Brown v. Handgun Permit Review Board

⁴⁵⁹ MEREDITH, J. The Maryland State Police (“MSP”) denied the application of Ralph Coleman Brown, Jr., appellant, to renew his permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun. Initially, the MSP informed Brown by letter that his application was denied due to his “propensity for instability.” But, at an informal review of the decision to deny, the MSP informed Brown in person that the real reason was his 1984 conviction in the District of Columbia for possession of a dangerous weapon. That misdemeanor offense carried a maximum sentence of one year of imprisonment in the District of Columbia. Brown was sentenced to probation.

Despite the fact that Brown had not been sentenced to imprisonment, the MSP took the position that Brown had been convicted of an offense that constitutes a “disqualifying crime” as defined by Maryland Code (2003), Public Safety Article (“PS”), § 5-101(g)(3), and he is therefore ineligible under PS § 5-133(b)(l) to possess a handgun. The MSP reached this conclusion by relying upon a recently issued opinion from the Maryland Attorney General, 91 Op. Att’y Gen. 68, 80 (Md. 2006), that had concluded: The phrase “disqualifying crime” includes out-of-State offenses, as well as those committed in Maryland. An offense in another state that would be classified as a misdemeanor in Maryland with a potential penalty under Maryland law in excess of two years imprisonment falls within that definition.

Thus, an individual who has been convicted of such an offense may not possess a regulated firearm in Maryland. Applying the analysis set forth in 91 Op. Att’y Gen. 68, the MSP reasoned that the D.C. crime of possession of a dangerous weapon is equivalent to the Maryland crime of wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor which is punishable in Maryland by imprisonment of up to three years, and, for that reason, is clearly a disqualifying crime within the meaning of PS § 5-101(g)(3). ⁴⁶⁰ Brown appealed to the Handgun Permit Review Board (“the Board”), appellee, which adopted the reasoning of the MSP and affirmed the denial of Brown’s permit application. Brown then petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Frederick County.

The circuit court affirmed the Board’s denial of the permit application. On appeal to this Court, Brown presents four questions, which he phrased as follows: 1 []. Is Attorney General’s Opinion, 91 Op. Atty.

Gen. 68, unconstitutional, unenforceable, and in conflict with federal law? Additionally, is the MSP, H[P]RB, and Circuit Court for Frederick Cou[nty]’s reliance upon this A.G. Opinion misplaced as a result, since the Opinion holds that a person can be disqualified from possessing a firearm because Maryland law enforcement personnel may apply the Maryland penalty to a misdemeanor conviction from another jurisdiction, and further, that Maryland may apply the penalty as it is at the current time, not as it was at the time of the offense to any prior conviction? [ 2], Is the Attorney General’s Opinion, 91 Op. Atty. Gen. 68, in conflict with Maryland Law, wherein it would render all guilty pleas null and void because they would no longer be “knowing and voluntary” since the penalty for the offense could change at any moment and be applied to the prior conviction? 3.

If this Court finds the Attorney General’s Opinion, 91 Op. Atty. [Gen.] 68, to be valid and good law, is the Maryland offense of “wearing and carrying” with intent to injure the equivalent offense to the D.C. offense of “possession” of a prohibited weapon? 4. Was Mr. Brown denied appropriate procedural due process, as required under the Administrative Procedures Act, Maryland Law, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, when the formal written notice apprising him of the reason for which he was denied did not use the same reason as stated at his informal review and is not the same as the reason stated at his HPRB hearing in this matter? ⁴⁶¹ With respect to the first three questions, we note that the Attorney General’s opinion itself is not the direct object of our judicial review. Rather, it is the ruling of the Board that we are called upon to review.

Nevertheless, we conclude that a fair reading of Brown’s first three questions, when considered together, is: (1) whether the Board made an error of law by adopting the legal analysis set forth in 91 Op. Att’y. Gen. 68, and, (2) if not, whether the Board erred in concluding that Brown was convicted of a misdemeanor in the District of Columbia for which the equivalent Maryland offense carries a potential statutory penalty of more than two years. We conclude that the Board did not err in either determination.

Further, we answer “no” to Brown’s fourth question. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which affirmed the ruling of the Board. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Maryland law requires a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun. PS § 5-303.

