Burgoyne v. Brooks

GILBERT, Chief Judge. This appeal is concerned with whether, under the attendant circumstances, a federal employee is absolutely immune to a State tort action. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Fader, J.) held that the doctrine of absolute immunity was applicable and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee. The Facts John Burgoyne, Terry Hall, and Charles L. Brooks were detectives in the Federal Protection and Safety Division ²²⁴ (FPSD) of the General Services Administration (GSA).

They were assigned to the Baltimore offices of the Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration. The trio were interviewed by members of GSA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) in connection with an investigation into the possibility that a supervisor was falsifying reports. Subsequently, Brooks made several false statements to the Regional Director of FPSD and to the two OIG investigators regarding Burgoyne’s and Hall’s job behavior. As a result of those statements, Burgoyne and Hall filed a defamation suit in the circuit court against Brooks.

No discovery was conducted by the parties, and, as we have said, the court granted summary judgment on the basis of the absolute immunity of federal employees. This appeal ensued. The Issues Three questions are presented for our consideration: I. Are state courts bound by federal common law to determine defenses to common law slander for federal employees?

II

Is absolute immunity available to a government employee who, pursuant to an employee regulation, makes representations about his fellow employees?

III

Did the trial court err by denying appellants an opportunity to conduct discovery? I Federal Law The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, in Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 580, 583 , 98 L.Ed. 619 (1988), said: “In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), and Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 , 79 S.Ct. 1331 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959), this Court held that the scope of absolute official immunity afforded federal employees is a matter of federal law, ‘to be formulated by ²²⁵ the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress.’ Id., at 597 , 79 S.Ct. at 1334.” Whenever federal common law governs a particular issue, it must be applied, irrespective of whether the case is in a State or federal court. See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 , 84 S.Ct. 742 , 11 L.Ed.2d 724 (1964). One reason for that hard and fast rule is to avoid “forum shopping,” so that a litigant cannot select governing law simply by choosing whether to sue in a federal or State court.

Almost thirty years before Westfall, the Court, in Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 , 79 S.Ct. 1331 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959), held that States must follow federal law with respect to slander or libel committed by a federal employee. The Howard Court commented that “[n]o subject could be one of more peculiarly federal concern, and it would deny the very considerations which give the [federal] rule of privilege its being to leave determination of its extent to the vagaries of the laws of the several States.” Id. at 597 , 79 S.Ct. at 1334. Three years later Maryland recognized that point of view in Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578 , 177 A.2d 841 (1962). Contrary to the way the appellants see it, Judge Fader did not err in applying federal common law.

II Absolute Immunity Having decided that the federal common law is applicable, we now turn our attention to whether Brooks is immune in the circumstances of this case. According to Westfall, a federal employee is absolutely immune from damage suits under State tort law if the alleged tortious conduct falls within the scope of the employee’s duties and discretion. 108 S.Ct. at 584 . Immunity is not afforded federal officials in order to protect them from their errors but