Brown v. State

FISCHER, Judge. Darrell Eldon Brown was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of first degree rape, first degree sex offense, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, burglary, and two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to a total of fifty years imprisonment. Appellant now queries whether the court erred in admitting his statement purportedly obtained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

On April 14, 1986, Officer Nelson Parker learned that a suspect, shot during the commission of a crime, was receiving treatment in a Baltimore County hospital. Because the circumstances of that crime were similar to others Officer Parker was investigating, he attempted to interview the suspect. The officer’s effort was in vain, however, as the suspect, appellant herein, declined to discuss the matter, claiming that his lawyer instructed him not to speak with anyone. Officer Parker left his telephone number in case appellant or Ms attorney should decide to contact him.

Later that day, Officer Parker received a call from someone, apparently appellant’s counsel. The attorney thanked Officer Parker for not interviewing his client and added that he would “have to deny any interview.” Officer Parker’s next contact with appellant occurred on July 18, 1986. At that time, appellant was in the Baltimore County Detention Center, under arrest for these crimes. The officer intended to serve appellant with warrants in two other cases and interview Mm on all the pending matters, including the instant charges.

Before commencing the interview, Officer Parker advised appellant of his Miranda rights and gave Mm an opportunity to call his lawyer. Appellant stated he understood his rights and did not need to speak with counsel. Appellant then waived his rights, and the interrogation commenced. ¹⁶⁶ During the course of their conversation, appellant made an inculpatory statement which is an issue in this appeal. Appellant now claims that his statement is inadmissible under the dictates of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Preliminarily, we note that the Fifth Amendment issue was not raised below. As the transcript of the suppression hearing indicates, appellant’s motion was based solely on the Sixth Amendment: [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, at first when I anticipated this, I thought the problem, as did [defense counsel], was much more complex than I really believe it is now. I think primarily there are two directions that this argument could take; a Fifth Amendment argument and a Sixth Amendment argument. I think that— THE COURT: Excuse me.

I don’t think we have a Fifth Amendment problem. The problem is the Sixth Amendment. I don’t know if [defense counsel] would agree, but there’s no Fifth Amendment problem that I see. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think that’s a correct position, Your Honor. In light of this exchange, we exercise our discretion and decline to address the Fifth Amendment issue.

Maryland Rule 8-131. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 , 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that an accused person in custody who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” The Court, in Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 641 , 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1340 , 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984), reiterated the Edwards bright-line rule that “once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him.” This rule was found equally applicable to Sixth Amendment situations in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). ¹⁶⁷ The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees the assistance of an attorney at post-arraignment interrogations. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629, 106 S.Ct. at 1407 . This is true because the arraignment “signals ‘the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings’ and thus the attachment of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 188 , 81 L.Ed.2d 146 , 104 S.Ct. 2292 [2297] (1984); thereafter, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including interrogation, represent ‘critical stages’ at which the Sixth Amendment applies.” (citations omitted.) Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629-630, 106 S.Ct. at 1407 .

In the case sub judice, Brown was arraigned on June 30, 1986. The docket entries reflect that Brown informed the court he retained counsel, “Mr. R. Walker.” On the same day, Roland Walker entered his appearance on behalf of appellant. Certainly the State was aware of Brown’s desire to be represented by counsel and his assertion that he had, in fact, already hired an attorney. This was confirmed by counsel’s entry of appearance.

These facts reveal two key occurrences on June 30, 1986; the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings triggering appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and appellant’s invocation of his right to counsel. 1 Whether the interrogating officer was aware of what