Pursuant to PS § 5-306(a), if the applicant is not under the age of 30, the Secretary of the MSP shall issue a permit within a reasonable time to a person who the Secretary finds: (1) is an adult; (2) (i) has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemean- or for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed; or (ii) if convicted of a crime described in item (i) of this item, has been pardoned or has been granted relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925 (c); (3) has not been convicted of a crime involving the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance; (4) is not presently an alcoholic, addict, or habitual user of a controlled dangerous substance unless the habitual use of the controlled dangerous substance is under legitimate medical direction; and (5) based on an investigation: ⁴⁶² (i) has not exhibited a propensity for violence or instability that may reasonably render the person’s possession of a handgun a danger to the person or to another; and (ii) has good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger. [1] The permit expires two years after issuance, but may be renewed for successive three year periods “if, at the time of an application for renewal, the applicant possesses the qualifications for the issuance of a permit and pays the renewal fee____” PS § 5-309. If the MSP denies a permit application, the applicant is entitled to an informal review by the MSP pursuant to PS § 5-311. And if the informal review does not resolve the dispute, the applicant may request a review by the Board pursuant to PS § 5-312. The Board may receive and consider additional evidence, and may either “sustain, reverse, or modify the decision of the Secretary” of the MSP.

PS § 5-312(d)(2) provides: “If the action by the Board results in the denial of a permit or renewal of a permit or the revocation or limitation of a permit, the Board shall submit in writing to the applicant or the holder of the permit the reasons for the action taken by the Board.” In 1997, Brown first obtained a handgun permit. Over the course of the following years, he successfully renewed that permit twice. Handgun permit applicants must disclose any crimes of which they have been convicted. On each of his applications, Brown noted that, as a result of a November ⁴⁶³ 1983 incident, he had been convicted of possession of a prohibited weapon in January 1984, in the District of Columbia.

D.C.Code § 22-3214 (1981) (recodified at D.C.Code § 22-4514 (2008)). 2 At the time of Brown’s conviction, as today, that crime was a misdemeanor under D.C. law, punishable by up to one year in prison. D.C.Code §§ 22-3214(c), 22-3215 (recodi-fied at D.C.Code § 22-4515 (2008)); see Henson v. United States, 399 A.2d 16, 20 (D.C.1979) (“Largely for historical reasons, the courts in this jurisdiction generally define ‘felony’ as any offense for which the maximum penalty provided for the offense is imprisonment for more than one year; generally, all other crimes are misdemeanors.”). PS § 5-133(b) states: “A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) has been convicted of a disqualifying crime.... ” “Regulated firearms” are a class of firearms that includes handguns. PS § 5-101(p).

PS § 5-101(g) defines a “disqualifying crime” as “(1) a crime of violence; (2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years.” 3 ⁴⁶⁴ Before the spring of 2006, the MSP had interpreted PS § 5-101(g)(3)—and its statutory predecessors—such that Brown’s D.C. conviction was not a disqualifying crime. The MSP’s position with respect to Brown’s D.C. conviction changed after the Maryland Attorney General issued an opinion on March 27, 2006, interpreting PS § 5-101(g)(3). 91 Op. Att’y Gen. 68 (Md.2006). In response to an inquiry from the Superintendent of the MSP, the Attorney General opined that, when the MSP applies PS § 5—101(g)(3) to an out-of-state conviction, the agency should examine the equivalent Maryland offense that exists at present (rather than the equivalent extant at the time of the conviction).

It was the Attorney General’s opinion that, if the Maryland equivalent is a misdemeanor that carries a potential penalty in Maryland of more than two years’ imprisonment, then, under Maryland’s firearms statutes, the person has been convicted of a disqualifying crime, and cannot legally possess a regulated firearm. Id. at 68. Two months after the Attorney General’s opinion was published, on May 25, 2006, Brown applied for the third renewal of his handgun permit. Once again, he listed his D.C. conviction on his permit application.

