Brown v. Rowles

Bowie, C. J., delivered the opinion of this Court: As the legal effect of the settlement and releases relied on by the appellees lies at the threshold of this case, and in the opinion of this Court is conclusive, an examination of the circumstances attending their execution is necessary to ascertain their character and operation. Mary Brown, one of the appellants, had by a previous marriage, certain children named Norfolk, who were legatees under the will of Mary Stinchcomb, her mother, and the widow and executrix of George Stinchcomb; of which children, Mary Brown was guardian. She was also legatee in remainder under the will of George Stinchcomb, of all the property bequeathed to Mary Stinchcomb for life, and at the time of the settlement and releases referred to, was the wife of Lewis B. Brown, the other appellant. After the death of her mother, Mary Stinchcomb, the appellants authorised the appellee to sell all the personal property belonging to the estate of George Stinchcomb, by a writing under their hands and seals, dated 25th of September 1860.

Which paper, it is proved, was in the handwriting of W. H. G. Dorsey, Esq., attorney at law. It is shewn that Mr. Dorsey acted as counsel for Mrs. Brown and the appellees; that after the sale, the funds being then in the hands of the appellee, it was agreed by Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Sands, attorneys for the Ridgelys, other legatees of Mary Stinchcomb, that Mr. Rowles, (the appellee,) knowing the property of George and Mary Stinchcomb, should go over the sale-list and select such property as belonged to Mr. George Stinchcomb, determine the amount belonging to each of the parties, and distribute the funds in hand accordingly. “The understanding between Dorsey and Sands was, that the whole matter should be settled upon the basis of that agreement.” Mr. Rowles brought his statement of the division of the ²⁷ property he had made before the attorneys, and they agreed to tho correctness of it. The appellants, by their joint deed of release, acting as husband and wife, acknowledged the receipt of eight hundred and ninety-one dollars and seventy-nine cents, of the appellee, in full for all sums of money belonging to the said Mary A. Brown, as legatee under the will of George Stinchcomb, late of Howard County, deceased, which have been received by him. This deed was attested, executed, and acknowledged, before a justice of the peace of Baltimore city, on the 14th. of August 1861.

On tbe same day, Mary A. Brown, by ber several deed of release, as guardian ofWm. W. H. Norfolk and Louisa Norfolk, executed and acknowledged before the same justice, admitted tbe receipt of two hundred and thirty-six dollars and twenty-two cents, on account of legacies bequeathed to the said William and Louisa Norfolk by the will of Mary Stinchcomb. These papers are not mere receipts; they are drawn with all the formality of deeds, executed, attested and acknowledged as such. They profess to release the appellee of and from all and every action, suit, claim or demand which could or might possibly be brought against him, for or on account of said sum of money, or the payment thereof, &c.

Executed on the same day, attested by the same witness, and acknowledged before the same justice, the one, in the joint names and character of husband and wife, for a legacy, or part of a legacy, under George Stinchcomb’s will, and the other hy the wife alone, in the character of guardian of her children, for part of a legacy under Mary Stinchcomb’s will, they imply a settlement whereby it was admitted that Mary Stinchcomb’s administrator had assets sufficient to pay considerable pecuniary legacies; an hypothesis wholly irreconcilable with the appellant’s present theory. “ When the law ascribes to one instrument a conclusive, and to another a prima facie character, we must presume that parties using either, intend it to operate according to ²⁸ its legal