Brown v. Stubbs
Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to an answer to a petition for a mandamus and entering a judgment for the defendant for costs. The petition alleges that the appellant is the owner of the properties known as Nos. 842 and 844 West North avenue, Baltimore City, and that he applied to the appellee, Inspector of Buildings for Baltimore City, for a permit to erect ■ a moving picture theatre upon said properties, in accordance with section 3 of paragraph 1 of an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, approved June 19, 1908, and known as No. 155, etc. That section is as follows: “The Inspector of Buildings shall receive applications, examine plans, and grant permits for the erection, construction, alteration, repairs and removal of buildings.” The Inspector of Buildings refused to issue a permit until the petitioner secured the assent of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore as required by Ordinance No. 269, passed May 20th, 1913. That ordinance provides that: “No permit shall be issued for the construction of any new building or for the conversion of any existing building, or for the construction or conversion of any tent or other enclosure of any kind whatsoever, or for the erection or operation of any appliance or paraphernalia, whether enclosed or on open lot, to be used for the exhibiting of moving picture shows, until the said application for permit is first assented to by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, by ordinance, nor shall such 131 ordinance he passed until public notice is- first given in two daily newspapers of Baltimore City at least once a week for ■fifteen days prior to the introducing of said ordinance, which notice shall set forth the intention of introducing said ordinance, and which notice shall contain a, sufficient description of the provisions of said ordinance for everybody interested to understand the scope and purpose of s-uch measure.
The cost of the advertisement of said notice to he borne by the applicant for said permit.” The petition alleges that Ordinance bio. 269 was illegal, invalid and of no force or effect in law, in that: “1. The Mayor and City Council had no power or authority to pass said ordinance, and it is, therefore, ultra vires and void. 2. That at the time of the passage of same there was no statute of the General Assembly of Maryland in force authorizing the passage of said ordinance, and it has ne-ver since been ratified by an Act of the General. Assembly of Maryland. 6.
Even if there was such a statute, it would have been void and illegal in that it would be unconstitutional as depriving a citizen of Baltimore of his property without due process of law. 4. Said ordinance is discriminatory, oppressive and unequal in its application, and therefore unconstitutional. 5. Said ordinance is invalid and unreasonable, in that it commits to the Mayor and City Council unlimited discretion in granting or refusing said permits, and does, not undertake to provide any general rules or regulations limiting the exercise of said discretion.” Before discussing those questions it may be well to refer to several other matters mentioned in the appellant’s brief. It is said that from the pleadings it can not be logically deduced that the appellant intends to erect a building, which must necessarily be used for moving picture exhibitions.
Inasmuch as the petition alleges that tho appellant applied “for a permit to erect a moving picture theatre upon said property,” and the refusal to grant that permit is the foundation for the proceeding, we must assume for the purposes of the case, that such was his intention. It is also contended 132 that the ordinance is invalid because the title is defective and in violation of the provision of the Oity Charter, that “Every ordinance enacted by the city shall embrace but one subject, which shall be described in its title,” etc. (Sec. 221 of the Charter, which is Ch. 123 of the Acts of 1898.) It is said that “the title gives no inkling to a lot owner that he can not erect a tent or install the machine on a vacant lot, without such assent as required in the body of the ordinance.” It is sufficient to say that the appellant’s application was not for a permit to erect a tent or install the machine on a vacant lot, and hence they are in no way involved in this case. The title is as explicit as could he desired or required in reference to the construction of new buildings, or the conversion of existing buildings, which are to be used for the exhibition of moving picture shows, and hence no one could be misled by the prior reference to the section proposed to be repealed and re-ordained, as suggested by the appellant. First.