He handwrote the following explanation: 11/83 Possession of a prohibited weapon (pipe) D.C. Superior Court ■ Got into an altercation with another male. I received probation (unsupervised) This information was on my original application On June 5, 2006, the MSP sent Brown a letter informing him that his application had been denied because he “[e]xhibit-ed a propensity for instability.” The letter further informed Brown that he could request that the MSP conduct an informal review of the denial. ⁴⁶⁵ Brown did request an informal review, which took place on June 7, 2006. At the informal review, the MSP informed Brown in person (although it never has done so by written notice) that the actual reason for the denial was the MSP’s determination that his 1984 conviction was for a disqualifying crime that rendered him ineligible, under PS § 5—133(b)(1), to possess a handgun. Adopting the Attorney General’s interpretation of PS § 5—101(g)(3), the MSP concluded that the Maryland equivalent of D.C.Code § 22-3214 is Maryland Code (2002), Criminal Law Article (“CR”), § 4-101(c)(2), which forbids wearing or carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure. 4 Under CR § 4-101(d)(l), the Maryland offense is a misdemeanor punishable by up to three years in prison.

Accordingly, the MSP found that Brown had been convicted of a disqualifying crime. At the conclusion of the informal review, the MSP affirmed its denial of Brown’s application. Brown sought review of the MSP’s decision by the Handgun Permit Review Board, which held a hearing on the matter of Brown’s application on October 4, 2006. At the hearing, Brown and an MSP officer who had reviewed the permit application testified.

On October 25, 2006, the Board issued its final decision and order, that concluded as follows: Findings of Fact The Board finds the applicant pled guilty to and was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon in Washington D.C. on January 6, 1984. The Board finds that the Maryland equivalent of possession of a prohibited weapon is a misdemeanor that could carry a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both. Conclusions of Law Based upon its findings of fact, the Board concludes, based on the Attorney General’s opinion regarding the ⁴⁶⁶ conversion of out-of-state crimes to Maryland crimes that the applicant pled guilty and was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon in the District of Columbia; the Maryland equivalent to possession of prohibiting [sic] weapon is stated under Section 4-101(c)(2) of the Criminal Law, Annp-tated Code of Maryland—a person may not wear or carry a dangerous weapon. Section 4-101(d)(l) states a person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $1,000 or both....

Therefore this conviction would prohibit the applicant from possessing a firearm pursuant to Section 5—133(b)(1) of the Public Safety Article, Annotated Code of Maryland—a person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person has been convicted of a disqualifying crime. Under 5-101(g)(3) a disqualifying crime means a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years. The Board affirmed the denial of Brown’s permit by a vote of three to zero. Two Board members abstained, expressing their concern that the Attorney General’s definition of a “disqualifying crime” under PS § 5—133(b)(1) could be, as Brown alleged, in conflict with federal firearms law.

Brown next petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-202 (2008), and PS § 5-312(e). The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. DISCUSSION I. Appellate Review of the Board’s Ruling The standard for appellate review of a ruling of an administrative agency was described as follows in Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185,192-93 , 950 A.2d 766 (2008) (footnote omitted): When reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, ... we review the agency’s decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court.

Anderson v. General Casualty, ⁴⁶⁷ 402 Md. 236, 244 , 935 A.2d 746, 751 (2007). A reviewing court will affirm the decision of the [agency] when it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record and it is not erroneous as a matter of law. Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 535 , 890 A.2d 279, 283 (2006); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834 , 490 A.2d 1296, 1300-01 (1985). Because an agency’s decision is presumed prima facie correct, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency.

Comptroller v. Citicorp, 389 Md. 156, 163 , 884 A.2d 112, 116 (2005). Indeed, “it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence it is for the agency to draw the inferences.” Id. at 163-64 , 884 A.2d at 116 (quoting Ramsay, 302 Md. at 835 , 490 A.2d at 1301 ). When we review an agency decision that is a mixed question of law and fact, we apply “the substantial evidence test, that is, the same standard of review [we] would apply to an agency factual finding.” Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486 , 522 n. 8, 924 A.2d 1129 , 1149 n. 8 (2007). We review questions of law de novo, although we give weight to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing where the interpretation is longstanding and falls within the agency’s area of expertise.

Colburn v. Dept. of Correctional Services, 403 Md. 115, 128 , 939 A.2d 716 (2008) (citing Schwartz v. DNR, 385 Md. 534, 554 , 870 A.2d 168 (2005)); see Opert v. Criminal Injuries, 403 Md. 587 , 604 n. 8, 943 A.2d 1229 (2008) (“Because this appears to be a case of first impression, we discern no long-standing or consistent practice by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board to which particular deference would be due.”). In this case, we decline to give significant weight to the Board’s present interpretation of PS § 5—101(g)(3). The fact that Brown had been issued three previous handgun permits demonstrates that the Board’s present interpretation is not “long-standing.” Indeed, the transcript of Brown’s hearing before the Board suggests that his case may be the first time ⁴⁶⁸ the Board had applied an interpretation of PS § 5-101 (g)(3) in accordance with 91 Op. Att’y Gen. 68.

