendment.” Broadwater was found to have standing “to address the constitutionality of section 12 as it affects all unregistered voters.” Applying a rational basis test, the court declared the section constitutional. It rejected as “without merit” the contention that the amendment in question was drafted for the sole purpose of preventing Broadwater from presenting himself as a candidate to the electorate in his district, pointing out that “the amendment applies equally to all citizens of this State, not just Tommie Broadwater.” The court concluded that Broadwater “had not complied ■with the rules necessary to place his name on the 1986 ballot prior to the passage of the constitutional amendment” and said that “he has no vested interest in running for office under the laws as they existed in 1984.” The trial court declared “that Tommie Broadwater is not entitled to become a candidate for any constitutionally created office in 1986 unless he complies with all the requirements imposed by the laws of this State in 1986 ____” An appeal to the Court of Special Appeals followed.

We granted a writ of certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the intermediate appellate court. ⁶⁰² In this Court Broadwater’s arguments are based entirely upon the equal protection clause of U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 2 We assume for the purpose of our decision in this case that Broadwater has standing to represent the class of all unregistered voters who are barred from elective office. According to Broadwater approximately 40% of those in Prince George’s County and 30% of the people in Maryland who are 18 years of age or older are not registered to vote and therefore are unable to run for office. Broadwater contends that this group by not being able to seek elective office is deprived of equal protection of the laws.

Last year in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), Justice White declared for the Court: “The Equal Protection Clause of. the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 [, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 ] (1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce this mandate, but absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have themselves devised stan ⁶⁰³ dards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 [, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080-81 , 67 L.Ed.2d 186 ] (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 [, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368 ] (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 [, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943 , 59 L.Ed.2d 171 ] (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 [, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 ] (1976). When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174, [101 S.Ct. at 459]; New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, at 303 [, 96 S.Ct. at 2516-17 ], and the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes. “The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 [, 85 S.Ct. 283, 288 , 13 L.Ed.2d 222 ] (1964); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 , [ 91 S.Ct. 1848 , 29 L.Ed.2d 534 ] (1971). Similar oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 [, 89 S.Ct. 1886 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583 ] (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 [, 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 ] (1969); ⁶⁰⁴ Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 [, 62 S.Ct. 1110 , 86 L.Ed. 1655 ] (1942).” 473 U.S. at —, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55 , 87 L.Ed.2d at 320 .

The personal right found in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 , 89 S.Ct. 1886 , 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969), to be protected by the Constitution was the right to vote. The right protected in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), was the right to travel. The rights to procreate and to marry were found to be protected in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 , 62 S.Ct. 1110 , 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942).

Broadwater contends that strict scrutiny should be applied in this case. However, the classifications here do not pertain to race, alienage, national origin, or “personal rights protected by the Constitution,” mentioned by the Court in Cleburne as areas for strict scrutiny. Broadwater would like to equate the right of an unregistered voter to seek elective office with the right to vote. According to an affidavit of the Deputy Administrator of Election Laws filed in the trial court: “In a period beginning January, 1984 and ending June, 1985, 243,685 individuals in the State of Maryland have been removed from the rolls of registered voters. 24,390 have been removed because of death, 87,491 because of their failure to maintain their status as a resident of the state, 104,688 because they have not voted at least once at a primary, general or special election within the five preceding calendar years, and 1,226 because they have been convicted of theft or other infamous crimes.

Additionally, 25,890 have been removed for reasons including but not limited to cancellation upon voters’ requests, failure to change address within the county of residence and registration at a business address.” (Emphasis in original.) Since by far the larger number removed from the voting lists was because of their failure to vote “at