The first and second reasons assigned in the petition for the alleged invalidity of the ordinance can be considered together. Assuming that a valid statute could be passed containing such provisions as the ordinance does (which we will consider later), there can be no doubt about the power of the Mayor and City Council to pass the order. Section 6, sub-section (18) of the charter gave it full power and authority: “To pass ordinances for preserving■ order, and securing property and persons from violence, danger* and destruction, protecting the public and city property, rights and privileges from waste or encroachment, and for promoting the great interest and insuring the good govern- ' ment of the -City. To have and exercise within the limits of the city of .Baltimore all the power commonly known as the Police Power to the same extent as the State has or could exercise said power within said limits,” etc. By subsection (14) of section 6 it has the power: “To license, tax and regulate all businesses, trades, avocations, or professions,” and hy sub-section 29, “To provide- for licensing, regulating and restraining theatrical or other public amuse 133 ments within the City of Baltimore.” Then sub-section 31 of section 6 provides: “The foregoing or other enumeration of powers in this article shall not he held to limit the power of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore-, in addition thereto to pass all ordinances not inconsistent with the provisions of this article or the laws of the State as may he proper, in executing any of the powers, either express or implied, enumerated in this section and elsewhere in this article, as well as such ordinances as it may deem expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and wel fare of the City of Baltimore,” etc. In Rossburg v. State, 111 Md. 394 , Judge Pearce, in speaking for the Court, said: “Broader or more- comprehensive police powers could not he conferred under any general grant of police power, for the purposes mentioned in section 18, than those granted in that section, and when we consider the ‘Welfare Clause? of the charter, section 31, greater emphasis could not he laid upon the implied powers of the city for the maintenance of the peace-, good government-, health and welfare of the city, than is there laid.” Again he said: “The powers thus vested in the city are hroad and sweeping, and are expressed in terms which indicate a liberal view of the need of hroad powers for effective local government of a great city.” As these provisions are so clear and hroad, we deem it unnecessary to further discuss this branch of the case.
There would seem to be no doubt that if the Legislature can lawfully adopt such regulations as are contained in the ordinance, the Mayor and City Connell can do so under the powers conferred on it. Second. Wo will therefore determine whether it was within the power of the Legislature to grant such powers. The Legislature by Chapter 693 of the Acts of 1910 (p. 603), created a “Board of Examining Moving Picture Machine Operators,” and required such operators to take out a license and submit to an examination.
In the Preamble tho danger to life and property from explosions- caused by the carelessness and incompetency of moving picture machine opera 134 tors, was referred to. This Court sustained that Act in State v. Loden, 117 Md. 373. Judge Pattison, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “The danger to life and property incident to the use of moving picture machines, when operated by incompetent persons, is known to all. The films used in connection with the machine are highly explosive and dangerous in their character, and if not properly managed and cared for are liable to explode.
In large cities, compactly built, like Baltimore, there exist possibilities of immense loss of property by fire as was shown by the great fire of 1904, which swept the business section of the city and destroyed property worth many millions of dollars. Moreover, in large cities moving picture machines are usually operated in large, crowded rooms or halls filled with a constantly changing assemblage, largely composed of women and children, and where in the event of explosion or fire, excitement and panic usually follow, resulting in great loss of life. Therefore every reasonable and proper precaution and safeguard should be taken to prevent or lessen the possibilities of fires so destructive and disastrous in their consequences.” It is thus seen that the Legislature and this Court recognized the danger to life and property incident to the use of moving picture machines if improperly operated. It is said in a note to State v. Loden, as reported in 30 Am. & Eng.
An. Cas. (1913 Ed.) 1300, that: “In all jurisdictions wherein the question has been passed on it has been held that the public exhibition of moving pictures is a proper subject of regulation under the police power of the State.” A number of cases are cited in that note, among others Dreyfus v. Montgomery, 4 Ala. App. 270 , 58 So. 730 , in which it is held that the provisions of the Code of that State cited in the note empowering cities to license, regulate, restrain or prohibit places of amusement, gave authority to a city to adopt an ordinance making it unlawful to operate a moving picture show in a certain part of the city.
In another case there 'cited, Laurelle v. Bush, 17 Cal. App. 409 , 119 Pac. 135 953, -it was held: “That the manifest menace of fire and panic likely to result to school children and church congregations from
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