Broady v. Baltimore Transit Co.

Prescott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case below was submitted to a jury after the taking of testimony and instructions from the trial Judge, and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. In due course, judgment on this verdict was made absolute in favor of the defendant for costs, and the plaintiff below entered an appeal to this Court. On February 21, 1955, in the early afternoon, Lucy Broady, ³⁷⁹ together with her infant daughter, Phyllis, aged three years, the appellant here, boarded a street-car owned and operated by The Baltimore Transit Company, the appellee.

Shortly before reaching her intended destination, Mrs. Broady pulled the signal cord, and proceeded with the plaintiff to the side doors located at the center of the street-car to alight. These doors are two in number and are opened and closed by electricity. When a weight of fourteen pounds or more is placed upon a treadle and the car is at a standstill, the doors are caused to open; and the electrical mechanism is set for the doors to remain open for two seconds, or slightly more, and then to close. Mrs. Broady testified she had Phyll'is in her left arm at the time and “we stepped” down.

The record fails to disclose with clarity just how Mrs. Broady stated she was holding the child, although she demonstrated this to the jury. The best we can gather from the record is that she claimed she had Phyllis under her left arm, with Phyllis’ head forward and her feet dangling to the rear; that Mrs. Broady stepped down and was outside of the doors when she heard Phyllis screaming; that she looked and one of Phyllis’ ankles was caught between the doors; and that Mrs. Broady also started screaming, whereupon, in a couple of seconds the doors were opened and Phyllis’ foot was released. Relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, this was all of the evidence offered by the plaintiff excepting that which related to her injuries. The appellee then called the operator of the street-car, who was a man of thirty years of experience in that field of endeavor.

He testified that on the occasion of the accident he heard the signal bell and made a normal stop; that he was in the process of permitting a passenger to leave by the front door, over which he had complete control; that a short while thereafter, he heard some one “holler” and his signal bell for an emergency, ring; that the doors are equipped with “pieces” of rubber where they meet in the center, and, inside of the rubber, there is something that causes the emergency bell to ring and that cuts off the power to start the car, when any object is caught between the doors; that upon hearing the bell, he immediately pushed his emergency switch that ³⁸⁰ released the doors, finished letting the passenger out of the front door, and then left the car by the front door himself; that he went directly to Mrs. Broady and inquired if the child were hurt; and, that upon being assured she was not, he proceeded on his trip. He further testified that he had inspected the doors when he started to work that day, and they were in good working condition; that after the accident, as soon as he arrived at the car barn he requested the shop man to inspect the doors; that the operator of a car has no control over the center door operation, excepting the emergency switch, which releases the power that closes them; and that he was equipped with a rear-view mirror but did not watch Mrs. Broady and the plaintiff “get off”, something that he was not required to do. Whereupon, a Mrs. Fulton, another passenger, was called by the appellee and stated she saw Mrs. Broady when she rang the bell to stop the car; that when Mrs. Broady “stepped down” she held the baby by the hand, and, when the door opened, Mrs. Broady picked up the baby; that when Mrs. Broady and the child were both on the outside, but the child’s foot was still on the inside, the door closed; and, that very shortly thereafter, the child’s foot was released. The appellee next produced its former maintenance supervisor who testified that he had been employed by the appellee for thirty-six years; that two seconds is considered a safe interval of time from the time weight is removed from the treadle until the doors start to close; that this interval was set by the National Company that makes all kinds of equipment for different transit companies throughout this country; and, that he had tested the doors on the streetcar involved, on the day of the child’s injury, and found them in perfect operating condition and with “proper timing”.

I The appellant, by her counsel, insists that she offered sufficient facts to bring her case within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; that the appellee had exclusive control over, and responsibility for, the doors involved; that the doors closed upon her foot; and, that she suffered consequent' damages. ³⁸¹ She argues that this was all that she was called upon to prove in order to invoke the doctrine, and that she was entitled to an instruction from the trial Court that this made out a prima facie case. Quite a