Brooks v. State

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Retired, Specially Assigned Judge. I Our colonial forefathers had experienced “the close connection of criminal law with politics .... [TJheir constant fear of political oppression through the criminal law led them and the generation following ... to give excessive power to juries and to limit or even cut off the power of the trial judge to control the trial and hold the jury to its ¹⁴⁹ province.” Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 101-102 , 63 A.2d 599 (1949) (quoting R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 122-123). See Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 174-175 , 423 A.2d 558 (1980). Under the Maryland Constitution of 1776 there was lack of uniformity in procedure with respect to criminal cases. “[T]here were opposing views as to the power of a jury in a criminal case, which prevailed in different parts of the state . . . . ” Stevenson at 173 (quoting A. Niles, Maryland Constitutional Law 340 (1915).

To guard in the future against conflicts, the Constitutional Convention of 1851 wrote into the Constitution, as Article X, § 5, that “[i]n the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact.” 1 Under this constitutional prescription this Court had no power to review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal case tried to a jury. State v. Devers and Webster, 260 Md. 360, 369 , 272 A.2d 794 , cert. denied, Devers v. Maryland, 404 U.S. 824 , 92 S.Ct. 50 , 30 L.Ed.2d 52 (1971). This lack was remedied, after the passage of 100 years, by an amendment to the Constitution. Acts 1949, Ch. 407, ratified by the voters of this State on 7 November 1950, simply added the proviso, “except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” The amendment was supplemented by the enactment of a statute, now Md.Code (1957,1982 RepLVol.) Article 27, § 593, 2 and implemented by ¹⁵⁰ the adoption of a Maryland Rule of Procedure, now Md.Rule 756., The provisions of § a of the Rule are in substance the same as the provisions of the statute.

Section b of the Rule reads: “If the court grants a motion for judgment of acquittal or determines on its own motion that a judgment of acquittal should be granted, it shall direct the clerk to enter the judgment of acquittal and to note that it has been entered by direction of the court.” The function and effect of a motion for judgment of acquittal emerges bright and clear from its history. Within the limitations noted in Stevenson, 289 Md. at 178-181 , the jury remain the judges of law and fact. In determining the disposition of a motion for judgment of acquittal, however, the trial court is passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 387 , 255 A.2d 5 (1969), cert. denied, Gray v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 944 , 90 S.Ct. 961 , 25 L.Ed.2d 126 (1970); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 384-385 , 183 A.2d 359 (1962), appeal dismissed, Giles v. Maryland, 372 U.S. 767 , 83 S.Ct. 1102 , 10 L.Ed.2d 137 (1963).

If the trial judge finds any relevant evidence which is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, he must deny the motion for judgment of acquittal and allow the evidence to go before the trier of fact. The defendant is entitled to have the denial reviewed on appeal. 3 ¹⁵¹ If the trial judge finds that there is no relevant evidence which is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, he must grant the motion for judgment of acquittal. When the motion is duly granted, the defendant stands acquitted on the offense to which the motion is directed. The grant has the same force and effect as the return of a verdict of not guilty by the trier of fact, be it the court or a jury.

This assertion finds support in the fact that the motion for judgment of acquittal has been substituted, in criminal causes, for a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty and for an instruction that the evidence is insufficient in law to sustain a conviction. Because of the substitution, the motion for a directed verdict and the instruction to the jury as to the sufficiency of the evidence were no longer necessary and were dropped from the Rules of Procedure. See Committee note to Md.Rule 756. Thus it is clear that the grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal was intended to have the same effect as the direction of a verdict of not guilty and as an instruction that the evidence is insufficient in law to sustain a conviction, which would call for the rendering of a verdict of not guilty.

II The Grand Jury for the body of the City of Baltimore returned a number of indictments presenting that Karl Levi Brooks had committed various offenses arising from the murder of Keith Bee during an armed robbery. He was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of robbery with a deadly weapon for which he was sentenced to 20 years, of conspiracy to commit armed robbery for which he was sentenced to 15 years and for carrying a deadly weapon with intent to injure for which he was sentenced to three years. The sentences were to run consec ¹⁵² utively for a total of 38 years. Brooks noted an appeal.

