Brotman v. McNamara

Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. As a result of a collision on Park Heights Avenue in Baltimore City on November 5, 1941, at 2.30 o’clock P. M., suit was brought by the appellee, McNamara, against Brotman. After filing the general issue plea, Brotman filed a petition under Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1941 (adding Sections 21-29 to Article 50, Code, 1939), asking for leave to serve a summons on Eppes and Jacob Levin and Benjamin Levin. An order was passed grant ²²⁶ ing the prayer of this petition and subsequently Brotman filed a pleading as third-party plaintiff against the three defendants brought into the case on his petition-, in which pleading it was alleged the third-party defendants were solely responsible for the collision.

To his pleading, each of the third-party defendants filed the general issue plea. By directed verdicts, the case was withdrawn from the consideration of the jury as to the third-party defendants, and Brotman’s motion for a directed verdict in his favor having been overruled, and the verdict being against him, he brings these appeals. . The collision occurred in the north lane of the 3600 block of Park Heights Avenue in Baltimore City. McNamara was driving a Ford sedan in the north lane of the avenue, following the automobile of Eppes.

Ahead of both of them was the Levin truck, which had been parked parallel to the curb, but was being maneuvered out into traffic. When McNamara first saw the truck he was about 100 feet to the reár of it and approximately one and one-half car lengths behind Eppes. The truck was then on an angle of about forty-five degrees with the curb and McNamara testified he thought there was insufficient room for the Eppes car to pass the truck in its then position, so he applied his brakes and reduced his speed, which was then about twenty miles per hour, at the same time signalling traffic behind him by extending his left arm out the window. McNamara testified he had his car under perfect control at all times and that his rear signal lights were in good condition just prior to the collision.

Eppes’ car and the truck collided, but McNamara brought his car to a stop about four or five feet behind Eppes’. The cab, owned by the appellant, then struck the back of McNamara’s car, driving it forward into that of Eppes’. In addition to damage to his automobile, McNamara claimed damages for personal injuries and loss of earnings.. Although Eppes testified there were two impacts against the rear of his car after he struck Levin’s truck, ²²⁷ Jacob Levin, the truck driver, testified he was sure the Eppes and McNamara cars did not touch each other until the cab collided with the latter.

The operator of the taxicab did not testify. The appellant has abandoned all but his 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th and 19th exceptions and all of these relate to the prayers and the oral instructions given by the court. The 8th and 9th relate to the directed verdict in favor of the Levins and the 10th, 11th and 12th to like action as to Eppes. The appellant argues that the plaintiff was permitted to choose the defendant.he wanted to hold and by limiting his testimony to that defendant, has defeated the purpose of the Uniform Contribution Among the Joint Tortfeasors Act, which is Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1941.

We do not agree with appellant’s contention that the purpose of - the Act has been defeated in this case. By Section 27 (a) thereof, it is provided: “Before answering, a defendant seeking contribution in a tort action may move ex parte or, after answering, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and pleading upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable as a joint tortfeasor to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him. If the motion is granted and the summons and pleading are