Caesar v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On 8 March 1966 the Court of Appeals found that James Lawrence Jones had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial on two indictments charging armed robbery pending against him and ordered that his motion to dismiss them be granted. Jones v. State, 241 Md. 599 . Thereafter, it became fashionable for defendants to allege that the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the ⁴² 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article 21 of the Declaration of Eights of the Constitution of Maryland had been violated.

Even if they did not fall within the ambit of Jones so that prosecution of them would be barred, at the least a trial on the merits could be postponed for a substantial time on a denial of their motion to dismiss, since the matter was immediately appealable. Allen v. State, 1 Md. App. 249 . Thus, it is not surprising that we have, during the existence of our Court thus far, considered the question in some half a hundred reported cases that bobbed up in the wake of Jones . The holding in Jones was not predicated on a new interpretation of the constitutional guarantees, or on a rule of law regarding them in Jones enunciated, or on a rationale not previously followed, but on its particular facts.

It was simply that the Court did not consider as valid in the face of Jones’ oft-repeated demands for trial, the State being prepared for trial, excuses offered that the prosecutor would be away, for a time, on summer military encampment, overcrowded trial dockets, and the lack of a jury during summer recess of the courts. In the cases which came before us we developed the test to be applied in determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We summarized the governing principles in Wilson v. State, 8 Md. App. 299 , 306-307: “The right to a speedy trial is a relative one and the time within which trial must be had to satisfy the constitutional guaranty depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Jones v. State, 241 Md. 599 ; Johnson v. State, 4 Md. App. 648 ; Kelly v. State, 2 Md. App. 730 .

Four factors are relevant to a consideration of these facts and circumstances in determining whether a delay in trial assumes constitutional proportions: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether prejudice to the accused has resulted, and (4) whether the accused has waived his right to a speedy trial. ⁴³ Barnett v. State, 8 Md. App. 35 ; Stevenson v. State, 4 Md. App. 1 . Waiver will, of itself, dispose of a contention that an accused has been denied a speedy trial; ‘but the other three factors are relative and must be considered together in arriving at a decision in each case.’ Hall v. State, 3 Md. App. 680, 686 . Where the delay in bringing the case to trial is ‘substantial’ in the constitutional sense, a prima facie showing of prejudice is deemed to exist and the State in such case has the burden of proving that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary process of justice and that the accused suffered no serious prejudice thereby; when the delay is less than ‘substantial,’ even if it is purposeful, oppressive, or negligent, at least some showing by the defendant of ‘a strong possibility of prejudice’ is required. King v. State, 6 Md. App. 413 ; Frazier v. State, 5 Md. App. 88 ; Stevenson v. State, supra.

There is, however, no precise rule by which to determine when a delay is ‘substantial;’ the determination must be made in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Stevenson v. State, supra. * * * In determining the question whether, under the circumstances, a delay is substantial or less than substantial, we recognize the principle espoused by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 119 , that ‘because of the many procedural safeguards provided an accused, the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace.’ We also recognize that an accused is protected only against unreasonable or unnecessary delay; and that the State is entitled to time to prepare for trial with reasonable diligence and also to any reasonably needed time to conform with the trial court’s calendar of criminal cases ⁴⁴ in the actual .trial of the case. See Jones v. State, supra; Bryant v. State, 4 Md. App. 572 ; Fabian v. State, 3 Md. App. 270 . We have thus taken into account the fact that in the course of the administration of justice, administrative problems sometimes arise of such consequence as to make a delay on the part of the State in bringing a case to trial not one stemming from a failure on its part to proceed with due diligence, e.g. the administrative problems encountered by the State’s Attorney of Baltimore City in the wake of Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121 .

See Hall v. State, supra; Brown v. State, 2 Md. App. 388. On the other hand, we have given consideration to the fact of incarceration without bail pending trial in assessing whether a trial delay is unreasonable, concluding that, of itself, such incarceration is not controlling in determining whether the right to a speedy trial has been denied. State v. Long, 1 Md. App. 326 . We have also been mindful of the fact that the constitutional guaranty of a speedy trial is one which seeks to prevent lengthy pretrial imprisonment where an accused is unable to make bond.

See Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F. 2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), and cases cited at page 367.” It is clear from these principles that the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the rights of public justice and that an accused is not without obligation to establish his claim within defined guidelines. Four indictments were returned against Samuel Lee Caesar, also known as Lee Samuel Caesar. Three of them arose from the same incidents occurring on 4 October 1968 when he allegedly entered a branch of the Provident Savings Bank and robbed an employee and two customers at gun point. The fourth charged larceny of the use of an automobile two days before.

These indictments have not come to trial on the general issue. On 30 October 1969 ⁴⁵ the lower court denied a motion to dismiss the indictments made on the ground of denial of a speedy trial and it is the appeal from that denial which is now before us. Caesar was confined to jail under a commitment filed 9 October 196S, presented on 17 October and indicted on 24 October. He was arraigned on 27 November and counsel was appointed for him on 29 November.

The docket entries disclose the following: a motion for discovery was made in proper person on 25 October and 16 December 1968 and by appellant’s attorney on 2 December 1968; answers were filed by the State on 19 November and 22 November 1968 and 9 January 1969; a motion to suppress evidence was made in proper person on 30 October 1968 and heard and denied on 28 October 1969; motions to suppress were made in proper person on 13 and 16 January 1969, heard on 28-30 October 1969 and denied; a motion for a speedy trial was made on 25 April 1969; an oral motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial was heard and denied on 23 June 1969; a motion to dismiss was made in proper person on 1 and 6 August 1969 and hearing requested; a hearing on the motion to dismiss of 1 August 1969 was had on 28-30 October 1969 and denied. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss in October 1969 Caesar testified. He recounted that he was arrested on 4 October 1968, charged with three offenses of armed robbery and one of unauthorized use of an automobile, bound over at a preliminary hearing on 9 October, indicted on 24 October and arraigned on 27 November. It was stipulated that when defense counsel’s motion for discovery filed 29 November was answered by the State on 9 January 1969, the case was set for trial on 20 February.

It appeared that it was postponed that day due to absence of State’s witnesses and Caesar was brought back in the next day — a Friday. Pretrial proceedings on a motion to suppress eyewitness identification were commenced that morning. At noon, as defense counsel had a case in the Federal Court, the matter was continued. The transcript of the proceedings at that hearing discloses ⁴⁶ .that Fred Grant, Esq., the Assistant State’s Attorney, indicated the matter could be resumed the following Monday. “THE COURT: Well, my docket depends on how you put these cases in, Mr. Grant.

MR. GRANT: Perhaps we can put our witnesses on call with the possibility that Mr. White can come here on Monday, and we can have the witnesses here. MR. WHITE (Defense Counsel) : Fine.

I will notify you as soon as I can ascertain this on Monday