Butler v. James

DAVIS, Judge. Clarence James, appellee, filed suit against Nathaniel Butler, appellant, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for injuries appellee alleged that he received when appellant’s ¹⁹⁸ pick-up truck struck the rear of the vehicle appellee was driving on May 21, 1998. After the case was removed from the district court to the circuit court upon appellant’s prayer for a jury trial, the trial commenced on August 19, 1999; the jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of appellee. After the lower court denied appellant’s Motion for New Trial or Remittitur and granted appellant’s motion to amend the ad damnum clause to conform with the verdict amount, appellant noted this timely appeal, in which he raises five questions that we have rephrased and reordered for clarity as follows: I. Once appellee submitted medical records and bills under Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-104 at trial, was he statutorily precluded from obtaining a judgment in excess of $25,000?

II

Once appellee filed notice of his intent to admit medical records and bills through Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-104, was he then statutorily precluded from obtaining a judgment in excess of $25,000?

III

Did the trial court err in granting appellee leave to amend his ad damnum clause pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-341 to conform to the verdict?

IV

Did the trial court err in concluding that Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-104 was inapplicable to the case because of appellee’s presentation of live testimony of a treating chiropractor at trial? V. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to exercise its discretion when it denied the Motion for New Trial or Remittitur? For the reasons set forth below, we answer appellant’s five questions in the affirmative and reverse the decision of the trial court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellee initially filed his claim in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County in the amount of $25,-000, along with his intent to introduce in the district court the writings, records, and bills of medical/health care provider, ¹⁹⁹ pursuant to Md.Code (1998 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud.Proe. 1 § 10-104.

Appellee gave notice of his intention to introduce medical records from Back to Health Chiropractic Centers, Prince George’s Hospital Center, Christopher M. Magee, M.D., as well as medical bills from Back to Health Chiropractic Centers in the amount of $5,855, Prince George’s Hospital Center in the amount of $670.98, Chesapeake Emergency Medical Associates in the amount of $145, and Schonholtz, Magee & Michaels, M.D. Orthopaedics, P.A. in the amount of $870. Appellee offered an affidavit of Stephen T. Michaels, M.D., appellee’s treating orthopedist, to establish the causal relationship between the motor vehicle accident and the injuries for which appellee received subsequent treatment and the necessity for that treatment as well as the fairness and reasonableness of the medical bills. Listed in the pre-trial statement by appellee were itemized medical expenses as reflected in the medical bills submitted, as well as notification that appellee intended to establish damages for lost wages in the amount of $922.50. Appellee further indicated that he intended to introduce the medical records, pursuant to § 10-104.

Appellant timely filed a prayer for jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Counsel for appellee corresponded with appellant’s counsel regarding possible stipulations concerning the admissibility of “my 10-104 statement.” Appellant responded by letter dated May 18, 1999 that counsel did not want to agree to the admissibility of a “10-104” statement if “there is going to be live testimony.” Counsel further indicated that he would agree to a stipulation, pursuant to § 10-104, only as to the records that were not the subject of live testimony. A bench conference was held at trial when appellee indicated he intended to proceed pursuant to § 10-104 and the lower court ultimately ruled that, because § 10-104(f) provided that ²⁰⁰ nothing contained in this section of the code “may be construed to limit the right of a party to: (1) Request a summons to compel the attendance of a witness; or (2) Examine a witness who appears at trial,” the notice given by appellee, pursuant to § 10-104, would be admitted as Exhibit No. 1 and appellee’s treating chiropractor, Michael Fedorczyk, D.C., would be permitted to testify at trial. Dr. Fedorczyk testified that the areas which were injured as a result of the accident might flare up if appellee was overworked, overstressed, or if the weather changes and that, as to future medical intervention, appellee would not need “a lot of future treatment”; the witness indicated appellee “might need treatment when these things flair [sic] up, mild treatment just to get the thing to ... calm down,” adding that appellee would not need treatment for the rest of his life.

