Cain v. Midland Funding

Clifford Cain, et al. v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 38, September Term, 2020; Tasha Gambrell v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 39, September Term, 2020, Opinion by Booth, J. COURTS & JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 5-101 – STATUTES OF LIMITATION – GENERAL APPLICATION. Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations under Courts & Judicial Proceedings (“CJ”) § 5-101 applies to claims filed by a judgment debtor against a judgment creditor for unjust enrichment and money damages under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (“MCDCA”) related to collection activities arising from the entry of a judgment at a time when the judgment creditor was not a licensed collection agency. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – ACCRUAL – CONTINUING HARM DOCTRINE. The Court of Appeals declined to apply the continuing harm doctrine to extend the accrual period for claims for unjust enrichment and statutory money damages related to a judgment creditor’s collection activities, where the wrongful conduct forming the basis of the Petitioners’ claims was the debt collector’s licensure status at the time the judgment was entered, and where the collection activities occurred after the debt collector obtained its license.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION – TOLLING – CLASS ACTION TOLLING OF SUCCESSIVE CLASS ACTIONS. The Court of Appeals declined to expand the Maryland class action tolling rule to successive class actions, and instead adopted the reasoning and logic of the Supreme Court in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018). STATUTES OF LIMITATION – TOLLING – CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL CLASS ACTION TOLLING. Maryland recognizes American Pipe class action tolling for absent members of putative class actions filed in other state and federal courts.

The same factors that we articulated in Christensen for intra-jurisdictional tolling also apply to cross- jurisdictional class action tolling. Specifically, in order for the plaintiff to claim the benefit of class action tolling in a later-filed individual claim, the plaintiff must show that the class action complaint: (1) notified the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs; and (2) the individual suit must concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class action suit. Cross-jurisdictional class action tolling ends when there is a clear dismissal of a putative class action, including a dismissal for forum non conveniens, or a denial of class action for any reason. CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPELLATE JURISDICTION – JURISDICTION OVER A FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER.

The circuit court’s orders in Cain, which entered summary judgment and a declaratory judgment, constituted a final judgment under the procedural posture of this case. The orders completely adjudicated all claims between the parties at the time that the judgment was entered. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No.: 24-C-13-004869 Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Case No.: C-02-CV-15-002988 OF MARYLAND Argued: March 4, 2021 Nos. 38 & 39 September Term, 2020 CLIFFORD CAIN, et al. v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC TASHA GAMBRELL v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. Opinion by Booth, J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal McDonald, J., dissents in part.

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-10-08 16:42-04:00 Filed: August 4, 2021 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In the instant cases, we must decide the applicable statute of limitations for claims filed by consumer debtors against a consumer debt buyer, Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland”), alleging improper debt collection activities in connection with money judgments that Midland obtained against the plaintiffs at a time when Midland was not licensed as a collection agency under Maryland law. These matters originated as two separate putative class action cases that were filed against Midland in Maryland circuit courts. Petitioner Clifford Cain, Jr. filed a putative class action against Midland in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 30, 2013. Petitioner Tasha Gambrell filed a putative class action against Midland in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on September 28, 2015.

In both cases, Petitioners allege that Midland obtained judgments against the named plaintiffs and similarly situated members of the putative classes for consumer debts during a time period when Midland did not have a collection agency license under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (“MCALA”).1 Both putative class actions included counts for declaratory judgment (seeking a declaration that the judgments obtained by Midland were void), injunctive relief preventing Midland from collecting on the judgments in the future, and money damages arising from claims for unjust enrichment and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (“MCDCA”)2 and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”).3 In 1 Maryland Code, Business Regulation Article (“BR”) §§ 7-101 through 7-502. 2 Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article (“CL”) §§ 14-201 through 14-204. 3 CL §§ 13-101 through 13-501. both cases, the circuit courts resolved the cases by motion. In Mr. Cain’s case, the circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment to each party in part, and a separate declaratory judgment declaring the rights of the parties. In Ms. Gambrell’s case, the circuit court granted Midland’s motion to dismiss. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

That court issued an unreported opinion in each case. With respect to Mr. Cain’s case, the Court of Special Appeals determined that it had jurisdiction to consider Mr. Cain’s appeal, concluding that the circuit court’s summary judgment order and declaratory judgment constituted a final judgment. Aside from that procedural issue, which was unique to Mr. Cain’s case, the Court of Special Appeals resolved Mr. Cain’s and Ms. Gambrell’s claims in the same manner. In each instance, the intermediate appellate court held that our decision in LVNV Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 Md. 586 (2019) (“Finch III”) resolved the Petitioners’ declaratory judgment counts and that under Finch III, the judgments obtained when Midland was unlicensed were not void.

The court also held that, since Petitioners’ judgments had been satisfied, they were not entitled to injunctive relief because Midland was no longer collecting on them. With respect to the remaining claims seeking restitution under an unjust enrichment theory and money damages for the statutory claims, the Court of Special Appeals held that the claims were barred by the general three-year statute of limitations codified at Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 5- 101. The court rejected Petitioners’ argument that the claims constituted “actions on a judgment” and were therefore subject to a 12-year statute of limitations applicable to specialties actions under CJ § 5-102(a)(3). The court similarly rejected Petitioners’ 2 assertion that the continuing harm doctrine applied to change the accrual date for their unjust enrichment claims.

Finally, the court rejected Petitioners’ argument that the statute of limitations was tolled under the class action tolling doctrine based upon Mr. Cain’s earlier participation as a putative class member in a federal class action case, and in Ms. Gambrell’s case, based upon two would-be class action cases pending against Midland in Maryland state courts. We granted Mr. Cain’s and Ms. Gambrell’s petitions for writ of certiorari.4 Because the cases involve the same questions of law, we issue one opinion to answer the following questions, which we have rephrased for clarity: 1. Whether Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and money damages under the MCPA and MCDCA are subject to the three-year general statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101? 2. Whether the continuing harm doctrine applies to change the accrual date for Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and statutory money 4 The questions presented in Mr. Cain’s petition for writ of certiorari are: 1.

Whether the statute of limitations for actions on judgments under [CJ] § 5-102(a)(3) applied to both parties to the judgment? 2. If the Petitioner’s claims here are not governed by [CJ] § 5-102(a)(3), do claims under Maryland’s consumer protection laws concerning the continuing unfair, deceptive and wrongful conduct accrue each time a damage occurs or a[n] ill-gotten benefit is realized by the wrongdoer? 3. Whether the Federal tolling under 28 [U.S.C.] § 1367(d) or class action tolling from a prior Federal action applies to a subsequent Maryland state action? 4. Whether the [Court of Special Appeals] had jurisdiction to review the Circuit Court’s non-final orders?

Ms. Gambrell’s petition for writ of certiorari presented the identical questions to Mr. Cain’s questions 1 and 2. 3 damages because Midland garnished Petitioners’ wages over a period of time after it obtained the judgment? 3. Whether the statute of limitations period on Mr. Cain’s individual claims was tolled under Maryland’s class action tolling doctrine? 4. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) tolled the statute of limitations on Mr. Cain’s claims asserted in his state court class action based upon his earlier participation as a putative class member of a federal class action? 5. Whether a final judgment was entered by the circuit court in Mr. Cain’s action that was therefore reviewable by the Court of Special Appeals?

