Burral v. State

SONNER, Judge. In the early morning hours of February 27, 1989, a truck driver found the body of a young man in a ditch by the side of Interstate 81 in Pennsylvania. The first Pennsylvania State Trooper on the scene, Edward Vymazal, found no evidence of a car accident and determined that the man had died as a result of a homicide. The Pennsylvania police later identified the body as that of Jeffrey Fiddler, a twenty-one year old resident of Hagerstown, Maryland, and began a cooperative investigation with the Hagerstown Police Department.

After an autopsy, Dr. Neil Hoffman, a Pennsylvania pathologist, determined that the cause of death was a stab wound to the chest, which caused heavy bleeding and death within a half hour of the injury. The fatal wound was approximately eight inches deep, indicating that the killer used a large knife. Dirt ²⁹² and grass present on the victim’s body indicated that the body had been moved after death. Dr. Hoffman testified that the injuries sustained by the victim would have caused large pools of blood at the crime scene; however, Trooper Donald Paul, a criminal investigator for the Pennsylvania State Police, testified that there was very little blood in the roadside ravine where the body had been found.

This evidence from the autopsy and the lack of evidence of a struggle at the scene indicated that the murder had occurred elsewhere. As the joint investigation proceeded and suspects were questioned, authorities concluded that the murder had, in fact, occurred in Maryland, and the Hagerstown, Maryland police assumed primary responsibility for the investigation. The Hagerstown police learned that the defendant, Lewis William Burral, met with Jeffrey Fiddler and brothers Eddie and Willie Stouffer in Clear Spring, Maryland, on the night of the murder. The men met at the home of Willie Stouffer’s girlfriend and then drove up into the mountains to smoke marijuana.

It was there, according to statements made by the defendant, that the murder occurred. Burral told police that he helped Eddie Stouffer stuff the body in the back of a car and then dump the body at a location just beyond the Pennsylvania state line. On March 15,1996, a jury in the Circuit Court for Washington County (McDowell, J.) convicted Burral of second degree murder for his participation in the death of Jeffrey Fiddler. The court sentenced Burral to thirty years in prison.

Appellant noted an appeal and raised the following issues, which we restate slightly for clarity: I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the murder had occurred in Maryland; II. Whether the trial court properly admitted testimony that the defendant had been in prison; III. Whether the trial court properly barred the posthypnotic recollection testimony of a defense witness; ²⁹³ IV. Whether the trial court properly excluded testimony by a witness who was not listed on defendant’s voir dire list.

We answer each issue in the affirmative and, accordingly, affirm.

II

The first issue Burral raises is whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the murder of Jeffrey Fiddler occurred in Maryland so as to vest the trial court with jurisdiction. Jurisdiction must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 51 Md.App. 321, 340 , 443 A.2d 967 (1982), vacated on other grounds, 298 Md. 634 , 471 A.2d 1055 (1984). Appellant argues that, because the body was found in Pennsylvania, and there is a permissive inference that jurisdiction over a homicide lies with the state in which the body was found, the State of Maryland lacks jurisdiction.

Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 200 , 151 A.2d 743 (1959) (citations omitted). That is, as the trial judge instructed in this case, the jury is permitted, though not required, to infer that the murder occurred in Pennsylvania. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (“A permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.”) Indeed, this inference may be erased, or, as one commentator has put it, “the bubble is burst” by sufficient evidence to the contrary. 1 In the case at bar, we find that the State adduced enough evidence not only to overcome this inference, but also to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder occurred in Maryland. Although Jeffrey Fiddler’s body was found in Pennsylvania, it was clear that the act of murder did not occur where ²⁹⁴ the body was found. 2 First, there was testimony from Pennsylvania State Trooper Donald Paul, the State Police’s criminal investigator who examined the body at the scene.

Trooper Paul testified in the State’s case-in-chief that, although he observed a “very deep stab wound” on the victim’s body, he found “very little” blood. He further testified that “it did not appear as though the actual stabbing occurred at that location.” In addition, the State’s forensic expert, Dr. Neil Hoffman, testified that the particular stab wound that Jeffrey Fiddler received would have resulted in the loss of a “large amount of blood,” and not just the few drops that Trooper Paul actually found on the body. Finally, Burral himself told Hagerstown police that he assisted Eddie Stouffer in stuffing Fiddler’s body into the trunk of Stouffer’s car, which supports a finding that the body was eventually transported. We conclude that, under these circumstances, where there is actually affirmative evidence that the murder occurred elsewhere, the inference regarding the location of the murder is much weaker than if no such evidence existed.

Therefore, the jury could reasonably have rejected the inference that Pennsylvania was the location of the murder. Accord People v. Sims, 244 Ill.App.3d 966 , 184 Ill.Dec. 135 , 612 N.E.2d 1011 (1993). Even though the evidence was sufficient to overcome the inference that the murder occurred in Pennsylvania, the State still bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Maryland had jurisdiction. Jones, 51 Md.App. at 340 , 443 A.2d 967 .