With respect to matters of statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals said in Opert, supra, 403 Md. at 593, 943 A.2d 1229 : The overarching rule is that, in construing statutes, “our primary goal is always ‘to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision ... ’ ” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172 , 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007), citing Dep’t of Health v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20 , 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007), and Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352 , 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). If the language is clear and unambiguous, we ordinarily “need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.” Barbre, supra, 402 Md. at 173 , 935 A.2d at 709 . If, upon this preliminary analysis, however, we conclude that “the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose.” Barbre, supra, 402 Md. at 173, 935 A.2d at 709 ; Patterson Park v. Teachers Union, 399 Md. 174, 198 , 923 A.2d 60, 74 (2007).

To the extent relevant, we look as well to “the statute’s structure, including the title, and how the statute relates to other laws.” Stouffer v. Pearson, 390 Md. 36, 46 , 887 A.2d 623, 629 (2005). Additionally, “a statute will be construed so as to avoid a conflict with the Constitution whenever that course is reasonably possible.” Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 425 , 921 A.2d 171 (2007) (quoting In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 327 , 455 A.2d 966 (1983)).

II

Notice At the outset, we dispose of Brown’s fourth question, in which he raises a claim of denial of procedural due process. Brown contends that the MSP violated § 10-207(b) of Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article (“SG”)—which requires that an agency give reasonable notice of the facts underlying its decisions—by falsely notifying him ⁴⁶⁹ by letter that his permit application was denied due to a “propensity for instability.” Brown also contends that the MSP’s failure to notify him in writing of the true reason for denial of his application violated his constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. 24 of the Maryland Constitution. The Board acknowledges in its brief that the written notice of denial provided to Brown by the MSP “did not state the actual basis for the disapproval of his application,” “did not cite any facts in support of the violations alleged, and misstated the reason for disapproval.” But the Board counters, and Brown does not dispute, that the MSP provided Brown actual notice of the real reason for the permit denial at the informal MSP hearing, approximately four months prior to the Board’s hearing. The Board contends, therefore, that Brown had adequate notice of the reason for denial of his application prior to the Board’s hearing, such that he was not prejudiced, and there was no denial of due process.

In other contexts, it has been held that actual notice compensates for a failure to provide notice as required by statute, unless the statute prescribes a sanction for the violation (which SG § 10-207 does not). See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210 , 328 A.2d 737 (1974); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 467-70 , 597 A.2d 939 (1991) (allowing agency’s disciplinary action to proceed despite untimeliness where statute did not prescribe a sanction and there was no demonstrated prejudice); cf. Gorge v. State, 386 Md. 600, 614-15 , 873 A.2d 1171 (2005) (sentence of life without parole unavailable where State gave actual but not written notice as required by CR § 2-203). Other cases have held that there was no independent violation of the constitutional right to due process where there was actual notice. Dept. of Education v. Shoop, 119 Md.App. 181, 204 , 704 A.2d 499 (1998) (citing Barnes, supra, 273 Md. at 210 , 328 A.2d 737 , and Clark v. Wolman, 243 Md. 597, 600 , 221 A.2d 687 (1966)).

Although actual notice must sufficiently precede the hearing that follows in order for the notice to satisfy due process concerns, see Casey v. Rockville, 400 Md. 259, 319 , 929 ⁴⁷⁰ A.2d 74 (2007) (“due process requires the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”) (quoting Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 30 , 410 A.2d 1052 (1980)), and Brown did not receive notice of the reason for denial of his application in time to effectively prepare for the informal review before the MSP, he did receive actual notice four months prior to his hearing before the Board. The Board is authorized to receive additional evidence. It reviews the MSP’s decision de novo, and has final say over a permit application. Accordingly, Brown had sufficient notice to provide him due process and negate any prejudice resulting from the failure of the MSP to advise him in writing of the reason it denied his application.

Therefore, the error by the MSP provides no basis for vacating the Board’s decision.

