Brown v. Legum

BARBERA, J. This appeal involves an attempt by appellant, Shirley Brown, to record in Maryland a judgment she obtained in Colorado against the Estate of Archie Brown, after the estate had closed. Ms. Brown is the widow of Thomas Jordan Brown and Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Brown. Appellee is Alan H. Legum, the Personal Representative of the Estate of Archie Brown (hereafter, “the Estate”). The record does not disclose the relationship between Archie Brown and Shirley and Thomas Brown.

In December 2004, Ms. Brown filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, seeking to have the Colorado judgment recorded in Maryland. The Clerk of the court promptly recorded the judgment. Mr. Legum, as the Personal Representative of the Estate, filed a motion to strike the judgment. Ms. Brown, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Brown, responded with a motion to “retain” the judgment, and the case proceeded to a hearing.

The court later passed an order striking the foreign judgment, precipitating this appeal. BACKGROUND The record does not provide a clear procedural history of the underlying Colorado lawsuit in which Ms. Brown, presumably a Colorado resident, evidently alleged that Archie Brown at one time went to Colorado and exerted undue influence upon her and her husband to obtain money from them. The record does not disclose the date upon which the Colorado suit was filed, and the parties dispute the timing of it. Ms. Brown states in her petition to transfer judgment that the Colorado case “was filed years before the death of Archie Brown.” The ⁴⁰⁴ Estate maintains, however, that Ms. Brown filed suit against it sometime after Archie Brown’s death on July 11, 2000.

The procedural background of the case, is further complicated by the fact that the lawsuit that produced the Colorado judgment was not the only lawsuit filed by Ms. Brown against Archie Brown. The Record Extract contains a “Return of Service” dated February 26, 1999. The return states that Archie Brown was served on February 25, in Annapolis, Maryland, with a copy of a citation issued by the District Court, El Paso County, Colorado in Case No. 97PR92 Division W, “Shirley Brown v. Archie Brown.” The Colorado judgment at issue in this appeal, however, bears the case number 99CV3117, and is captioned “Shirley Brown v. The Estate of Archie Brown.” Ms. Brown declares in one of her papers that “Archie Brown’s attorney,” by whom we surmise she means Mr. Legum, informed her Colorado attorney in September 2002, that Archie Brown had died more than two years earlier. That information evidently prompted Ms. Brown to file a claim with the Register of Wills against the Estate on December 9, 2002.

A Notice of Disallowance of Claim was filed on December 12, 2002. Neither of those documents is in the record. We suspect, however, that the claim was for the same monies sought in the suit that produced the foreign judgment (and perhaps the earlier Colorado suit, as well). The record also contains a “Motion for Entry of Default” dated May 7, 2003, filed by Colorado counsel for Ms. Brown in the Colorado suit involving the foreign judgment. 1 That paper represents the following: “A copy of the Amended Complaint was served on the attorney for Defendant’s Estate on January 7, 2003, as evidenced by the court file”; “No answer has been filed”; and “Plaintiff is entitled to Entry of Default.” ⁴⁰⁵ By “Order of Judgment” dated July 29, 2008, the District Court, El Paso County, Colorado awarded Ms. Brown a default judgment in the amount of $60,000.00 against the Estate of Archie Brown.

The Maryland- Case- On December 4, 2003, Ms. Brown, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Brown, filed the petition to have the Colorado judgment recorded in Maryland. A certified copy of the foreign judgment accompanied the petition. The judgment was recorded later that same day. On December 18, 2003, Mr. Legum, as Personal Representative of the Estate, filed a “Motion to Strike Foreign Judgment.” He stated several grounds in support: (1) the Estate was not properly served with the Colorado lawsuit; (2) the Colorado court did not have jurisdiction over the case because Archie Brown never lived or did business in Colorado; and (3) no claim was filed against the Estate within six months of Archie Brown’s death; indeed, the only claim Ms. Brown filed against the Estate was on December 9, 2002, and was disallowed on December 12, 2002.

Ms. Brown responded with a “Motion to Retain Foreign Judgment.” She alleged, inter alia, without supporting documentation, that Archie Brown had done business in Colorado. On March 1, 2004, the matter came on for a hearing before the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Ms. Brown appeared, pro se, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Brown. Mr. Legum appeared, pro se, as Personal Representative of the Estate.

He proffered that the Orphans’ Court signed an order on November 19, 2002, approving the first and final accounting of Archie Brown’s estate; no exceptions to the order were filed; and the estate was closed by the time Ms. Brown filed her claim on December 9, 2002. In response to Ms. Brown’s argument that she was not timely informed of the death of Archie Brown, Mr. Legum pointed out that a proper notice to creditors was published in The Capital in November 2000. ⁴⁰⁶ As for the argument that the Colorado court lacked jurisdiction over the person of Archie Brown, Mr. Legum proffered that Archie Brown had run a trash hauling business in Anne Arundel County and had never done business outside of Maryland, much less in Colorado. With regard to the Estate’s claim that it never was properly served with the Colorado lawsuit, Mr. Legum informed the court that he had a copy of the motion for default judgment that was filed in the Colorado lawsuit, showing that “service” took the form of leaving a copy of the summons, with Mr. Legum’s secretary, on January 7, 2003. For her part, Ms. Brown reasserted that Archie Brown had done business in Colorado, as evidenced by some unidentified paper.