We answer yes to questions one, three and five, and no to question two. Given our holding that Maryland recognizes cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, we determine that it is unnecessary to answer question four. In Ms. Gambrell’s case, we affirm the judgment entered by the Court of Special Appeals in both cases in its entirety. In Mr. Cain’s case, pertaining to Mr. Cain’s individual claims, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in part, and reverse it in part.

Before we get into the weeds of the instant cases, we start with some background and history for context. This is not the first time that we have addressed debt collection activities by consumer debt purchasers like Midland. It is useful to give an overview of the licensing laws that apply to the collection activities that spawned several class action cases in both the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and our state circuit courts. 4 I. Background A. Debt-Buying Industry—Unlicensed Collection Activities and Legislative Amendments to Regulate Industry In Finch III,5 we described the emergence of the consumer debt-buying business model that was developed in the late 1980s, which has become commonplace in the debt collection industry. Under this new business format, creditors (such as credit card companies) sell consumer debt accounts that are in default to bulk purchasers for pennies on the dollar, thereby transferring the expense and risk of consumer debt collection efforts to the consumer debt purchaser.

In Maryland, a debt collection agency is required to be licensed. See the MCALA, Md. Code, Business Regulation Article (“BR”) § 7-301(a) (“a person must have a license whenever the person does business as a collection agency in the State[]”). The MCALA was enacted by the General Assembly in 1977.6 From its enactment until some amendments in 2007, the license requirements focused on persons who were “directly or 5 In order to distinguish between the various decisions related to the Finch litigation, we refer to the various cases as follows: Finch v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 212 Md. App. 748 cert. denied, 435 Md. 266 (2013) (“Finch I”); LVNV Funding v. Finch, No. 1075, 2017 WL 6388959 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017) (“Finch II”), vacated, LVNV Funding LLC v. Finch, 463 Md. 586 (2019) (“Finch III”). 6 We summarized the legislative history of the MCALA in Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87 (2018). 5 indirectly in the business of collecting for, or soliciting from another, a consumer claim.” Finch III, 463 Md. at 603 (emphasis omitted).7 By 2007, it was apparent to the state regulators, and ultimately, the General Assembly, that the new business model did not fit within the existing definition of “collection agency,” and debt bulk purchasers were engaging in debt collection activities—filing civil lawsuits, obtaining judgments, and engaging in post-judgment collection activities—in the State without a license.

Id. at 603–04. It was estimated that, by 2007, there were approximately 40 debt purchasers that were engaging in debt collection activities in Maryland without a license.8 To close this loophole, at the urging of the Commissioner of Financial Regulation, the General Assembly expanded the definition of “collection agency” to include a person “who engages directly or indirectly in the business of . . . collecting a consumer claim the person owns, if the claim was in default when the person acquired it[.]” BR § 7-101(d)(1)(ii) (the “2007 amendment”). The 2007 amendment took effect on October 1, 2007. From that date, bulk purchasers of consumer debts “who engaged directly or indirectly in the business of collecting consumer debt that they owned and that was in default when they acquired it” were required to be licensed.

Finch III, 463 Md. at 604 . 7 In Finch III, we pointed out that the 2006 version of the MCALA defined “collection agency” in relevant part as a person who “engages directly or indirectly in the business of collecting for, or soliciting from another, a consumer claim.” 463 Md. at 603 (emphasis in original). 8 See Dep’t Legis. Servs., Fiscal and Policy Note, House Bill 1324, at 2 (2007) (“The department estimates that the bill would make 40 debt purchasers subject to State regulation. Debt purchasers are not currently subject to regulation, as they purchase the debt directly from the creditor and are generally compensated as a percentage of their recovery.”). 6 Despite the legislative change that brought bulk consumer debt purchasers within the statutory umbrella of the state licensing scheme, some debt purchasers professed confusion concerning whether they were required to be licensed in certain instances. This confusion purportedly arose from their reliance on a letter issued in June 2007 by an employee of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (“DLLR”) on behalf of the Chair of the Collection Agency Licensing Board.

These debt purchasers relied on the June 2007 letter as support for the proposition that they were not required to be licensed as a collection agency, provided that the collections were handled on their behalf by an attorney who was licensed as a Maryland collection agency.9 To address the confusion, in May, 2010, the Collection Agency Licensing Board (“Board” or “Licensing Board”) issued an advisory notice “clarify[ing] that it has been its consistent position that a consumer debt purchaser that collects consumer claims through civil litigation is a ‘collection agency’ under Maryland law and required to be licensed as such[.]” (Some capitalization omitted). Notwithstanding the Board’s position on the need for licensing, the Board acknowledged the “claims of confusion” arising from the June 2007 letter by some consumer debt purchasers in deciding not to become licensed. In order to facilitate the prompt licensing 9 We summarized the circumstances surrounding the letter, and its contents in Finch III. We noted that the June 2007 letter was written by Kelly Mack, an employee of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, purportedly on behalf of the Chair of the Collection Agency Licensing Board.

Finch III, 463 Md. 586 , 604 n.9. In Finch III, we rejected the debt buyer’s reliance on this letter as being inconsistent with both the plain language of the MCALA, and the affidavits submitted by the Commissioner of Financial Regulation, attesting to the fact that the DLLR and Collection Agency Licensing Board had consistently taken the position that consumer debt purchasers who collect debts through civil litigation are “collection agencies” that are subject to the licensing requirements of the MCALA. Id. at 604 n.9. 7 of the unlicensed consumer debt purchasers, the advisory notice stated that the Board would not preclude an unlicensed consumer debt purchaser from obtaining a license where, prior to September 1, 2010, it engaged in civil litigation to collect a consumer debt, provided that: (1) the consumer debt purchaser was represented in the action by an attorney who was licensed as a Maryland collection agency; and (2) the consumer debt purchaser applied for a license on or before August 31, 2010. The Board further proclaimed that it would not bring an action against a consumer debt purchaser solely for its non-licensed status provided it fit within the criteria set forth above.

After October 1, 2007, the effective date of the 2007 amendment, a multitude of lawsuits were filed in both state and federal courts seeking to challenge judgments obtained by debt purchasers who were not licensed as a collection agency at the time they obtained the judgments, as well as post-judgment collection efforts undertaken by the debt purchasers. We discuss the history of one such legal saga—“the Finch cases”—below. We shall explain the Finch litigation in some detail because the Finch cases were decided during the pendency of the instant cases, and the lower courts relied upon the various Finch holdings in their rulings below. Moreover, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted, our holding in Finch III resolves some of the claims made by the Petitioners here.

