Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc.

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Prior to the litigation which gave rise to this appeal, the appellant (Brown) was employed by the appellee (Suburban Cadillac) as an automobile salesman, and pursuant to his employment was given an opportunity to purchase an automobile from the company at $300 above the company’s cost. Brown purchased a 1970 Cadillac on or about September 26, 1969, pursuant to a “Salesman Demonstrator Plan.” This plan was in contract form and was executed by Brown. Under the terms of this agree ²⁵³ ment the company had the right to repurchase the automobile “at any time.” If the automobile was financed, title to it was to be held by General Motors Acceptance Corporation (through whom financing was to be arranged), and if the automobile was paid for in cash by the salesman, title was to be held by Suburban Cadillac.

The plan further provided: “8. Should any salesman, whose employment with Suburban Cadillac Company is terminated, either by his own decision or by decision of the Company, refuse to relinquish his demonstrator [automobile] when requested to do so by the Company, his signature below attesting to this agreement also gives to Suburban Cadillac Company, or a duly appointed representative and/or agent, the right to repossess said salesman’s demonstrator [automobile] at any time after said refusal to relinquish said vehicle.” The contingency provided for in numbered paragraph 8 of the agreement occurred at some time early in November, 1969. At that time (a little more than a month after purchasing the Cadillac), Brown terminated his employment with Suburban Cadillac and began working for another automobile dealership in Montgomery County, Maryland. Suburban Cadillac, pursuant to paragraph 8 of the “Salesman Demonstrator Plan,” made a demand for return of the automobile, and when the demand was not met, repossessed the Cadillac on November 11, 1969.

Brown in turn repossessed the automobile from Suburban Cadillac’s lot three days later, and in the early morning hours on November 18, 1969, appellee Suburban Cadillac again repossessed the automobile from Brown’s residence. Brown filed suit on November 26, 1969, alleging trespass de bonis asportatis of the Cadillac; the defendant (Suburban Cadillac) filed a general issue plea and a special plea stating that the vehicle had been repossessed pursuant to the provisions of a contract between the parties. ²⁵⁴ On May 11, 1970, Suburban Cadillac filed a motion for summary judgment together with an affidavit in support of the motion. Maryland Rules 610 a 1 and 610 a 3. In its affidavit the company stated that: 1.

Brown had commenced employment with Suburban Cadillac on or about July 24,1969. 2. Brown had been fully advised of his rights, duties, and obligations regarding his purchase of the 1970 Cadillac under the Salesman Demonstrator Plan. 3. Upon terminating employment, Brown had again been advised of the contract, that demand for return of the automobile was made, and that Brown “failed to relinquish same” in violation of the Salesman Demonstrator Plan, which was attached to the affidavit as Exhibit A. Brown filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment on May 19, 1970, and in his supporting affidavit stated that: 1. He had not been fully advised of his obligations regarding the purchase of the automobile. 2.

He did not execute “the power of attorney which was a necessary part of the Salesman Demonstrator Plan.” 3. He has not at all times failed to relinquish the vehicle in question. A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held before Judge Shure and he filed his opinion granting the motion and dismissing the case on May 26, 1970. We must decide in this appeal whether or not the granting of appellee’s motion for summary judgment was proper.

The purpose of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment at the trial level is not to try the case on its merits, but rather to decide whether any real dispute as to material facts exists. Lipscomb v. Hess, 255 Md. 109, 118 , 257 A. 2d 178 (1969). If the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits (if any) show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment should be granted. Maryland Rule 610 d 1; Groves v. Alexander, 255 Md. 715, 719-721, 724 , 259 A. 2d 285 (1969), cert. denied 397 U. S. 1023 (1970) ; ²⁵⁵ Lawless v. Merrick, 221 Md. 65, 69-70, 175 A. 2d 27 (1961).

Conversely, if there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment would not properly be granted. Hilton v. Williams, 258 Md. 285, 289 , 265 A. 2d 746 (1970) ; Tellez v. Canton R. R. Co., 212 Md. 423, 431 , 129 A. 2d 809 (1957). Cf. Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138 , 265 A. 2d 256 (1970), and cases cited therein.

An appellate court, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, should be concerned primarily with deciding whether or not a factual issue exists, and in this regard, all inferences should be resolved against the party making the motion. Hilton v. Williams, supra, at 288; Lipscomb v. Hess, supra, at 118; Lawless v. Merrick, supra, at 70. Be that as it may, when the moving party has set forth sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must show with some precision that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Foreman v. Melrod, 257 Md. 435, 441 , 263 A. 2d 559 (1970) ; Fishman Const.

Co. v. Hansen, 238 Md. 418, 422-423 , 209 A. 2d 605 (1965), and cases