Burton v. State

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, Walter Lee Burton, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore in a court trial, Judge Shirley B. Jones presiding, of housebreaking, rouge and vagabond, and larceny under seven indictments, same being Nos. 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2698 and 2699. He was sentenced to a term of five years under each indictment, sentences to run consecutively under indictments Nos. 2692, 2695, 2698 and 2699 and concurrently under indictments Nos. 2691, 2693 and 2694. The total sentence imposed was twenty years.

On his appeal to this Court, appellant presents three questions, namely: 1. Did the court below properly admit into evidence alleged statements made by the defendant? 2. Does the evidence presented justify a conviction in each case ? 3. Was the conviction under the first three counts of each indictment proper?

I Were the alleged statements of the appellant properly admitted into evidence ? As a result of information received by the police relating to a number of burglaries that had taken place between March 29, 1968 and April 17, 1968, a warrant for burglary was obtained by Detective Harry McDonald on April 18, 1968 for the arrest of Walter Lee Burton. On April 19, 1968, appellant Burton was arrested by De ⁶⁷⁴ tective McDonald and taken to the Southwest District Police Station where he was questioned in the cellblock by Detective Richard Palmer in the presence of Detective McDonald. Detective Palmer testified that prior to any questioning, appellant was advised by him as to his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ).

His testimony was as follows: BY MR. NEAL: “Q. What were those advisements ? BY THE WITNESS: “A. Advised of the fact he could remain silent, he could contact anyone of his choice, had a right to have an attorney present during questioning and if he was not financially able to obtain an attorney, the Court would provide one for him. At any time during questioning he could stop the line of questioning, stop talking and request an attorney be present.” 1 An objection was then noted by counsel for the appellant.

Before ruling on the objection, it was established by the lower court that there was no dispute as to the voluntariness of any statement given by the appellant and no force or coercion was used to obtain the same. Appellant’s sole objection to any statement made was to the lack of compliance with the Miranda requirements. It was admitted that at no time did appellant ask for counsel or say that he desired to have counsel present. Moreover, the witness, in response to a question by the court, testified that appellant understood what was told him but appeared in an angry mood, and while the warnings were being given said: “Yes, yes, I know about all that.” Appellant’s objection was then overruled and in so doing the lower court said: “I think the defendant was adequately advised ⁶⁷⁵ as to his right to counsel.

He said, ‘Yes, I know all that.’ The record will show that there has been no objection made to voluntariness of the statement on grounds of force, threats or violence. So, I will overrule the objection and the State may proceed.” Detective Palmer then testified to appellant’s statements as follows: BY MR. NEAL: “Q. What did the defendant say to you at that time ? “A. Well, the defendant said to me, he says, ‘You are charging me with the Edgewood Road burglary.’ He said he wasn’t involved. He said, ‘You didn’t charge me with Mount Holly Street or Wildwood Parkway.’ “Q. Ask that one . . . “A. He said, ‘You are charging me with the Edgewood Road burglary which I didn’t commit.’ But, he said, ‘You didn’t charge me with Wildwood Parkway and Mount Holly Street burglaries.’ “Q. Any other statements given by him to you at that time? “A. Yes, as to the addresses on Mount Holly Street and Wildwood Parkway. “Q. What were they? “A. 1106 Wildwood — correction, Mount Holly Street. 1308 Wildwood Parkway and the other was....

BY THE COURT: “Q. Was he telling you all this? Are you still on the statement, Officer ? BY THE WITNESS: “A. He told me this from the cellblock. ⁶⁷⁶ BY MR. NEAL: “Q. What was the other address ? “A. 1100 Mount Holly.” From the record transcript we are of the opinion that the Miranda requirements (Miranda v. Arizona, supra) were sufficiently complied with and the appellant, knowingly and intelligently, waived his privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.

Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 313 , 239 A. 2d 761 . In arriving at this conclusion we have considered the fact that there was no allegation that appellant was subjected to physical or psychological coercion or that his intellectual endowments were impaired. It is clear from the record that he was advised as to his constitutional rights and, furthermore, understood them. While his rights were being explained to him by Detective Palmer, he kept repeating, “Yes, yes, I know about all that,” and then volunteered the statement with reference to the Mount Holly Street and Wild-wood Parkway burglaries along with the addresses of the apartments burglarized.

As stated in Brown v. State, supra, p. 321, the ultimate determination of whether the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before making a statement is governed by whether the particular facts and circumstances involved in the case are such as demonstrate an intelligent and intentional relinquishment of a known • right or privilege. Moreover, a statement by the accused that he fully understands and waives his rights is not an essential link in the chain of proof. Waiver may be shown by the attendant circumstances. Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 378 , 247 A. 2d 530 ; United States v. Hayes, 385 F. 2d 375 (4th Cir.) ; Brown v. State, supra; Mullaney v. State, 5 Md. App. 248 , 246 A. 2d 291 . .We therefore find that appellant’s statements were properly admitted into evidence by the lower court.

II Does the evidence presented justify a- conviction in each case? - ⁶⁷⁷ Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and complains that the facts fail to justify a conviction in each case. Indictments Nos. 2691, 2693 and 2694 Under these three indictments the appellant was charged and convicted of breaking in the daytime the apartment of Ben Mobley, 1100 Mount Holly Street, March 31, 1968 (No. 2691) ; the apartment of Robert L. McCleary, 1106 Mount Holly Street, March 30, 1968 (No. 2693) ; and the apartment of Maxwell Anderson, 1106 Mount Holly Street, March 30, 1968 (No. 2694) and stealing from each various articles of personal property. Each of the owners testified that on the above dates when they left their homes the doors were fully locked and no one had been given permission to enter. Upon their return they found that their homes had been broken and entered and various valuable articles of personal property removed therefrom.

The only evidence that links the appellant with these three offenses is his admission that he committed these offenses as set forth in the statement given Detective Palmer at the Southwest Police Station on April 19, 1968. In Miller v. State, supra, p. 381, the Court of Appeals said: “ [The] well established law in this State is that an extrajudicial confession or statement of the accused does not warrant a conviction unless there is independent evidence to establish the corpus delicti. Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341 , 209 A. 2d 70 ; Pierce v. State, 227 Md. 221 , 175 A. 2d 743 ; Koprivich v. State, 1 Md. App. 147 , 228 A. 2d 476 . The sufficiency of this independent evidence need not establish, by itself, the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, but any facts and circumstances that are substantial in nature and fortify the truth of the confession or statement are sufficient to support a conviction.

Had ⁶⁷⁸ der v. State and Koprivich v. State, both supra. Such proof does not have to be full and positive and it may be circumstantial in nature, when direct evidence is not available. Cooper v. State, supra; Bollinger v. State, 208 Md. 298 , 117 A. 2d 913 ; Davis v. State, 202 Md. 463 , 97 A. 2d 303 .” Moreover, the appellant in his statement to Detective Palmer supplied him with the specific addresses of the residences on Mount Holly Street and Wildwood Parkway which were broken into. Appellant’s admission, together with the clear evidence of the burglary at each of the dwellings, was sufficient to sustain the convictions, and we think that the lower court’s judgment of conviction in each of these three cases was not clearly erroneous under Maryland Rule 1086.