B. The Finch Cases Finch III originated as a class action lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) that resulted in money judgments in favor of two named plaintiffs, as well as a separate money judgment against LVNV in the amount of $25 million in favor of the class. LVNV was a debt purchaser that began its debt collection 8 activity upon its founding in 2005 but did not obtain a collection agency license until 2010. During this period, LVNV obtained individual judgments against the named plaintiffs, as well as members of the plaintiff class, and engaged in post-judgment collection activity. The plaintiffs alleged that LVNV violated three Maryland consumer protection statutes that govern debt collection activity—the MCALA (BR §§ 7-101 through 7-502); the MCDCA (CL §§ 14-201 through 14-204); and the MCPA (CL §§ 13-101 through 13-501).

Like the Petitioners in this case, the plaintiffs in Finch sought, among other things, a declaration that the judgments entered against them in the state District Court in favor of LVNV when it was not licensed as a collection agency were void. Id. at 598. On LVNV’s motion, the circuit court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on enrolled District Court judgments. Id.

In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the judgments obtained by LVNV when it was not licensed as a collection agency were void, and not merely voidable, and could be collaterally attacked at any time and in any court. See Finch I, 212 Md. App. 748 . Upon that ruling, and the denial of certiorari by this Court, the case returned to the circuit court for further proceedings. On remand, the case was submitted to a jury on the plaintiffs’ claims of unjust enrichment and whether LVNV violated the MCDCA.

The jury awarded damages to the named plaintiffs and the class, which was ultimately entered as a judgment in the amount of $25 million. After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion (“Finch II”), LVNV filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider three issues: (1) whether the MCALA was intended to apply to entities such as 9 LVNV that “passively own” consumer debt but retain licensed collection agencies to collect it; (2) whether a judgment in favor of an unlicensed agency is void; and (3) whether the lower courts erred in finding a private right of action in the MCALA or MCDCA. As to the issue of whether the MCALA applied to LVNV, after examining the plain language of the 2007 amendment, as well as the legislative history, we rejected LVNV’s argument that the amendment did not apply where the unlicensed agency retains a law firm licensed as a collection agency to collect the debt. We held that, from the date that the 2007 amendment took effect, “debt buyers who engaged directly or indirectly in the business of collecting consumer debt that they owned and that was in default when they acquired it needed to be licensed.[]” Finch III, 463 Md. at 604 .

Accordingly, we held that LVNV’s collection activity from October 1, 2007 until it obtained a license in February 2010 was unlawful under the MCALA, MCDCA, and MCPA. Id. at 606 . However, we disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Finch I and Finch II, that a judgment obtained by an unlicensed collection agency is void. In rejecting this holding, we explained that “[j]udgments, by and large, are meant to be final.” Id. at 607 .

Repeating the words expressed by this Court 143 years ago, which have been repeated several times since, we pointed out that [i]t is most desirable of course that there should be an end to litigation, and a judgment is presumed to be a settlement of all matters in dispute in that particular case; and once entered, parties are no longer under the necessity of preserving the evidences upon which their claims rested. By it new rights are acquired, and if stricken out other claims may intervene, and the plaintiff may not only lose his lien, but in many cases the entire debt. 10 Id. (quoting Abell v. Simon, 49 Md. 318, 324 (1878)) (additional citations omitted). We explained that, “[i]n furtherance of that principle, the ability to challenge a civil judgment, other than by appeal, is limited, even in the court that entered it.

The court that rendered the judgment has discretionary revisory power over it for only 30 days.” Id. We pointed out that, under Maryland Rules 2-535 and 3-535, the judgment becomes “enrolled” on the 30th day following its entry, “and after that time, the court may revise it only upon a finding of fraud, jurisdictional mistake, or irregularity, which are narrowly construed.” Id. at 607–08 (citations omitted). In addition to principles of finality, we also observed that our jurisprudence dating back to 1824 distinguished “between judgments that were merely voidable because of irregularities in the proceeding that produced them and those that were absolutely void ab initio.” Id. at 608 (citing Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 182, 204 (1824)). We stated that [c]ollateral attacks, whether in the court that entered the judgment or in any other court, are even more severely limited and are permitted only when the court that rendered the judgment had no jurisdiction to do so.

Indeed, there are few principles of law that are so firmly and consistently entrenched in our jurisprudence, and for good reason. Id. (emphasis in original). We also explained that our holding was not “a matter of blind adherence to an outmoded judicial policy[,]” but in recognition that “[e]nrolled judgments create important vested rights that not just the parties, but the entire public, have a right to rely upon.” Id. at 611.

Because the District Court “clearly had fundamental jurisdiction over the collection actions filed by LVNV, notwithstanding that LVNV had no legal authority to file them,” we held that the two lower courts erred in declaring them void. Id. 11 Although we determined that the judgments obtained when LVNV was unlicensed were not void or otherwise subject to collateral attack, we nonetheless held that the MCALA establishes a private remedy for the recovery of “any damages” arising from a violation of its statutory provisions, including for emotional distress. Id. at 612. Accordingly, we remanded the case for further proceedings with respect to damages.

We stated that “[a]lthough the District Court judgments may not be collaterally attacked, BR § 7-401, read in conjunction with § 7-101(c), would permit declaratory and injunctive relief precluding LVNV from taking any action to enforce those judgments and for any damages incurred by the plaintiffs as the result of LVNV’s collection efforts.” Id. (emphasis in original). To summarize our holdings in Finch III, we held that: • As of October 1, 2007—the date that the 2007 amendment took effect—debt buyers were required to be licensed before engaging in efforts to collect consumer debt. • Enrolled judgments obtained by an unlicensed debt buyer are not void or subject to collateral attack on any ground other than the fundamental jurisdiction of the court that entered the judgment to render it. • Although an enrolled judgment obtained by an unlicensed debt buyer is not void, a judgment debtor may still have a cause of action under the Maryland consumer protection statutes governing debt collection (MCALA, MCDCA and MCPA) for declaratory and injunctive relief precluding the debt buyer who obtained the judgment while unlicensed, from enforcing those judgments and for any damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the collection efforts. 12 In Finch III, we did not consider the issue presented in this case—the applicable statute of limitations that applies to a plaintiff’s claims for unjust enrichment and statutory monetary damages arising from a debt buyer’s collection activities.10 That issue is presented in the instant case. C. Midland’s Licensing Status Like LVNV in the Finch saga, Midland is also an out-of-state debt-buyer11 that obtained judgments and pursued debt collection actions at a time when it was not licensed in Maryland as a debt collector.

The Board entered an administrative order on September 16, 2009 requiring Midland and a number of its affiliates to cease and desist collection activities in Maryland. On December 17, 2009, Midland, several of its affiliates, and the Board entered into a settlement agreement, whereby Midland agreed to stay all of its active collection-related actions and not to file any new collection-related actions in Maryland until it was issued a license by the Licensing Board. The agreement also provided that, after it obtained the proper license, Midland could “file appropriate motions in the 10 In Finch III, the respondents filed a cross-petition asking the Court to determine whether the subclass members’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The purported subclass consisted of all persons who had paid amounts pursuant to the judgments.