That paper may have been a “Defendant’s Status Report” filed by a William Kirkland,, a Colorado attorney, in the suit that produced the default judgment. Ms. Brown proffered that Archie Brown traveled to Colorado (she did not disclose when), and there he exerted undue influence upon her and her husband to obtain their life savings. He then returned to Maryland. Those facts, Ms. Brown proffered, “can be proven on paper by Archie Brown’s signature.” Again it is unclear from the record to what paper Ms. Brown was referring.

Ms. Brown further proffered that she personally served Archie Brown with a Colorado complaint in July 2000, the month of his death. Ms. Brown, however, did not have a return of service available for the court’s review at the hearing. The hearing came to a close and the court held the matter sub curia. In a written order dated April 5, 2004, and entered on April 8, 2004, the court struck the Colorado judgment. 2 The court stated in the order: ⁴⁰⁷ For all of the reasons stated by [the Estate’s] counsel in his written brief and through oral arguments, this Court is striking the foreign judgment against [the Estate], This Court finds that [Archie Brown] died on July 11, 2000 and that [Ms. Brown] was required to file a claim within six months of his death. [Ms. Brown] did not file this claim until December 4, 2003.

Counsel for [the Estate] proffered to the Court that proper notice of [Archie] Brown’s death had been published. In addition, the Court finds that [Ms. Brown] failed to make proper service. For these reasons, the Court is granting [the Estate’s] motion. On May 7, 2004, Ms. Brown noted her appeal from that order. 3 She raises the following issue for our consideration: “Where [the Estate] presented no evidence or law to attack the validity of a foreign judgment, did the trial court err in striking the judgment?” For the following reasons, we shall vacate the order striking the foreign judgment and remand for further proceedings.

THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS Ms. Brown contends that the court erred in striking the Colorado judgment because the Estate “failed to introduce any evidence whatsoever,” that the Colorado judgment was invalid under Colorado law. Ms. Brown further argues that the court failed to apply Colorado law when it analyzed the Estate’s claims regarding lack of personal jurisdiction and ⁴⁰⁸ improper service, and that, by application of Colorado law, the Estate failed to overcome the presumption of validity of the foreign judgment. Ms. Brown adds that any argument concerning her noncompliance with Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2005 Supp.), § 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”) does not implicate the Colorado court’s subject matter jurisdiction over her suit against the Estate. That issue, she argues, should have been raised by the Estate in Colorado as a defense to the suit there.

The Estate responds that the court correctly struck the Colorado judgment. Couching the argument for the first time on appeal as implicating the Colorado court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the Estate argues that the Colorado claim did not comply with ET § 8-103, and, moreover, that Ms. Brown did not substantially comply with any of the methods of presenting a claim specified in Maryland Code (1973, 2002 RepLVol.), § 8-104 of the Estates and Trusts Article. The Estate also argues that it never obtained proper service of the Colorado suit. DISCUSSION We first address Ms. Brown’s contention that the Estate failed in its burden to overcome the presumption of validity of the Colorado judgment.

The contention rests on the fact that the Estate made no formal offer of evidence that Colorado did not have jurisdiction and, instead, proceeded only by way of proffer. The argument comes too late. The hearing on the Estate’s motion to strike the Colorado judgment did proceed by way of proffer by the parties, but neither of them objected to the procedure. Ms. Brown cannot now complain about a procedure to which she evidently acquiesced below.

See Md. Rule 8-131(a); Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md.App. 288, 312-13 , 722 A.2d 73 (1998). We turn now to the remainder of appellant’s attack upon the court’s decision to strike the Colorado judgment. We begin that analysis by restating the applicable legal principles. ⁴⁰⁹ Full faith and credit Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const, art. IV, § 1.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that, “in order to fulfill this constitutional mandate, ‘the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which [the judgment] had in the state where it was pronounced.’ ” Imperial Hotel, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Tri-Con Leasing Corp., 91 Md.App. 266, 270 , 603 A.2d 1371 (1992) (quoting Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 455 U.S. 691, 704 , 102 S.Ct. 1357 , 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982)). Maryland law therefore treats an authenticated copy of a foreign judgment as prima facie evidence of the issuing court’s jurisdiction, and the foreign judgment is “presumed valid until it is declared invalid by a competent court.” Imperial Hotel, 91 Md.App. at 271-72 , 603 A.2d 1371 . The full faith and credit doctrine, and the presumption of validity of a foreign judgment attendant to it, have their limitations.

See Underwriters, 455 U.S. at 704 , 102 S.Ct. 1357 (“[T]he structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers, dictates some basic limitations on the full-faith-and-credit principles[.]”); accord Imperial Hotel, 91 Md.App. at 270 , 603 A.2d 1371 ; Superior Court of Cal., County of Stanislaus, Family Support Division v. Ricketts, 153 Md.App. 281, 328 , 836 A.2d 707 (2003). The Underwriters Court explained: “Chief among those limitations is the caveat, consistently recognized by this Court, that ‘a judgment of a court in one