Bullock v. State

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in these cases is whether the petitioners (Donald Bullock and Charles L. DuDonis), 1 who ²⁸² are presently confined in the Patuxent Institution, are entitled to remove the petitions they filed, for a redetermination of the status of each as a defective delinquent, from the Criminal Court of Baltimore to some other court for hearing. The question to be decided is before us on the motion of the State to dismiss the appeals of the petitioners from identical orders of the Circuit Court for Howard County (to which the petitions had been removed) remanding the petitions for redetermination of status to the Criminal Court of Baltimore because there was no constitutional or statutory authority for the removals. Since the only question on appeal is the same as that raised by the motion to dismiss, it is apparent that the ruling on the motion will be dispositive of the appeals. 2 When the petitions for redetermination of status came on for hearings in the Criminal Court of Baltimore each of the petitioners filed a suggestion of removal pursuant to Section 8 of Article IV of the Constitution of Maryland and Maryland Rule 542.

The Criminal Court of Baltimore ordered the cases removed to the Circuit Court for Howard County. That court, in ruling on the motion of the State’s Attorney for a remand of the petitions to the court of original jurisdiction concluded that “since there was no constitutional nor statutory authority for the removal of these cases to [the Circuit Court for Howard County], they must be remanded to the Criminal Court of Baltimore.” We agree. Section 8 of Article IV of the Constitution in pertinent part provides that: “[I]n all suits or actions at law, * * * upon suggestion * * * [that a] party cannot have a fair and impartial trial * * * [the court] shall order and direct the record of proceedings * * * to be transmitted to some other court having jurisdiction * * * for trial.” ²⁸³ The constitutional provision further provides that the General Assembly “shall make such modification of existing law as may be necessary to regulate and give force to this provision.” Code (1957), Art. 75, § 44, is the legislative action giving force to the constitutional provision and Rule 542 is the procedural regulation governing the right of removal. In substance, the constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions are the same.

And see Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524 , 122 A. 2d 102 (1956), where it was said that that part of the provision requiring the court in which the case “may be pending” to transmit it “to some other court having jurisdiction” would seem to refer to jurisdiction of the subject matter. There is no longer any doubt that a proceeding under Article 31B of the Code relating to defective delinquents is civil in nature. See Purks v. Director, 224 Md. 643 , 166 A. 2d 917 (1961); Blizzard v. State, 218 Md. 384 , 147 A. 2d 227 (1958); McElroy v. Director, 211 Md. 385 , 127 A. 2d 380 (1956); Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504 , 121 A. 2d 698 (1956). But that does not necessarily mean, as the petitioners contend, that such proceedings are “suits or actions at law” within the purview of the Constitution, the statute or the rule.

While the purpose of the constitutional provisions affording a right of removal is to assure “a fair and impartial trial” when it cannot be had in a court in which an action at law is pending, Baltimore v. Libowitz, 159 Md. 28 , 149 Atl. 449 (1930), it has invariably been held that the removal clauses are to be liberally construed in favor of the right, Barnes v. Meleski, 211 Md. 182 , 126 A. 2d 599 (1956). Yet, there have been a number of cases 3 in which the right of removal has ²⁸⁴ been denied because the particular proceeding was considered not to be within the provisions of the Constitution or the statutes regulating and giving force to such provisions. The principle of the Maryland cases—which, together with the constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the removal of causes, were extensively reviewed and discussed in Baltimore v. Libowitz, supra,—is that the term “suits or actions at law” are (as was said at p. 34 of 159 Md.) “[t]hose common law and statutory actions [which], in addition to tendering (a) an issue of fact (b) for trial by jury, have the further attributes (c) of beginning in a court of original common law jurisdiction, and (d) of being the ordinary proceedings between man and man by which redress is sought as a matter of right in cases of ordinary injuries to person and to property,” but do not include (as was also said at p. 37) those actions “brought in a court of original jurisdiction by the State in the exercise of its sovereign power or function.” We think the latter clause would embrace a proceeding such as those brought to determine or redetermine the status of a person as a defective delinquent. Such a proceeding necessarily involves the power and function of the State to safeguard society against the anti-social behavior of a defective delinquent as well as to afford such person the means of terminating his