Brooks v. Ford Motor Credit Co.

Singley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This controversy stems from a simple transaction which took place in October, 1965, when the appellant Brooks bought a used Ford sedan from Archway Motors, Inc. (Archway). Brooks says that Archway’s salesman represented that Archway would maintain collision insurance on the car, although the installment sales contract, which contains elaborate provisions regarding insurance, carries the word “none” on the line “Total Amount Included for Insurance.” Archway assigned the sales contract to Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford). Brooks made 10 monthly payments of $57.58 each to Ford, but stopped in August, 1966, when the car was involved in an accident.

Ford sued Brooks for the balance due on the contract together with the attorney’s fee. Brooks defended the suit, primarily on the ground that a provision of the sales contract contravened Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 83, § 130 (e). 1 Brooks then impleaded Arch ²⁸⁰ way, alleging that any recovery which Ford might achieve would be in consequence of Archway’s alleged misrepresentation. Summary judgment was entered in Ford’s favor, and Brooks has appealed.

This case poses an interesting question which we have heretofore considered only obliquely in cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, Tedrow v. Ford Motor Co., 260 Md. 142 , 271 A. 2d 688 (1970) ; Picking v. State Finance Corp., 257 Md. 554 , 263 A. 2d 572 (1970) ; Parish v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass’n, Inc., 250 Md. 24 , 242 A. 2d 512 (1968) : May a defendant in an action in which he is also a third-party plaintiff appeal from a judgment entered against him while the third-party claim is still pending? Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol.) Art. 5, § 1 provides: “Any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from any final judgment or determination of a court of law in any civil suit or action * * We have consistently held that appeals will lie only from final judgments which settle the rights of the parties or conclude the cause, Tvardek v. Tvardek, 257 Md. 88 , 261 A. 2d 762 (1970) ; Hillyard Constr. Co. v. Lynch, 256 Md. 375 , 260 A. 2d 316 (1970).

We may, proprio motu, dismiss an appeal for cause, Maryland Rule 835 a 2; Harkins v. August, 251 Md. 108 , 246 A. 2d 268 (1968). Brooks had impleaded Archway as permitted by Rule 315 a: “Where the defendant in an action claims that a person not a party to the action is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him, he may at any time after commencement of the action cause to be served a summons and third-party claim, together with a copy of the previous pleadings, upon such third party. The defendant shall also cause a ²⁸¹ copy of the third-party claim to be served on the plaintiff.” We have had occasion to discuss the origins of this rule in White v. Land Homes Corp., 251 Md. 603 , 248 A. 2d 159 (1968) and Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. John C. Grimberg Co., 229 Md. 585 , 185 A. 2d 337 (1962), pointing out that the rule, modeled on Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has as its purpose the avoidance of circuitry of action in order that disputed jural relationships