Given our remand for a consideration of declaratory and injunctive relief that might preclude LVNV from taking prospective action to enforce the judgments, and for any statutory damages arising out of LVNV’s collection efforts, we did not reach the statute of limitations issue, stating that “[b]ecause of this remand for further proceedings with respect to damages, we need not address the issues raised in respondent’s cross-petition. If raised again in the Circuit Court, the context may be different.” 463 Md. at 612 . 11 Midland is a limited liability company that was organized in Delaware. Its business is to purchase bulk portfolios of past-due consumer debt from lenders for purposes of collection. 13 Maryland state courts or take other appropriate actions in order to have the voluntary stay . . . lifted by the courts.” (Capitalization omitted). Midland also agreed to pay a penalty in the sum of $998,000.

On January 15, 2010, the Licensing Board issued Midland a collection agency license. Midland’s unlicensed debt collection activity included the collection litigation against Mr. Cain and Ms. Gambrell that resulted in judgments being entered against them, and which ultimately gave rise to the putative class actions filed by them in these cases. We describe the nature of the debt collection activity and the resulting putative class action litigation below.

II

Procedural History A. Mr. Cain’s Litigation with Midland 1. Midland’s 2009 Collection Action Against Mr. Cain The genesis of Mr. Cain’s dispute with Midland started with a debt collection action that was filed against him in 2009. Midland purchased a portfolio of past-due loans from Citibank in January 2009. One of those loans included an unpaid balance on a credit card account owed by Mr. Cain.

On March 30, 2009, Midland filed a collection action against Mr. Cain in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City. Mr. Cain was served with the complaint and filed a notice of intention to defend in which he requested a postponement of the trial date so that he could obtain counsel. When the trial was held on August 19, 2009, Mr. Cain did not appear. The District Court entered judgment by affidavit in Midland’s favor in the amount of $4,520.54, plus costs.

On September 25, 2009, 14 Midland received a partial payment of $300 toward the judgment. On October 29, 2010, Midland filed a request for writ of garnishment to collect the remaining balance. Whether through garnishment or other means, the balance due was paid, and Midland filed an order of satisfaction on August 8, 2012. When Midland obtained the judgment, and when Mr. Cain made his first payment, Midland was not licensed as a debt-collection agency under Maryland law.

Midland’s attempts to collect the judgment through its garnishment efforts occurred after it was licensed as a collection agency. 2. Federal Class Action Litigation - Johnson v. Midland Midland’s attempts to collect consumer debts without a license spawned class action litigation. On September 10, 2009, a federal civil action was filed against Midland in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. See Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, D. Md. Civil.

No. 09-2391. Mr. Cain was a putative class member of the Johnson plaintiffs’ proposed class, which was defined as “all natural persons who reside in Maryland and who have been the subject of consumer debt collection efforts by Midland within three years immediately preceding the filing of this class action that included the filing of an action before a Court of the State of Maryland.” In June 2010, the parties agreed to a settlement of the Johnson case. As part of the settlement, the plaintiff class was narrowed to exclude persons—like Mr. Cain—against whom Midland had obtained a judgment. The federal district court approved the settlement on March 10, 2011.

The claims that were not included in the settlement were dismissed with prejudice. 15 3. The Present Action Mr. Cain filed the present action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 30, 2013. The complaint alleges that Midland improperly sought to collect debts as an unlicensed collection agency and as a result, the judgments obtained by Midland were void.12 Rather than filing an individual action, Mr. Cain filed the case as a putative class action, with the proposed class consisting of all persons sued by Midland in Maryland courts from October 30, 2007 to October 14, 2010, and against whom Midland had obtained judgments. Mr. Cain, on his own behalf, and on behalf of members of the putative class, brought three counts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (counts I, II and III), including: a declaration that Midland was not entitled to interest, attorney’s fees or court costs on his debt or the debts of the plaintiff class members because it was acting as an unlicensed debt collection agency; a declaration that Midland’s judgment against Mr. Cain (as well as any other judgments obtained against members of the putative class) was void; injunctive relief to enjoin Midland from engaging in any further collection activities on judgments obtained while it was unlicensed; and money damages based on theories of unjust enrichment (count IV) and Midland’s statutory violations of the MCALA, MCDCA and MCPA (count V).

In June 2017,13 Midland filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Although Midland presented a number of contentions, only one is pertinent to 12 Given our holding in Finch III, this claim has been adversely decided against Petitioners. Between the filing of the complaint and Midland’s filing of its motion to dismiss 13 or for summary judgment, the case took a procedural detour to this Court. As noted above, Midland’s original claim against Mr. Cain was based upon his failure to make payments 16 the present case—specifically, that all counts are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Mr. Cain filed an opposition to Midland’s motion, as well as his own motion for partial summary judgment. Relying upon Finch I, 212 Md. App. 748 , Mr. Cain argued that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on his request for declaratory judgment, asserting that the judgment was void because Midland was not licensed in Maryland when it obtained its judgment against him. Mr. Cain also argued that his additional claims were not time-barred because the statute of limitations was tolled under the class action tolling doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and adopted by this Court in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207 (2013). In July 2017, Mr. Cain filed a motion to compel discovery, asserting that Midland had supplied unresponsive answers to interrogatories, which caused him prejudice.

He requested that the court order Midland to provide complete responses to any outstanding discovery. Mr. Cain also sent a letter to the court requesting that a hearing be scheduled on his motion for class certification, which Midland opposed. on an overdue credit card balance. Midland asserted that it was entitled to invoke a mandatory arbitration clause contained in the credit card agreement between Mr. Cain and Citibank. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals agreed with Midland.

We did not. See Cain v. Midland Funding, 452 Md. 141, 163 (2017) (holding that Midland waived its right to arbitrate the current claim when it chose to litigate the collection action that it initiated against Mr. Cain in 2009). After holding that the mandatory arbitration provisions did not apply, we remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. 17 The circuit court held a hearing on September 13, 2017 on Midland’s motion and Mr. Cain’s motion for partial summary judgment. On September 21, 2017, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order that granted each motion in part and denied each in part.

As a result of the memorandum opinion and order, all of Mr. Cain’s individual claims contained in the amended complaint were adjudicated. First, the court determined that, based upon the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Finch I, the judgment that Midland had obtained against Mr. Cain in 2009 was void, and he was entitled to a declaratory judgment vacating that judgment. The court further determined that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applied to that claim. Second, the court determined that Mr. Cain’s claim for unjust enrichment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CJ § 5-101 and rejected Mr. Cain’s argument that such claims were tolled under a theory of cross-jurisdictional class action tolling.

Third, the court concluded that, because the judgment against Mr. Cain had been paid and an order of satisfaction had been filed, there was no basis to grant the injunctive relief sought by him. Consistent with its September 21 opinion and order, the court entered a separate declaratory judgment in favor of Mr. Cain in the principal amount of $4,520.54 plus $60 in costs and post-judgment interest. The court further ordered that the original judgment entered in favor of Midland and against Mr. Cain in the District Court be vacated. The order was docketed the following day, on September 22, 2017.