III

A. Application of PS § 5-133(b)(l) to Handgun Permits Before reaching the remainder of Brown’s arguments, we note that there is a discrepancy between the statutory definition in PS § 5-101(g) of a “disqualifying crime” that precludes a person from legally purchasing or possessing a regulated firearm in Maryland and the statutory standards in PS § 5-306 pertaining to issuance of a handgun permit. 5 The disqualifying convictions described in PS § 5-306(a)(2) and (3) are: “a felony or ... misdemeanor for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than 1 year has been imposed,” and “a crime ⁴⁷¹ involving the possession, use, or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance.” Neither of those disqualifications applies to Brown. Nevertheless, Brown has not argued that PS § 5-306 requires the MSP to issue a handgun permit to a person who, under PS § 5—133(b)(1), may not legally possess a handgun because of having committed a disqualifying crime. And it would produce an absurd result to construe PS § 5-306(a) to require the issuance of a handgun permit to a person ineligible to possess a handgun. Accordingly, we shall assume arguen-do that the Board may properly deny a handgun permit to anyone who has committed a disqualifying crime under PS § 5-101(g) and is prohibited from possessing a handgun under PS § 5—133(b)(1).

B. Which State’s Maximum Penalty Should Determine Whether An Applicant’s Conviction was for a Disqualifying Crime? Brown contends that the question of whether an out-of-state conviction is a disqualifying crime under PS § 5—101(g)(3) should be determined by looking to the maximum punishment for the offense in the convicting jurisdiction, not the punishment available under the equivalent Maryland offense. Brown asserts that, because the maximum penalty for his offense in D.C. was (and is) only one year in prison, the Board erred in concluding that he had been convicted of a disqualifying crime under PS § 5—101(g)(3). Brown argues that the Attorney General’s interpretation of PS § 5—101(g)(3)—adopted by the Board—is wrong.

He asserts that it is impractical to apply. Brown further argues the ⁴⁷² Attorney General’s interpretation is contrary to the generally accepted interpretation of a similar federal law and therefore violates the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and Art. 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Finally, Brown argues the interpretation would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art. IV, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 We first explain why the Attorney General’s interpretation—as adopted and applied by the Board—is a correct reading of PS § 5—101(g)(3). We then explain why that interpretation does not run afoul of either federal law or the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 1.

Statutory Text and Legislative History In Wyatt v. State, 169 Md.App. 394, 402-03 , 901 A.2d 271 (2006), we were called upon to construe PS § 5—101(g)(3). We ⁴⁷³ reviewed the phrase “carries a statutory penalty of,” and concluded that that statutory language was not ambiguous with respect to the issue raised in that case. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals noted in Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 689 , 861 A.2d 727 (2004), “ ‘[statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.’ ” (Quoting Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648 , 689 A.2d 610 (1997).) Because the language the General Assembly chose to describe disqualifying misdemeanors in PS § 5-101(g)(3) can support more than one possible interpretation, the phrase is ambiguous with respect to which state’s penalty is the proper measure. At the outset of its analysis of PS § 5-101(g)(3), the Attorney General’s opinion identified several possible interpretations, 91 Op.

Att’y Gen. at 70-71: As indicated above, [PS § 5-101(g)(3) ] defines “disqualifying crime” to include “a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory penalty of more than two years.” You ask whether this provision encompasses out-of-State misdemeanor convictions that would carry a maximum penalty of at least two years if committed in Maryland. The literal language of the statute is not dispositive of your question as there are potentially several ways to interpret it. First, it could be construed to describe only Maryland convictions. In that case, the answer to your question would be simple: an out-of-State conviction would never be a disqualifying crime under this provision.

Second, the phrase could be construed to include out-of-State convictions—specifically, certain convictions for offenses that would be “classified as a misdemeanor in the State” if committed in Maryland. However, there remains some ambiguity as to the universe of such offenses that are disqualifying crimes under this interpretation. On the one hand, the language could encompass only those out-of-State ⁴⁷⁴ offenses that would be classified as misdemeanors in Maryland and that carry a penalty in excess of two years under the law of the state of conviction. Under that view, the benchmark is the potential penalty in the other state.

