Brown v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. It has been long established in Maryland that, absent a satisfactory non-culpable explanation, exclusive possession of recently stolen goods permits an inference of fact that the possession is a guilty possession. Anglin v. State, 244 Md. 652, 656 . 1 The term “recent” when used in connection with recently stolen goods is a relative term and its meaning as applied to a given case will vary with the circumstances of the case. Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 77 ; Anglin v. State, 1 Md. App. 85, 92 .

The term “exclusive” is also a relative one and its meaning as applied to a given case will vary with the circumstances of the case. We discussed fully the meaning of “exclusive” in this context in Boswell and Poe v. State, 5 Md. App. 571 , 576- ²²⁶ 579. We said that it is in the sense of a personal possession and an assertion of property, express or implied by the exercise of dominion and right of disposal, that the possession is exclusive. So the possession of stolen property is exclusive if it shows exclusion of all persons who are not parties to the crime, although as to accomplices, the possession of one is the possession of all.

Thus the possession to be exclusive, need not necessarily be in one person and may be a joint possession of several persons. See Davis and Napier v. State, 7 Md. App. 667 . The fact inferred from such guilty possession by the accused fixes his identity as the offender — that he was the criminal agent. Proof of the corpus delicti of the crime may establish the offense he committed.

Thus where a burglary is proved to have been committed, the possessor of goods stolen therein may be found to be the burglar, Anglin v. State, 1 Md. App. 85 ; where a storehouse breaking is proved the possessor of goods taken therefrom may be found to be the one who broke the storehouse, Jones v. State, 5 Md. App. 180 ; where a larceny is proved the possessor of goods stolen may be found to be the thief, Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38 . However, if there is credible evidence that the possessor of the goods was not a principal in the burglary or storehouse breaking or larceny, he may be found to be a receiver of stolen goods, Boblits v. State, 4 Md. App. 534 . So, as was said in Jordan v. State, 219 Md. 36 , quoting, at 47-48, Judge Cardoza in People v. Galbo (N. Y.), 112 N. E. 1041 , 1044: “Only half of the problem, however, has been solved when guilty possession fixes the identity of the offender. There remains the question of the nature of his offense.

Here again the facts must shape the inference. Is the guilty possessor the thief, or is he a receiver of stolen goods? Judges have said that, if nothing more is shown, we may take him to be the thief. * * * But as soon as evidence is - offered that the theft was ²²⁷ committed by someone else, the inference changes, and he becomes a receiver of stolen goods.” There was evidence adduced in the case before us that a tavern in Annapolis had been broken into and ransacked between the hours of 3:00 P.M., 28 January 1968 and 7:05 A.M. the next day. A television set, $300 in cash, 134 quarts of whiskey and an antique “410 revolver” were stolen.

On 2 February a police officer observed a “van truck” in Annapolis. Based on information, the details of which are undisclosed in the record, he pursued the truck and apprehended four persons who had occupied the front seat, Larry Kenneth Brown (the appellant), Marvin Caldwell Cole, Jay Alsop Mullins, and Howard Hull. 2 Who was driving the truck was not shown. In the truck the officers saw and recovered the television set and several cases of whiskey stolen from the tavern. Latent fingerprints lifted from a bottle of scotch moved from the place where the proprietor of the tavern had left it when he secured the premises before the breaking but not removed from the tavern were shown to be those of Mullins.

(Fingerprints obtained from the appellant were not sent to the F. B. I. for identification.) There was also evidence that on 10 July 1968 Cole had attempted to sell the stolen revolver to a gun dealer. Cole testified in his own behalf. He said that on the day he was arrested he saw the truck driven by Hull and that the appellant was a passenger. Hull asked him if he wanted to go along and Cole did so.

They drove out West Street, saw Mullins and picked him up. Hull said “the stuff” in the truck was stolen “but I just took ²²⁸ it for a grain and just laughed at him.” He claimed he had purchased the revolver for $35 about three months later in Baltimore at a bus station from “this boy” who told him it was stolen. He claimed it was not in the truck. He denied seeing the television set before he saw it in the truck and claimed he had never been in the tavern from which it had been stolen.

The appellant testified. He said he was 18 years of age and had never been arrested before. He was in the eleventh grade at Annapolis High School and worked in the afternoon at the Annapolis Country Club. He asserted that on the night of Sunday, 28 January 1968 he worked until 7:30 P.M. and arrived home about 8:00 P.M. He remained home until he left for school the next day.

On 2 February, the day he was arrested, he went to the Pepsi Cola Company after school to see Mullins who owed him money. They went into town and at some stage of their travels were joined by Cole. They went to the “Amco Transmission place * * * to see about a car that was being worked on.” He did not know the owner of the car. They met Hull who said, “Come on let’s go” to rent a truck.

They went to Steven’s Citco Station and rented a truck. “He didn’t tell me why until we got out to the place and he said he had to help his cousin or somebody to move some furniture.” They went up Ritchie Highway and turned off on an old country road “not too far from Earleigh Heights.” They went to an old abandoned house and got out of the truck, Hull saying, “Come on, we are going in.” The appellant saw an automobile like the one he owned and went over to look at it. When he next saw Hull he was taking a television set from the house and putting it in- the truck. The appellant got back in the truck and saw “the liquor and