Bryant v. State

Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. I. THE LAW— The road to a civilized society leads past the use of the "rubber hose,” the "rack,” the "Chinese boot,” and other "third degree” 1 methods of obtaining "confessions” from persons accused of the commission of criminal acts. Although there may be some remote areas of the country where the "third degree” is still occasionally practiced, it is safe to state that as a general rule the physical abuse aspect of interrogation has been brought to a halt. For discussion of what constitutes an interrogation, see Rhode Island v. Innes, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S. Ct. 1682 , 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).

The Supreme Court of the United States, in a series of cases, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S. Ct. 1758 , 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 , 74 S. Ct. 716 , 98 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1954); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 , 65 S. Ct. 781 , 89 L. Ed. 1029 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 , 64 S. Ct. 921 , 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 , 62 S. Ct. 1139 , 86 L. Ed. 1663 (1942); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 , 61 S. Ct. 1092 , 85 L. Ed. 1513 (1941); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 , 60 S. Ct. 1032 , 84 L. Ed. 1342 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 , ²⁷⁴ 60 S. Ct. 612 , 84 L. Ed. 988 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 60 S. Ct. 472 , 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S. Ct. 461 , 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936), culminating in the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), has nullified the legality of confessions obtained through duress, whether physical or mental. In Miranda , the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, said: " 'Since Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , this Court has recognized that coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.’ Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 , [ 80 S. Ct. 274, 279 , 4 L. Ed. 2d 242, 247 ] (1960).” 384 U.S. at 448 , 86 S. Ct. at 1614 , 16 L. Ed. 2d at 709 . The Court observed that "[i]nterrogation still takes place in privacy” and that "[p]rivacy results in secrecy,” which leaves "a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.” Id. In order to minimize the loss of knowledge as to what occurs during the privacy of custodial questioning, while simultaneously assuring, insofar as possible, that any confession is actually voluntary, the Chief Justice, for the Court, spelled out a litany to be read to each arrestee, suspect, or accused before interrogation is commenced. 2 Miranda mandates that: "[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.

Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the per ²⁷⁵ son of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.

But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Footnote omitted). Id. at 478-79 , 86 S. Ct. at 1630 , 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726 . Chief Justice Warren made clear that "[t|he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” Id. at 476 , 86 S. Ct. at 1629 , 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725 . Dire consequences were predicted by some law enforcement officers as a result of what they saw as the unwarranted shackles placed upon them by Miranda .

Confessions, it was said, would be virtually eliminated. Nevertheless, we have found no statistics indicating that Miranda has reduced the number of confessions, nor do we perceive that it has unduly hampered the police. The end of what has been styled "the Warren Court” and the beginning of what is now known as "the Burger Court” gave rise to widespread speculation that Miranda would be short-lived. Indeed, in holdings such as Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643 , 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), the Court seemed to chip away at Miranda and to be fashioning a coffin ²⁷⁶ for Miranda’s ultimate demise as a viable constitutional force.

Miranda critics, and they were numerous, thought that "the outlook was extremely rocky for the . . . [Miranda] nine.” 3 It was just a matter of time, they said, until the "right” case would be heard by the Supreme Court and Miranda would be unlamented past history. Those prognosticators of Miranda’s expiration must have sustained an intellectual jolt when the Court filed Edwards v. Arizona, 49 U.S.L.W. 4496 (filed May 18, 1981 ). 4 In that case, Edwards was arrested by Arizona authorities for robbery, burglary, and first degree murder. He was furnished with the Miranda warnings and agreed "to submit to questioning.” He was "told that another suspect already in custody had implicated him in the crime! .1 Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense.” Id. Later, Edwards "sought 'to make a deal.’ ” Following an attempt to reach the county attorney on the telephone, Edwards exclaimed, " I want an attorney before making a deal. ’ At that point, questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail.” Id.

The next morning, two other police officers, who were colleagues of the officer that attempted to interrogate Edwards the night before, went to the jail to see Edwards. Edwards replied that he did not want to speak to them. A guard told him that " 'he had’ ” to talk to the officers. The officers identified themselves to Edwards and informed him again of his Miranda rights.

Edwards then made an inculpatory statement. Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress the statement and the trial court granted the motion. Arizona, unlike ²⁷⁷ Maryland, permits the State to appeal adverse suppression rulings. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed. 5 Edwards makes explicit what Miranda made implicit, and that is, when an accused, arrestee, or suspect invokes his constitutional right to have counsel present during any custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease.

The Supreme Court said: "[Although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler,. . . | 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 286 (1979)], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 4497-98. Miranda made crystalline that an accused, arrestee, or suspect was entitled to counsel at any custodial interrogation, unless he or she made a knowing and intelligent waiver of that constitutionally guaranteed individual right. ²⁷⁸ We read Edwards as laying to rest all speculation that Miranda is dead or dying. On the contrary, Edwards makes pellucid that' Miranda is alive and well.

Edwards does not, in our view, expand upon Miranda’s breadth but, rather, serves to underscore that when an accused, arrestee, or suspect, at any custodial questioning, demands his right to have counsel present, all interrogation must at that point cease until counsel for the accused, arrestee, or suspect is present. Once the right to the presence of counsel has been invoked, the authorities may not thereafter, directly or indirectly, initiate another attempt at interrogation until and unless counsel for the accused, arrestee, or suspect is present. Edwards makes perspicuous that notwithstanding the prior invocation of the Miranda tenet of the right to the presence of counsel, the accused, arrestee, or suspect may validly waive that right provided the accused, arrestee, or suspect, himself, initiates "further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” Id. See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979).

The burden of showing a waiver of Miranda rights rests on the prosecution. "[A] valid waiver of ... [the right to counsel] cannot be established by showing only that... [the accused, arrestee, or suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” (Footnote omitted.) Edwards v. Arizona, supra at 4498. We think it transpicuous that efforts by law enforcement officers to induce an ensuing waiver of the right to the presence of counsel cannot and will not be tolerated. Violation of Miranda-Edwards will lead to the suppression of any evidence obtained in contravention thereof, except as may be permitted by Harris v. New York, supra.

We point out that the bounds of both the Fifth Amendment and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are exactly the same as those of the conduct they seek to prevent. Attempts to manipulate the mental process of the accused, arrestee, or suspect in order to "psych” him or her into changing his or her mind about the presence of counsel are just as ²⁷⁹ devastating to individual rights as is the use of the "rubber hose.” The only difference between the two types of coercion is the matter of the degree of the duress. We emphasize, even at the expense of redundancy, that Miranda and Edwards mean exactly what they say: once the accused requests the presence of counsel at a custodial interrogation, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are ipso facto invoked, and all questioning must cease. Previously, in Wantland v. State, 45 Md. App. 527, 535 , 413 A.2d 1376, 1381 (1980), cert. denied, 288 Md. 745 (filed September 4, 1980), cert. granted and judgment vacated, case remanded for reconsideration in the light of Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 29 Cr.

L. 3074 (1981), we said: "[A]n accused may decline to rely upon the safeguards