We believe the State satisfied its burden. First, Hagerstown Police Detective Richard Johnson testified that Burral made a statement to him, in which Burral stated: He [Burral] was present on a dirt road up in the Clear Spring, Maryland area when Eddie Stouffer had, uh, stabbed Jeff Fiddler and killed him and placed him into the ²⁹⁵ trunk of a white VW Rabbit ... and Mr. Burral assisted Stouffer in pushing the vehicle down to a residence. In addition, Sergeant Ronald Graves, also of the Hagerstown Police Department, obtained a second statement from the defendant. Sgt.

Graves testified to what Burral said in this statement: According to Mr. Burral, he was in front of Rocky’s Pizza in the square when he was picked up by Willie Stouffer and they went to Stouffer’s girlfriend’s home in Clearspring [sic]. Uh, while they were in Clearspring, Eddie Stouffer and Jeff Fiddler showed up ... [T]hey then got into Eddie Stouffer’s vehicle and drove up into the mountains to smoke some marijuana ... [Eddie Stouffer] stabbed Jeff Fiddler ... and they put [his] body in the back of a car.... Burral argues that this evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the murder was committed in Maryland. He argues that Clear Spring, Maryland, is “very near both the Pennsylvania and West Virginia borders,” and that, “given the geography of the region, it is just as likely, if not more likely, that the excursion took the party into Pennsylvania or West Virginia.” We disagree.

Under Md.Rule 5-201, we take judicial notice of a topographic map prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey, which shows that there are several dirt roads and mountains within one mile of Clear Spring proper. By contrast, the Pennsylvania-Maryland border is approximately three miles from Clear Spring, and no dirt road leads directly into Pennsylvania. As a result, we find it reasonable for a jury sitting in Washington County, Maryland, with first-hand knowledge of the local terrain, to conclude that the murder occurred in Maryland. The testimony elicited by the State, while perhaps not crystal clear, was enough to send the issue to the jury. 3 ²⁹⁶ The jury was properly instructed 4 and we will not interfere with the jury’s fact-finding prerogative.

See, e.g., Emory v. State, 101 Md.App. 585, 622 , 647 A.2d 1243 (1994), cert. denied, 337 Md. 90 , 651 A.2d 855 (1995); Wynn v. State, 117 Md.App. 133, 150 , 699 A.2d 512, 520 (1997).

III

Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted Lieutenant Robert G. Mutter’s testimony that defendant had previously been in prison. The statement occurred during the following colloquy on redirect examination of Lt. Mutter. Lt.

Mutter was testifying about an interview he had with Burral. [State’s Attorney]: I’d like to direct your attention please, to page 19 of the statement, with your statement, “What do you think happened to this guy?” ... would you read that please. [Lieutenant Mutter]: Okay. “What do you think happened to this guy? You, you’re smart you’re intelligent, streetwise, what do you think really happened? Cause you’ve been on the streets, you’ve been to prison ... what do you think went down ... in your own mind?” [Defense Counsel]: Excuse me, Detective. I need to interrupt, your Honor, it’s defendant’s motion to strike the previous testimony as to unrelated offenses ... [The Court]: Overruled. ²⁹⁷ Burral argues that Mutter’s inadvertent reference to prison amounts to inadmissible “other crimes” evidence under Md. Rule 5-404(b).

We disagree. Maryland Rule 5-404(b) provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith .,. There are, however, well-recognized exceptions to this general rule. The Rule goes on to provide that other crimes evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

See also Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602, 631 , 645 A.2d 22, 36 (1994); Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 501 , 597 A.2d 956, 962 (1991). The list of exceptions provided in the Rule is not “a laundry list of finite exceptions ... but rather a representative list of examples” of permissible uses of other crimes evidence. Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 407 , 697 A.2d 432, 440 (1997) (citing Harris, 324 Md. at 501 , 597 A.2d at 962 ). Indeed, with so many exceptions to the general ban on other crimes evidence, the Court of Appeals has recently noted that the “exceptions ‘appear to swallow the rule.’ ” Ayers, 335 Md. at 632 , 645 A.2d 22 (quoting Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473 , 386 A.2d 757 (1978)).

In short, there remains only one purpose for which other crimes evidence, in and of itself, may not be admitted, that is to “prove guilt of the offense for which the defendant is on trial.” Ayers, at 630, 645 A.2d 22 . In our view, Lt. Mutter’s testimony in this case regarding Burral’s prison record was not offered to prove that Burral was guilty of second degree murder in the case at bar. The complete statement, “You’ve been on the streets, you’ve been to prison, what do you