The clerk indexed the judgment, entering a $4,520.54 “money judgment” against Midland on September 29, 2017. We pause here for a moment to discuss the purported claims that another individual, Cassandra Murray, attempted to raise in this proceeding. On September 21—the same date 18 that the court signed the order and declaratory judgment—Mr. Cain filed an amended complaint, which sought to add Cassandra Murray as a second plaintiff.14 Midland and Mr. Cain and Ms. Murray filed motions to alter or amend the court’s September 21 opinion and order. Mr. Cain and Ms. Murray’s motion to alter or amend asserted that the court’s opinion and order failed to address: (1) Ms. Murray’s claims; (2) the putative class claims; or (3) that the case was to be closed.

The court denied all the parties’ motions to alter or amend by an order entered on October 24, 2017. Midland’s motion is not relevant to the issues presented here, other than to note that, in denying Midland’s motion, the court accepted Mr. Cain’s argument that the 12-year limitations period set forth in CJ § 5-102(a)(3) applied to Mr. Cain’s statutory claim that Midland’s act in obtaining a judgment against him while it was unlicensed was void. Addressing Ms. Murray’s claims, the court pointed out that the amended complaint was filed on September 21—the same date that the court issued its memorandum opinion and order. The court further noted that Mr. Cain moved for summary judgment “individually and on behalf of a class and subclass of similar persons” on July 7, 2017— several months before Ms. Murray attempted to join the case as a plaintiff.

The court also 14 Ms. Murray, through Mr. Cain’s counsel, previously filed a class action lawsuit against Midland in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The case was later removed to federal court. The federal court decided part of the case against Ms. Murray on the same limitations issue presented in this case, remanded a portion of the case to state court, and certified questions to this Court. See Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, Case No. JKB-15- 0532, 2015 WL 4994212 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2015).

Ms. Murray dismissed her remaining federal claims, which eliminated this Court’s need to answer the certified question. Ms. Murray ultimately dismissed her state court claims pending in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on August 5, 2017. The amended complaint purporting to add her to this case was filed six weeks later. 19 stated that Ms. Murray’s claims were not argued at the hearing on September 13, and therefore, the “court did not have the opportunity to opine on Ms. Murray’s hypothetical claims.” Finally, the court stated that it “was not aware that such claims existed until after the [o]rder was issued.” With respect to the plaintiff’s motion to certify the class, the court noted that it expressly declined to rule on that motion at the September 13 hearing, and specifically stated at the hearing that the request would be forwarded to the judge assigned to determine class certification. The court noted that, although the clerk inadvertently closed the case after the entry of the memorandum opinion and order, the matter was reopened and consequently, the plaintiff’s motion as it pertained to the improper closure of the case was moot.

Midland filed a timely notice of appeal. After a delay pending this Court’s decision in Finch III, the Court of Special Appeals requested supplemental briefing, followed by oral argument. In an unreported opinion, after determining that the circuit court’s summary judgment and declaratory judgment orders constituted a final appealable judgment, the Court of Special Appeals held that Mr. Cain’s claims for monetary damages were time-barred; that Finch III resolved Mr. Cain’s requested declaration that the judgments were void; and that Mr. Cain’s claim for injunctive relief had no basis because Midland’s judgment against Mr. Cain had been satisfied before Mr. Cain filed this lawsuit. Midland Funding, LLC v. Cain, No. 1805, Sept. Term, 2017, 2020 WL 4370888 at ¹⁵ (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. July 30, 2020). Mr. Cain petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. 20 B. Ms. Gambrell’s Litigation with Midland 1. Midland’s 2008 Collection Action Against Ms. Gambrell On July 14, 2008, Midland, through counsel, filed a breach of contract action against Ms. Gambrell in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County. Midland’s complaint was served on Ms. Gambrell on August 17, 2008.

The trial took place on October 8, 2008, and the court entered a judgment against Ms. Gambrell in the amount of $2,420.97, plus $141.68 in prejudgment interest and $60.00 in costs. Ms. Gambrell subsequently made a partial payment in the amount of $251.32 on November 30, 2009. It is undisputed that Midland did not have a collection agency license when it filed the lawsuit against Ms. Gambrell and obtained the judgment against her. As noted above, as part of the settlement agreement between Midland and the Licensing Board, the Board authorized Midland to collect on pre-licensure judgments after it became licensed.

On January 15, 2010, Midland obtained a license. Once it was licensed, and because the judgment against Ms. Gambrell was not satisfied, Midland’s attorneys requested a writ of garnishment, which was issued on December 5, 2011. Midland’s attorneys requested a second writ, which they signed on September 17, 2012. The writ noted that, as of September 17, 2012, the sum of $2,216.32 had been paid toward Ms. Gambrell’s judgment and that the remaining amount due was $437.07.

The judgment was fully paid. Ms. Gambrell did not allege, nor do the docket entries reflect, any collection efforts by Midland after 2012. 2. The Present Action On September 28, 2015, Ms. Gambrell filed a putative class action against Midland in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In 2016, she filed an amended complaint, 21 which is the operative complaint.

In it, she alleged that Midland’s failure to have a debt collection license in 2008 rendered the judgment Midland obtained against her “void and unenforceable.” She asserted the following five claims, all based on Midland’s licensure status: unjust enrichment (count I); a claim for disgorgement of all funds collected by Midland through its efforts to enforce the judgment while unlicensed in violation of the MCDCA, and the MCPA (count II); a similar claim based on Midland’s alleged violations of the MCALA and the common law action of money “had and received” (count III); a declaratory judgment that Midland’s judgment against her was void and unenforceable, together with an injunction against Midland’s attempts to enforce the judgments in the future (count IV); and declaratory and injunctive relief against Midland’s attempting to collect pre- and post-judgment interests and costs (count V). As to each count, Ms. Gambrell also sought class certification to encompass “[t]hose persons sued by Midland in Maryland state courts from October 30, 2007 [against] whom Midland obtained a judgment for an alleged debt, interest or costs, including attorney’s fees[.]”15 Midland filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Gambrell’s amended complaint, arguing, in pertinent part, that all counts are time-barred and fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted, that Ms. Gambrell could not attack a judgment obtained in the District Court in a different county, that Ms. Gambrell’s claims are not justiciable, and that its post-licensure collection activities were authorized by the State Licensing Board. Ms. Gambrell filed an opposition to Midland’s motion. 15 Ms. Gambrell also sought a subclass certification consisting of “those members of the [c]lass from whom Midland collected . . . any sum on the judgment.” 22 The court held a hearing on Midland’s motion, at the conclusion of which the court issued its ruling from the bench. As to Ms. Gambrell’s unjust enrichment, statutory and disgorgement claims (counts I, II and III), the court concluded that the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Jason v. National Loan Recoveries, 227 Md. App. 516 (2016), controlled and that a three-year statute of limitations applied to those claims.

