Maryland case law › Bugg v. Brown

Bugg v. Brown

251 Md. 99 (1968) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: Rev'd in partMcWilliams✓ Good law
HoldingThis tort action arose from a late-night altercation among taxicab drivers at the Whistle Stop in Perryville, Maryland.

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The altercation which provoked this litigation took place shortly after midnight on 19 October 1964 at the Whistle Stop in Perryville, Cecil County. The appellant (Bugg) and the appellees Cash and Carpenter, sitting in their taxicabs, were awaiting the arrival, on the late buses, of sailors returning to the Naval Training Station at Bainbridge, 3 miles distant. Cash was first in line; Carpenter was next; Bugg was further back.

When the first bus arrived Bugg, contrary to the prevailing custom, “shot up, cut everybody off, loaded up a full load and went on to Bainbridge.” Upon his return, ahead of the others, he became “first in line for the next bus.” It is no surprise that Cash and Carpenter took a rather dim view of Bugg’s conduct. 101 Bugg’s witnesses testified that Cash, who claims Bugg gave him “a good cussing,” grabbed Bugg, aged 70, by the shirt collar, held him at arm’s length and said, “Don’t you never bring those words through your mouth again for I am not Mr. Gaddy you are fooling with.” Cash then “backed him around * * * [behind another taxicab] and let him go.” They testified further that shortly thereafter Carpenter “slapped him [Bugg] across the face and broke * * * [his] glasses,” knocked him down and then hit him “in the jaw” as he tried to get up. Bugg, they said, ran in back of the Whistle Stop, “crying and begging * * * [Carpenter] not to hit * * * [him] no more.” A driver named Hall took Bugg to the hospital. Bugg filed suit against Cash, Carpenter and Ralph Brown on 31 August 1965. The declaration was signed by two members of a Baltimore law firm.

A member of the Cecil County bar entered his appearance for Bugg on the same day. All of them withdrew from the case in February 1967. The trial was held before Judge Mackey and a jury on 17 October 1967. Bugg appeared in proper person.

He said he had issued writs of summons for witnesses, including himself, but there is nothing in the record to show it. He advised the court that he planned “to get a lawyer” but he did not ask for a continuance. Judge Mackey was of the opinion that Bugg had had “plenty of time to get a lawyer” (8 months had passed since his attorneys withdrew). “So [said the judge] we are going ahead with the case. * * * You are representing yourself.” Although appellees pleaded only the general issue, counsel, in his opening statement, declared he would show that Bugg is “hotheaded,” that he is a “litigious, contrary individual,” that he was “known to carry a pistol or a knife,” that he attacked Carpenter, that on other occasions he had been convicted of assault, and that on the day following the incident he “was carrying a shotgun around looking for” Cash and Carpenter. During his direct examination, James Gaddy, produced as a witness on behalf of Bugg, was questioned by the trial judge.

The following transpired: “Q. You say [that you saw] nothing unusual about his face or his head or anything ? “A. He looked that night just about like he is look 102 ing right now. He always has been a bad man, ever since I have been knowing him. Bad man. Fights with me every time he gets in conversation with me.

Bad man. Of course, he is my neighbor. We are neighbors. “BY MR. BUGG: “Q. I didn’t ask you those questions, Mr. Gaddy. “A. Well, you asked me— “Mr. Bugg: I ask that be struck out. “The Court: Well, I will ask you the jury to disregard it as not being responsive to Mr. Bugg’s question, and not really having any bearing on this case.

I will ask jury to disregard those remarks.” In his cross-examination by counsel for appellees the following transpired: ■ “Q. You have already said you don’t know anything about the 19th. What is Mr. Bugg’s reputation for good order, sobriety, peacefulness, and general reputation in the neighborhood where he lives? Is it good or bad ? “A. (Witness indicating card in hand.) “Q. Answer my question. “A. It is bad. “Mr. Bugg: I object to that. “A. It is bad.

Bad as anybody I have met since I have been in the world, and I will soon be 70 years old, December 27th. “The Court: I overrule the objection. “A. He is the baddest man I ever met.” What follows is an excerpt from the cross-examination of Charles Woodrow Calary, another witness for Bugg: “Q. Now, you know Mr. Bugg, don’t you? “A. Yes. sir. “Q. What is his general reputation for peace and sobriety and good order in the community in which he lives ? “Mr. Bugg: I object to that. “The Court: Just a minute. Mr. Evans I will hear you on the propriety of that question. 103 “Mr. Evans: I think this man is charged with assault. The defense is going to be in here, as far as Mr. Carpenter is concerned, that Pink Bugg is a pugnacious man, he has been in trouble with the law and charged with assault before, and I want to know if Mr. Calary knows him, what his reputation is for good order and peacefulness in the community. “Mr. Bugg: I object to that. “Mr. Evans: I think it is relevant. “Mr. Bugg: I object to that. We are only concerned in this case—I don’t think that ties in with this case anywhere, where I am concerned with the law.

And I think as far as my record— “The Court: Excuse me, this question is proper in testimony as a character witness, but I can’t recall this question being— “Mr. Evans: This case charges assault, and I want to know what his general reputation is in the community, if Mr. Calary knows it, as to good order, peacefulness and being law abiding. “The Court: I am going to sustain the objection, Mr. Evans.” At the conclusion of Bugg’s case counsel for appellees moved “for a dismissal, a directed verdict of acquittal” on the ground there was “no evidence of the amount of damage, money-wise, or otherwise.” The trial judge appears to have agreed. Bugg had not met the burden, he said, of “satisfying the jury by a preponderance of the evidence as to the extent of his damages or anything that goes beyond, in the mind of the court, mere speculation or conjecture.” We do not find in the record anything which adds up to a prima facie case against Brown. Indeed, that he was home in bed at the time seems to be unchallenged. Bugg’s brief in this Court was filed in proper person but the case was argued by counsel.

There was no brief and no appearance for the appellees. I. In 86 C.J.S. Torts § 22 (1954) will be found a quite ade 104 quate statement of the general rule in respect of the necessity for proving damages: “Although damage is an essential element of tort, a fundamental distinction is to be observed between two classes of torts, one composed of legal wrongs in themselves constituting invasions of right and thus giving rise to legal damage, the other of breaches of duty not necessarily violative of legal rights and with which some actual express damage must concur in order to establish the violation of right essential to tort. In the former class, damage flows from the wrongful act, itself injurious to another’s right, although no perceptible loss or harm accrues therefrom; in the latter, however, some specific actual damage is a condition precedent to the tort.” In the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 (1965) it is said: “Since the essence of plaintiff’s grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done to his body, it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s actual body be

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