The witness felt that the medical bills were fair, reasonable, and necessary, “within a reasonable degree of chiropractic certainty.” The medical bills from Prince George’s Hospital Center, Chesapeake Emergency Medical Associates, and Schonholtz, Magee and Michaels, M.D. Orthopaedics, P.A., had previously been admitted into evidence based on the notice, pursuant to § 10-104. Appellant elected not to call any witnesses and, at the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury on the issue of damages: The personal injury sustained and their [sic] extent and duration, the effect such an injury will have on the physical, mental health, and well being of the [appellant], the physical pain and mental anguish suffered in the past, medical and other expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in the past, and a loss of earnings in the past. The trial judge then directed the jury to itemize its award, instructing that the jury “show the amount intended for the medical expenses incurred in the past, the loss of earnings incurred in the past, and the non-economic damages sustained in the past....” In a note from the jury delivered to the trial judge, it requested instructions on the maximum and minimum ²⁰¹ amount of available damages which the jury could award. The court simply responded by sending a note that the jury “must decide the appropriate amount of damages based on the evidence you heard.” Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict of $7,540.91 for medical expenses, $2,800 for loss of earnings, and $300,000 for non-economic damages.

The court, upon appellee’s request for leave to amend, permitted appellee to amend his ad damnum clause to conform to the jury verdict. LEGAL ANALYSIS Appellant initially contends that § 10-104 reflects an intent to limit its applicability to cases in which the amount in controversy does not exceed the jurisdictional limits of the district court. More specifically, he asserts: While the statute now applies to cases in the [cjircuit [cjourt, the conditions placed on using § 10-104 in [cjircuit [cjourt require that the litigation originate in [djistrict [cjourt, and that the “amount in controversy” not exceed the jurisdictional limits of the [djistrict [cjourt. Accordingly, it is apparent that the Maryland General Assembly never intended this legislation to allow the introduction of medical bills and records at trial without a physician’s . ‘stimony in cases in which the amount in controversy i'.weeded the jurisdictional limits of the [djistrict [cjourt.

Once the trial court allowed [appellee] to change the “amount in controversy” from his original ad damnum of $25,000 to the jury verdict of 310,340.91, [sic] that is precisely what occurred in the present case. The trial court’s decision to allow a Rule 2-341 amendment of his ad damnum under the facts of this case constitutes a failure to acknowledge and apply the clear mandate of this statute. During the colloquy between counsel and the court, the trial judge remarked: Yeah. And I certainly would not make that finding.

I don’t believe—I think the issue is I don’t think it really ²⁰² matters in my decision why you asked for a jury trial, whether it was to take advantage of the discovery. That really is totally irrelevant. It’s the fact that you did, and the jurisdictional consequences of doing it. That’s the issue.

Appellee responds that § 10-104 is inapplicable to the case at hand because he filed the notice of intent to introduce medical records in the district court rather than the circuit court. He argues that, by the language of section (c)(ii), the notice, pursuant to § 10-104, is required to be filed in the court in which the case will be tided. Section § 10-104(b)(2) and (c) 2 provides, in pertinent part: (b) (2) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the provisions of this section apply to a proceeding in: (i) The District Court; or (ii) A circuit court if: 1. The case was originally filed in the District Court; 2.

The case was transferred from the District Court to a circuit court; and 3. The amount in controversy in the action in the circuit court does not exceed the amount specified in § 4-401 of this article for that type of action. (c) In general.—(1) A writing or record of a health care provider described in this section is admissible under this section if: (i) The writing or record is offered in the trial of a civil action in the District Court or a circuit court; ²⁰³ (ii) At least 60 days, except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, before the beginning of the trial, the party who intends to introduce the wilting or record files with the clerk of the court and serves on all other parties as provided under Maryland Rule 1-321: 1. Notice of the party’s intent to introduce the writing or record without the support of a health care provider’s testimony; and 2.