The court determined that those claims accrued “when the defendant filed the collection action against the plaintiff as the defendant’s unlicensed status was a matter of public record and [the Licensing Board] had issued an advisory notice requiring collection agents to be licensed two years prior to the commencement of that action,” and therefore, that the limitations period had run in 2011. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed these counts with prejudice. With respect to the declaratory judgment and injunctive relief counts (counts IV and V), the court determined that it lacked authority to issue the declaratory relief and dismissed those counts without prejudice.16 Ms. Gambrell noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. After arguments, the case was stayed pending our decision in Finch III.

After additional briefing and oral argument, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unreported opinion affirming the circuit court’s decision. Gambrell v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 1939 Sept. Term, 2016, 2020 WL 4371297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 30, 2020). The intermediate appellate court determined that Ms. Gambrell’s claims for money damages (counts I, II and III) were 16 The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County concluded that if Ms. Gambrell wished to challenge a judgment entered by the District Court, sitting in Montgomery County, she must do so pursuant to that court’s power under Maryland Rule 3-535, and, if that fails, she may seek declaratory relief in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. 23 barred by the three-year statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101, and that her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief (counts IV and V) were resolved by our decision in Finch III.

Ms. Gambrell petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.

III

Standard of Review Under Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2), a defendant may seek dismissal of a complaint if the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “A motion to dismiss is properly granted if the factual allegations in a complaint, if proven, would not provide a legally sufficient basis for the cause of action asserted in the complaint.” Wheeling v. Selene Finance LP, 473 Md. 356 (2021). Whether a motion to dismiss was properly granted or not is a legal question. This Court reviews legal questions de novo, with no deference given to the trial court. See Lamson v. Montgomery County, 460 Md. 349, 360 (2018).

In doing so, the Court “must assume the truth of all relevant and material facts that are well pleaded and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from those pleadings.” Barclay v. Castruccio, 469 Md. 368 , 373–74 (2020) (quoting Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 121 (2007)). A motion to dismiss may only be granted where the allegations presented do not state a cause of action. Id. at 374.

Regarding Mr. Cain’s case, on review of a court’s grant of summary judgment, we must first determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 24–25 (2013). If not, we determine whether the circuit court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 25 .

The standard of review of a circuit court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Id. 24 IV. Discussion As discussed above, the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that our holding in Finch III applies to the Petitioners’ claims seeking a declaratory judgment that Midland’s judgments against them are void. The Court of Special Appeals also held that the circuit court correctly dismissed the injunctive relief claims because the judgments were paid and orders of satisfaction were filed, and accordingly, there was no basis upon which to grant injunctive relief.

The Petitioners did not seek our review of these holdings. The only issues before us involve whether Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and for statutory damages under the MCDCA and the MCPA are time barred, and whether a final appealable judgment was entered in Mr. Cain’s case. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that the blanket three-year statute of limitations applies to such claims. We agree that Ms. Gambrell’s claims are time- barred.

As set forth herein, we recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling with respect to Mr. Cain’s individual claims. Based upon the application of class action tolling, we determine that Mr. Cain’s claims are not time-barred. A. Accrual of Claims Before we discuss the applicable statute of limitations, we briefly recount the circuit courts’ respective determinations concerning the date that Mr. Cain’s and Ms. Gambrell’s claims for damages accrued. We have said that the question of when an action accrues is one left to judicial determination.

Frederick Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95 (2000). In Maryland, we apply the “discovery rule” in civil actions in determining 25 when the statute of limitations begins to accrue on a claim. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 (1981).

Under the discovery rule, a claim accrues when the plaintiff “knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong.” Id. at 636 . Although neither party has sought review of the circuit courts’ determinations of the respective accrual dates, we briefly discuss the issue given that any limitations period runs from that date. With respect to Mr. Cain’s claims, the circuit court concluded that his claims for money damages accrued for limitations purposes when Midland received its first payment on the judgment, which was on September 25, 2009. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s accrual determination, and Mr. Cain did not seek review of this issue.17 Mr. Cain filed suit on July 30, 2013—more than three years after the claim accrued.

With respect to Ms. Gambrell’s claims, the circuit court determined that Ms. Gambrell’s claims accrued on July 14, 2008, which is the date Midland filed its collection action against her. The circuit court concluded that Midland’s “unlicensed status was a matter of public record and [the Licensing Board] had issued an advisory notice requiring 17 Although Mr. Cain did not seek review of the circuit court’s determination of the accrual date and the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmance of the same, Mr. Cain asserts in his brief that he has “no memory of making the alleged payment.” Mr. Cain does not provide any record citation for this statement, and he never raised this issue by way of argument or affidavit. By contrast, with its motion for summary judgment, Midland attached business records pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) establishing that Midland received a $300 partial payment from Mr. Cain on September 2009, along with an October 29, 2010 writ of garnishment reflecting “total credits” of $300.00. As the Court of Special Appeals aptly stated, if Mr. Cain did not make the September 25, 2009 payment, “the proper way for him to establish a dispute of fact would have been for him to file an affidavit or other evidence to that effect.

At best, he has raised a ‘metaphysical doubt,’ which is insufficient.” Cain, 2020 WL 4370888 , at ⁶. 26 collection agents to be licensed two years prior to the commencement of that action.” Ms. Gambrell filed her lawsuit on September 28, 2015, almost seven years after the District Court entered judgment against her on October 8, 2008, and nearly six years after Ms. Gambrell made a partial payment to Midland on November 30, 2009. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination of Ms. Gambrell’s accrual date, concluding that her statutory cause of action for money damages accrued when she was placed on inquiry notice of Midland’s wrongdoing and “[a]t the very latest, this occurred when Midland received its first payment on the judgment.” Gambrell, 2020 WL 4371297 , at ⁴. Ms. Gambrell did not seek review from this Court of the circuit court’s accrual determination, which was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. Although neither party sought review of the accrual date established by the circuit court, like the Court of Special Appeals, we determine that Ms. Gambrell’s and Mr. Cain’s claims accrued at the latest when Midland received its first payments on the judgments.

By making the payments, they were clearly on notice of the judgment that had been entered against them, and had the ability to determine whether Midland was licensed at the time of the entry of the judgments—information that was a matter of public record.18 Establishing the accrual date for the Petitioners’ claims as the date that they made their first payment is consistent with the discovery rule established by our Court in Poffenberger, 290 Md. 631 . In Crowder v. Master Financial, Inc., 176 Md. App. 631 , 657–58 (2007), aff’d in part, Master Financial, Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 (2009), in determining that the borrowers’ 18 See http://www.dllr.state.md.us/financce/industry/licsearch.shtml. 27 claims under the MCPA were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, the Court of Special Appeals explained that: The relevant inquiry for the purpose of determining when a cause of action accrued under the discovery rule is when a plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the operative facts giving rise to the cause of action, not whether a plaintiff had knowledge of the applicable law. Neither ignorance of the law nor failure to consult an attorney to inquire about one’s legal rights will expand the period of limitations within which suit must be filed. (internal citations omitted).