On our own motion, before decision by the Court of Special Appeals, we ordered that the record and proceedings be certified to us for review. At the close of evidence offered by the State, the defense made a motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge that Brooks conspired to commit armed robbery of Bee. In support of the motion, defense counsel argued that the evidence was not sufficient to prove the offense and asserted that “the indictment must be dismissed on my motion because there is no evidence whatsoever that Keith Bee is the object of anyone’s conspiracy.” The court asked if the State wished to be heard, and the Assistant State’s Attorney replied, “The State would submit, Your Honor.” The Court then ruled in these words: “All right. I will grant the motion.” Shortly thereafter, following the disposition of various other motions for judgment of acquittal, the Assistant State’s Attorney again brought up the matter of the conspiracy charge, saying, “I realize that the Court has already ruled on the indictment [charging] conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

I did submit on that, Your Honor, and the Court granted the motion for judgment of acquittal. I would like the Court to reconsider that, Your Honor, if you will.” The court heard from the prosecutor, who argued that, despite his submission, there was evidence before the jury which was legally sufficient to prove the conspiracy. Defense counsel reacted immediately. He pointed out that the court had already granted the motion and that to reverse that ruling would be not only “highly unusual” but “improper.” He observed that when the motion was originally made the State was given the opportunity to speak to it, but had submitted. “The Court has had an opportunity to hear all the evidence that [the prosecutor] just referred to and I ask the Court not to reverse its ruling because I think it’s highly improper and prejudicial to the Defendant.” After further argument during which defense counsel emphasized the impropriety of a reversal of the original ruling, the judge ventured that “a preliminary ruling on a motion can ¹⁵³ be reconsidered.

I don’t think the Court is bound by its ruling.” He decided: “I will alter it to this extent, gentlemen. I will reserve ruling on the motion.” The defense offered no evidence. Defense counsel reminded the court that it had held sub curia the State’s request to reopen the motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. The judge indicated that he was still reserving the ruling.

At a bench conference the prosecutor observed that he and defense counsel were in the same predicament with respect to the conspiracy charge — “we don’t know how to argue.” The judge stated: “Reserving gives me a right to wait until after the defense has presented its case to rule on [the motion for judgment of acquittal], but if it’s not ruled on . . . at the end of the case — it's equal to a denial, but I was unmindful of the fact that you’re not putting on a defense.” The judge made clear that he was going to allow the conspiracy charge to go to the jury. Reversing himself, he expressly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Defense counsel observed that he thought that his “exception [was] noted for the record.” The instructions which the court gave the jury included instructions with respect to the conspiracy offense. As we have seen, the jury found Brooks guilty of that crime, and the court imposed a 15 year sentence thereon to run consecutively to the other sentences imposed.

The issue before us is the propriety of the actions of the trial judge with respect to the motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Ill In Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701 , 319 A.2d 542 (1974), we found it to be “settled that once the trier of fact in a criminal case, whether it be the jury or the judge, intentionally renders a verdict of ‘not guilty,’ the verdict is final and the defendant cannot later be retried on or found guilty of ¹⁵⁴ the same charge.” Id. at 706 , 319 A.2d 542 . 4 We have observed, supra, that the grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal has the same force and effect as the return of a verdict of not guilty by the trier of fact, be it the court or a jury. Therefore, the teachings of Pugh are applicable to the grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal. 5 Contrary to what the trial judge suggested and the State now argues, the grant of the motion was not “merely preliminary.” It was effective as a final disposition of the conspiracy charge. The State presents the notion that the ruling was “one of law, not fact.” But, when the court granted the motion, evidence relating to the conspiracy was before the court.

Defense counsel had argued that the evidence was not legally sufficient to prove the offense. The State did not dispute this at the time but simply submitted. The court granted the motion. To assert that the ruling was “one of law, not fact,” is not only specious but also captious.

It is obvious that the grant of the motion was predicated, as it had to be, on a review by the judge ¹⁵⁵ with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, and that he found that it was not legally sufficient to sustain