Buchanan v. County Commissioners

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The validity of the tax imposed upon the appellant depends upon the true construction of the Act of 1874, ch. 483, in connection with the antecedent legislation in regard to the assessment and taxation of property, including debts. With certain reservations, the Act of 1874, ch. 483, repeals the 81st Art. of the Code, and all previous laws inconsistent with its provisions. The 2nd section of the 81st Art. had provided that all real and personal property in the State, and all debts secured by or due on judgment, decree, mortgage, bonds, bills of exchange, promissory notes for solvent debts, &c., except debts due for goods sold and delivered, and bank notes, should be liable to assessment and taxation.

It seemed to regard the debts secured by or due on the respective instruments specified as alone taxable. The Act of 1866, ch. 157, provided that all property, real, personal and -mixed, of all kinds and descriptions ²⁹³ whatever, should be liable to valuation, assessment and taxation. The supplementary Act of 1867, ch. 341, provided, amongst other things, for the exemption of all mortgages for purchase money in the hands of the original mortgagee or his executor, &c., together with all equitable liens for the purchase money of lands and real estate remaining due and unpaid. The terms employed in the 2nd section of the Act of 1874, are general and comprehensive, providing that all property of every kind, nature and description within the State, including, amongst other things, aall debts secured by or investments in private securities of every kind, nature and description, except mortgages, shall be liable to assessment and taxation.” The manifest purpose was not to abridge but to enlarge the basis of taxation.

But it is equally evident that it was not the intention to impose taxes upon every kind of debt. Express discrimination is made as to the character of the debts liable to taxation. The authority of the Legislature to make such discrimination and to exempt any species of property from taxation according to its views of public policy cannot be questioned. Its power to do so has been exercised from the origin of the government.

Whilst this is the case, the purpose to make discrimination or to exempt any