As of the date that they made payments on their judgments, the Petitioners had the ability to ascertain, through due diligence and based upon matters of public record, whether Midland was licensed at the time that it obtained the judgments. Given that Petitioners’ claims were filed more than three years after their respective accrual, they are barred by the three-year statute of limitations unless: (1) an alternative limitations period applies; (2) it was extended under a continuing harm theory; or (3) it was tolled. B. The Default—Three Year Statute of Limitations As we have made clear on several occasions, the default statute of limitations for civil actions at law in Maryland, codified at CJ § 5-101, is three years, unless another provision of the Code expressly provides for an alternative limitations period. See, e.g., AGV Sports Grp., Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., 417 Md. 386, 392 (2010); Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453 , 459–61 (2000).

The three-year default statute was enacted in 1973 as part of one of the first articles of the Maryland Code that was adopted as a result of Governor Marvin Mandel’s Commission to Revise the Annotated Code that was created in 1970. In Tipton v. Partner’s Management Co., 364 Md. 419 (2001), we 28 described the derivation of the general blanket statute. We need not repeat that history here, other than to note that it “was enacted as a broad three-year limitation provision for the purpose of avoiding confusion and providing clarity.” Tipton, 364 Md. at 441 . The language of the three-year limitations statute remains unchanged from its initial enactment and states: “A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” CJ § 5-101.

In Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC, 454 Md. 680, 691 (2017), we explained that “[s]tatutes of limitations are designed to balance the competing interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the public.” We stated that a statutory period of limitations represents a policy judgment by the Legislature that serves the interest of a plaintiff in having adequate time to investigate a cause of action and file suit, the interest of a defendant in having certainty that there will not be a need to respond to a potential claim that has been unreasonably delayed, and the general interest of society in judicial economy. Id. (citations omitted). This balance is struck “primarily to assure fairness to defendants on the theory that claims, asserted after evidence is gone, memories have faded, and witnesses disappeared, are so stale as to be unjust.” Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 205 (2012) (quoting Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 367 (1966)).

Although statutes of limitations are not sacrosanct, see Ceccone, 454 Md. at 692 , the Court does not craft exceptions to limitations periods without compelling reasons. We apply a “strict construction regarding tolling of statutes of limitations” and, therefore, “absent legislative creation of an exception to the statute of limitations, we will not allow any ‘implied and equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.’” Anderson v. United States, 29 427 Md. 99, 120 (2012) (quoting Hecht v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 333 Md. 324, 333 (1994) (citations omitted)); see also Minh-Vu Hoang v. Lowery, 469 Md. 95, 126 (2020) (noting the “well established principle” of “narrow construction of statutes of limitations”); Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 359 (1993) (describing narrow construction of statutes of limitations as a “well established principle”) (citations omitted). As noted above, Petitioners’ claims are for unjust enrichment and money damages for violations of the MCPA and MCDCA.

We have previously held that a claim for unjust enrichment that seeks the remedy of restitution of money is subject to the general three- year statute of limitations. See Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 Md. 669, 698 (2004). We have also held that a claim for money damages under the MCPA is subject to the three- year statute of limitations. See Master Fin., Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 (2009); Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453 (2000).

Notwithstanding our application of the three-year statute of limitations to similar claims for money damages, Petitioners assert that their claims fall within the 12-year statute of limitations applicable to specialties actions because their claims constitute an “action on a judgment” under CJ § 5-102(a)(3). For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. C. 12-Year Statute for Specialties Actions “On” a Judgment The General Assembly has legislated several exceptions to the three-year limitations period. One such exception is the statute of limitations that is applicable to specialties actions, set forth in CJ § 5-102, which states: (a) An action on one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action accrues, or within 12 years from the date of the death of the last to die of the principal debtor or creditor, whichever is sooner: 30 (1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal; (2) Bond except a public officer’s bond; (3) Judgment; (4) Recognizance; (5) Contract under seal; or (6) Any other specialty.

Petitioners rely exclusively on the specialty addressed in CJ § 5-102(a)(3), which provides for a 12-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action on [a] . . . judgment.” Petitioners assert that, because Midland’s wrongful conduct involved the entry of a judgment, their claims for unjust enrichment and money damages arising under the MCPA and MCDCA are subject to the 12-year statute of limitations applicable to specialties actions. The Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument by relying on two reported cases of that court which addressed this very issue. Cain, 2020 WL 4370888 , at ⁷ (citing Jason v. Nat’l Loan Recoveries, LLC, 227 Md. App. 516 , 527–34 (2016); Murray v. Midland Funding, 233 Md. App. 254 , 259–60 (2017)). In Jason, the Court of Special Appeals rejected an identical argument made by a similarly situated plaintiff who filed a claim against a debt buyer who had obtained a judgment against him when it was not licensed as a collection agency.

Id. at 527–34. The intermediate appellate court held that the 12-year statute of limitations for specialty actions on a judgment—CJ § 5-102(a)(3)— did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims for unjust enrichment nor to his claims for damages arising out of alleged violations of the Maryland consumer protection statutes. Id. Instead, the court in Jason determined that such claims fell within the general three-year statute of limitations.

Id. at 531. The Court of Special Appeals reiterated these holdings in Murray. 233 Md. App. at 259–60. In the case at hand, the intermediate appellate court simply 31 applied its own precedent. Unsurprisingly, Petitioners contend that the Court of Special Appeals’ holding in Jason is incorrect.

This is our first opportunity to address the issue.19 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the analysis undertaken by our colleagues in Jason and hold that Petitioners’ claims for unjust enrichment and monetary damages arising under the MCPA and MCDCA fall within the blanket three-year statute of limitations under CJ § 5-101 and are not actions “on a judgment” pursuant to CJ § 5- 102(a)(3) subject to the 12-year statute of limitations for specialties actions. When undertaking an exercise in statutory interpretation, we start with the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation—to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute. 75-80 Properties, L.L.C. v. RALE, Inc., 470 Md. 598, 623 (2020). To discern the intent of the General Assembly, our analysis begins with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute. Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010). “We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” Id.

(citations omitted). If the statutory language is clear and consistent with its apparent purpose, our inquiry ordinarily ends, and we apply the statute as written. Id. As we stated in Lockshin: We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.

Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. We 19 No petition for writ of certiorari was filed following the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Jason v. Nat’l Loan Recoveries, LLC, 227 Md. App. 516 (2016) nor its opinion in Murray v. Midland Funding, LLC, 233 Md. App. 254 (2017). 32 presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope. Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.

In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. Id. at 275–76 (internal citations omitted). In this case, both parties assert that the language of the specialties statute applicable to “[a]n action on [a] . . . judgment” is plain and unambiguous. Petitioners assert that the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3) does not limit the actions covered to a creditor’s enforcement of a judgment.

Instead, they assert that the General Assembly intended to establish a 12-year limitations period for any action that involves the entry of a judgment. Because Petitioners’ claims are based upon judgments that Midland obtained when it was unlicensed, they assert that their claims falls within the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3). Unsurprisingly, Midland contends that the only reasonable reading of the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3) is the interpretation adopted by the Court of Special Appeals in Jason— which is that an action “on” a judgment is an action seeking to enforce a judgment. Notwithstanding the parties’ assertions that the language plainly and unambiguously supports their respective positions, we shall conclude that the language is 33 ambiguous.