A copy of the writing or record; and (iii) The writing or record is otherwise admissible. (2) A party, who receives a notice under paragraph (1) of this subsection and intends to introduce another wilting or record of a health care provider without a health care provider’s testimony, shall file and serve a notice of intent and copy of the writing or record at least 30 days before the beginning of the trial. I, II, and III We first address appellant’s contention that, once appellee introduced medical records and bills at trial pursuant § 10-104, he was statutorily precluded from obtaining a judgment in excess of $25,000. Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 10-104 was originally enacted by the Maryland General Assembly during the 1996 Session.

See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 554. Its purpose was to allow “a medical or dental writing or record to be admissible without a physician’s or dentist’s testimony when presented in the trial of a civil action in the [district fcjourt,” when advance notice of the intent to introduce such a writing was given to the parties and the court. Bill Analysis, House Bill (H.B.) 1431, 1996 Session. The provision was amended in the 1997 Session by H.B. 423.

As originally drafted, H.B. 423 would have “ma[de] these provisions applicable to a circuit court proceeding as well as the [district [cjourt.... ” Bill Analysis, H.B. 423, 1997 Session. The bill was amended before enactment, however, to apply only to a proceeding in: (I) The district court; or ²⁰⁴ (II) A circuit court if: 1. The case was originally filed in the district court; 2. The case was transferred from the district court to a circuit court; and 8.

The amount in controversy in the action in the circuit court does not exceed the amount specified in § 4-401 of this article for that type of action. 1997 Md. Laws ch. 443; see also Second Reading, H.B. 423, 1997 Session. Appellant contends that the language of the statute limiting its applicability to actions when the “amount in controversy ... does not exceed the amount specified in § 4^401 of this article for that type of action” limits appellee’s recovery to $25,000. Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 4-401 lists the categories of cases over which the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction. The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over an action in tort, “if the debt or damages claimed do not exceed $25,000.... ” Determining whether the provisions of § 10-104 serve as a limit on damages “is a matter of statutory construction, the object of which is to discern and effectuate the intention of the Legislature.” Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam, Chartered v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119 , 668 A.2d 929 (1995).

As the Court stated in Aluisi : Where the ordinary and common meaning of the words used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, usually, it is unnecessary to go further. Nevertheless, “(i)n the interest of completeness ... we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account.” Id. (citing Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946 (1993)). The purpose of the statute may be ascertained by looking at any material “that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal,” including “amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature [and] its ²⁰⁵ relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation.... ” Id.

(internal quotation omitted). Both a plain reading of § 10-104(c)(2) and an examination of the history of its enactment evince an intent that medical records not be admitted under the statute unless the amount in controversy, as measured by the damages claimed, does not exceed $25,000. The most likely reason for this requirement is the policy decision that, when the defendant is exposed to damages greater than $25,000, the plaintiff should be required to authenticate the records through live testimony. The requirement would fail to serve its purpose, however, if records were introduced at trial under § 10-104 because the plaintiff plead damages of $25,000 or less, but the defendant was exposed to a potential verdict in excess of that amount.

When a case is transferred from a district court to a circuit court, just this result is possible. Although a plaintiffs claim for damages, or ad damnum, has historically been a limit on the verdict, the Court of Appeals held in Falcinelli v. Cardascia, 339 Md. 414 , 663 A.2d 1256 (1995), that “the ad damnum does not inherently limit the power of the jury to render a verdict and does not inherently limit the power of the court to enter a judgment.” Id. at 427 , 663 A.2d 1256 . Moreover, Maryland Rule 2-341 was amended in 1998 to add a committee note reading, “By leave of court, the court may grant leave to amend the amount sought in a demand for a money judgment after a jury verdict is returned.” Md. Rule 2-341(b) committee note (2000). To effectuate the legislative intent not to allow § 10-104 to be used in cases where the defendant is exposed to liability exceeding $25,000, we interpret the statute as requiring a limitation on damages.

Cf. § 11-108 (placing a limitation on non-economic damages in personal injury actions); § 11-110 (limiting the damages for tortious injury to a pet). Appellant also