Cf., e.g., State v. Langlands, 276 Ga. 721 , 583 S.E.2d 18, 19-22 (2003) (construing Georgia felon-in-possession statute not to encompass Pennsylvania manslaughter conviction classified as a misdemeanor in Pennsylvania). Alternatively, it could include any out-of-State offense that would be classified as a misdemeanor if committed in Maryland and that would carry a maximum sentence in excess of two years if committed in Maryland, regardless of the sentence that the other state has designated for the offense. Cf., e.g., State v. Pollard, 273 Kan. 706 , 44 P.3d 1261 (2002) (construing Kansas felon-in-possession law to be triggered by a Missouri disposition involving probation before imposition of sentence, even though such a disposition is not considered a conviction under Missouri law). To resolve these interpretive issues, it is helpful to review the legislative history of PS § 5-101(g)(3) and, for reasons that shall become apparent, an analogous federal law.

The Attorney General noted that Maryland enacted a statute in 1941 that made it illegal to sell a handgun to a person who had been convicted of a crime of violence. According to the Attorney General, the legislative evolution of the current statutes that disqualify certain persons from possessing firearms began with that enactment, id. at 73-76: The precursor of PS § 5-133 was enacted in 1941. Chapter 622, Laws of Maryland 1941, then codified at Article 27, § 531D. That law made it illegal to sell or otherwise transfer a handgun to a person who “has been convicted of a crime of violence ...” Id.

It was “intended to prevent those who have already demonstrated a propensity for violence, as evidenced by a conviction of a crime of violence, from possessing handguns.” Johnson v. State, 67 Md.App. 347, 378, 507 A.2d 1134 , cert. denied, 307 Md. 260 , 513 A.2d 314 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 , 107 S.Ct. 594 , 93 L.Ed.2d 595 (1986). The statute defined “crime of violence” by listing ⁴⁷⁵ various crimes, without explicitly indicating any limits on the jurisdiction of conviction. The statute also disqualified a “fugitive from justice” from possessing a handgun. It defined “fugitive from justice” to include anyone “who has fled from any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or possession of the United States, to avoid prosecution for a crime of violence[.]” This indicates that “crime of violence” was not a phrase confined to Maryland offenses.

In 1966, the firearms law was substantially revised. Chapter 502, Laws of Maryland 1966. Under those amendments, an individual could not purchase a handgun from a firearms dealer unless the purchaser could truthfully attest that he or she had not been convicted “in this State or elsewhere” of a crime of violence or certain firearms crimes. Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 27, § 442(e)(2)(i) (1967 Repl.Vol.).

Similarly, in order to obtain a license to deal in firearms, an individual was required to state under penalties of perjury that he or she had not been convicted of the same categories of crimes “in this State or elsewhere.” Id., § 443(d)(4)(iii). The statute also made clear that conviction of such a crime “in this State or elsewhere” would result in revocation of the dealer’s license. Id., § 443(h)(2). Over the next three decades, the Legislature amended the statute in other respects, but retained the references to disqualifying convictions “in this State or elsewhere,” as well as definitional language that referenced prosecutions for “crime of violence” in other jurisdictions.

See Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 27, §§ 441(f), 442(f)(2)(i), 443(d)(4)(iii), and 443(h)(2) (1992 Repl.Vol. & 1995 Cum. Supp.). It was thus clear that the disqualification based on a prior conviction for a crime of violence encompassed convictions in other states. This was consistent with the original purpose of the firearms law—to keep regulated firearms out of the hands of those with an established propensity for serious lawbreaking.

In 1996, the statute was amended to apply to assault rifles, as well as handguns, which were collectively defined as “regulated firearms.” Chapter 561, § 2; Chapter 562, ⁴⁷⁶ § 2, Laws of Maryland 1996. The law was also revised in other respects. Notably, the range of disqualifying crimes was expanded to include misdemeanor offenses. The 1996 amendments were largely based on the recommendations of the Governor’s Commission on Gun Violence (“Commission”).

Among other things, the Commission recommended that Maryland law “incorporate federal law ‘reasons to deny a handgun’ into State law.” Governor’s Commission on Gun Violence, Comprehensive Reform for a Safer Maryland (November 1, 1995), Recommendation No. 17, p. 20. The Commission explained this recommendation: Under federal law, if a person is convicted of any misdemeanor that carries more than a two year term of imprisonment, they are prohibited from owning a firearm. There are approximately 90 misdemeanors in the State of Maryland that trigger this prohibition. Once an individual