We reach this conclusion because Petitioners’ interpretation of the phrase “action on a judgment,” when read in isolation, might arguably be considered to be a reasonable interpretation, given that their claims are centered around judgments that Midland obtained when it was unlicensed. See Koste, 431 Md. at 30–31 (determining that a statute was ambiguous notwithstanding the parties’ mutual assertion of unambiguity because two reasonable interpretations could be reached when the phrase in question was read in isolation). However, Petitioners’ plain language interpretation becomes untenable when viewed in the context of the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of the competing construction. We start with the plain language of the specialties statute, which is that a 12-year statute of limitations applies to a specialties “action on [a] judgment.” CJ § 5-102(a)(3).

At issue is the definition or meaning of the preposition “on” and whether it means an action “involving” a judgment or whether it means an action to “enforce” a judgment. In order to determine the legislative intent, we must read the language of the statute—providing for a 12-year limitations period for an “action on a judgment”—in context and in relation to all its provisions. Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Adm’r, Motor Vehicle Admin., 286 Md. 104, 108 (1979). Looking at the structure of the statute, although the statute does not define “specialty,” it lists several types of specialties actions, upon which rights are granted.

The wording of the statute indicates that it applies to “an action on one of the following specialties,” which includes an action to enforce a promissory note or other instrument under seal, a judgment, a contract under seal, etc. Given the nature of the specific list of 34 specialties identified, it is clear that the statute is intended to apply to an action to enforce rights granted by a specialty. This interpretation is consistent with our application of the statute in our case law. See, e.g., Goodwin & Boone v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 346 Md. 153 (1997) (action by a franchisor against a franchisee based upon an agreement under seal governed by the 12- year statute of limitations); McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155 (1944) (applying the 12-year statute of limitations for initiation of an action to collect “on” a sealed promissory note); Johnson v. Foran, 59 Md. 460 , 461–63 (1883) (noting that execution cannot be issued more than 12 years after the date of the judgment). In Rentals Unlimited, Inc., we remarked that, “[i]n Maryland, money judgments may be enforced by various methods including a new action on a judgment[.]” 286 Md. at 113 (emphasis added).

In O’Hearn v. O’Hearn, 337 Md. 292 (1995), we held that a former wife’s action against her former husband for reimbursement of their children’s medical and dental expenses fell within the 12-year specialties statute because the parties’ separation agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree, and therefore, the claims were a suit “on a judgment.” In other words, the wife was seeking to enforce the terms of the separation agreement, the obligations of which had been incorporated into the divorce judgment. Id. at 301 . By contrast, Petitioners are not seeking to enforce a judgment—quite the opposite—they are seeking a declaration that the judgments obtained against them are void (a declaration that is no longer available given our holding in Finch III) and money damages arising from the entry of the judgments against them. 35 Our interpretation of the statute as providing a 12-year statute of limitations on a specialties action to enforce a judgment is also confirmed by its legislative history. The present statute, CJ § 5-103, is a recodification of former Md. Code (1957), Article 57, § 3, which provided: No bill, testamentary, administration or other bond (except sheriff’s and constables’ bonds), judgment, recognizance, statute merchant, or other staple or other specialty whatsoever, except as shall be taken for use of the State, shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence against any person in this State after the principal debtor and creditor have both been dead twelve years, or the debt or thing in action is above twelve years standing . . . .

(Emphasis added). The language in the original specialties statute clearly contemplated a 12-year statute of limitations for actions on a judgment brought against a judgment debtor. There is nothing in the prior version of the statute that could be construed to establish a 12- year statute of limitations for a judgment debtor to assert a claim against a judgment creditor for a matter arising out of the entry of a judgment. As we explained in detail in Tipton, the 1970 Code Revision process was not intended to, and did not change the substantive meaning of this section. 364 Md. at 437–45.

Our interpretation of the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3)—as establishing a 12- year statute of limitations only to enforce a judgment and not establishing the same period to challenge a judgment—is consistent with principles of finality expressed by the Supreme Court and by this Court for over a century. In Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., Justice Harlan Stone explained the difference between “a cause of action on a judgment” and an “action upon which the judgment was entered” as follows: A cause of action on a judgment is different from that upon which the judgment was entered. In a suit upon a money judgment for a civil cause of 36 action, the validity of the claim upon which it was founded is not open to inquiry, whatever its genesis. Regardless of the nature of the right which gave rise to it, the judgment is an obligation to pay money in the nature of a debt upon the specialty.

Recovery upon it can be resisted only on the grounds that the court which rendered it was without jurisdiction. 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935). In Finch III, we expressed similar sentiments. We observed that “[j]udgments, by and large, are meant to be final. Even the court that rendered them has but a limited ability to open and revise them.” 463 Md. at 607 .

Citing to our case law dating back 141 years, which has been repeated several times since, we noted that “[i]t is most desirable of course that there should be an end to litigation, and a judgment is presumed to be a settlement of all matters in dispute in that particular case; and once entered, parties are no longer under the necessity of preserving the evidences upon which their claims rested.” Id. (citing Abell v. Simon, 49 Md. 318, 324 (1878)). To interpret the specialties statute as providing a 12-year statute of limitation for a debtor to challenge a judgment, or activities related to the entry of the judgment, runs contrary to the very principles we recently expressed in Finch III concerning the finality of judgments. By contrast, the competing construction—that the General Assembly would establish a longer limitations period only to enforce a judgment—is consistent with the general purpose of collection laws, which enable judgments to be paid over a longer time period thereby ensuring that payment is not unduly burdensome to a judgment debtor.

A money judgment is valid for 12 years from the date of entry or its most recent renewal. See Maryland Rule 2-625. Once a money judgment is entered, the law provides several collection tools at the judgment creditor’s disposal, such as discovery in aid of enforcement (see Maryland Rule 2-633) and a garnishment of the judgment debtor’s wages (see CL §§ 37 15-601 through 15-606). These laws also protect a debtor’s rights during the post- judgment collection process.

Our societal standards have evolved from the colonial practice of imprisoning debtors for nonpayment of debts20 to the enactment of laws that limit a judgment creditor’s ability to attach a judgment debtor’s wages over a statutorily established amount per pay period.21 These protections give a judgment debtor some breathing room to pay debts over time (of course, at a cost in the form of post-judgment interest), and correspondingly, the specialties statute gives a judgment creditor a longer time period for the collection of payment on the judgment. Finally, we conclude that Petitioners’ interpretation would also create illogical results. In other contexts, we have rejected arguments that statutory claims for money damages fall within other categories of the 12-year specialties statute instead of the three- year default statute. For example, as noted above, in Greene Tree Home Owners Ass’n v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453 (2000), we held that a claim based on the MCPA did not constitute a specialty action within the purview of CJ § 5-106(a)(6) (which includes “[a]ny other specialty”) and were therefore subject to the three-year period of limitations provided for in CJ § 5-101.

In Master Financial, Inc.