Callaway v. MAMSI Life and Health Ins. Co.

HOLLANDER, Judge. This life insurance dispute arises from the death of David Callaway (the “Decedent” or the “Insured”), who died in July 2000, at the age of 39, as a result of autoerotic asphyxiation. At the time of death, the Decedent was the named insured under a group life insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued by MAMSI Life and Health Insurance Company (“MAMSI” or the “Insurer”), appellee. John Callaway, the Decedent’s brother, and John Callaway, Jr. and Bennett J. Callaway, the ⁵⁷¹ Decedent’s nephews, are the beneficiaries of the Policy and the appellants.

MAMSI refused to pay death benefits to the beneficiaries, asserting two grounds: 1) the Decedent’s death was not the result of an accident, as required by the Policy; and 2) the Policy excluded coverage for death resulting from intentional self-injury. Thereafter, John Callaway, individually and as parent and guardian of his two sons, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County against the Insurer, claiming breach of contract. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. At the conclusion of the motions hearing, the circuit court ruled that the Insured’s death was not the result of an accident, but was the result of an intentional self-injury.

Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of MAMSI. From that decision, appellants noted this appeal. They present several questions for our consideration, which we have combined and rephrased for clarity: 1. Did the court err in granting summary judgment in favor of MAMSI, on the ground that the Insured’s death was not the result of an accident under the terms of the Policy? 2.

Did the court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Insurer, on the ground that the Insured’s death was the result of an intentional self-injury under the terms of the Policy? For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The circumstances of the Insured’s death are not in dispute. They are pertinent to the question of whether the death was the result of an accident or an intentional self-injury.

The Insured’s body was found at his residence on the evening of July 5, 2000, when Detective James Seibert of the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office was notified of an unattended death and proceeded to the Insured’s home. In his report, Detective Seibert described the scene of the bedroom where ⁵⁷² the Insured’s body was recovered. The detective observed the nude body of the Insured, on his back. The Insured’s hands were tied behind his back, and his feet were bound together at the ankles with rope.

A plastic bag covered the head of the body, and a brown belt was tightened around the neck. Detective Seibert also observed that the wall opposite the body “was covered with a large amount of centerfold pictures of naked females.” His report continued: D/Sgt. Seibert further observed a white ... rope tied around the body’s neck, with this rope extending up to the ceiling. D/Sgt.

Seibert observed this rope enter into a pulley mechanism, which was embedded into the ceiling. This rope then extended along the ceiling toward the bedroom’s entrance door. Near the door entrance, this rope entered a second pulley embedded into the ceiling. Attached to this rope was a 25 lb weight training plate, which was pulled up to the ceiling.

The weight appeared to be suspended up toward the ceiling by the weight of the body. The rope then extended down to the floor, and over the feet of the body. An autopsy was performed at the office of the Chief Medical Examiner on July 6, 2000. According to the Death Certificate dated July 10, 2000, signed by Assistant Medical Examiner Stephen S. Radentz, M.D., the “immediate cause” of the Insured’s death was “asphyxiation,” and the manner of death was an “Accident.” The Death Certificate contains a box labeled “Describe how injury occurred,” and the physician inserted “Autoerotic activity.” The Report of the Post Mortem Examination, dated October 11, 2000, also indicates that the Insured “died of ASPHYXIATION,” and that “[t]he manner of death is ACCIDENT.” 1 According to the Post Mortem Report, the body had “a plastic bag over the head and ligatures about the neck, wrists, and ankles.... ” Upon removal of the ligatures, however, “there ⁵⁷³ was no evidence of injury to the underlying neck, wrists and ankles.” In addition, the Decedent had “a piece of insulated electrical wire with two metallic ‘alligator’ clips at both ends attached to [his] nipples.... ” The section of the report titled “Evidence of Injury” refers to the release mechanisms employed by the Decedent.

It states, in part: There was also a yellow 1/4" synthetic rope attached to the loop binding the hands with a quick release knot secured by a wooden clothes pin. This rope was attached to a pulley to the above-mentioned leather belt around the neck and, according to the investigation reports, was strung through two additional pulleys attached to the ceiling of the room with a 25-pound weight at the end. Reportedly, an additional piece of rope was tied to the line at the ceiling between the pulleys. Pulling of this rope would cause lifting of the attached weight, releasing the tension applied to the neck loops and wrists.

The legs were tied at the level of the malleoli with four loops of 1/4" cotton rope tied between the legs, with transverse loops forming a Figure “8” knot.... The deceased held a 4-1/2 foot long strap in his right hand. The Medical Examiner opined: This 39-year-old white male, DAVID CALLAWAY, died of ASPHYXIATION. The manner of death is ACCIDENT.

The decedent was discovered in his secured residence with a plastic bag secured over his head, a belt about his neck, and his wrists and ankles bound. The bindings were elaborate and had several “escape” mechanisms. Erotic materials (photographs) were also present. The results of the autopsy and investigation indicate that the decedent accidentally asphyxiated (suffocated) while engaged in an erotic activity.

The complexity of the arrangements is typical for such activity; psychological background of such undertakings is complex and not entirely understood.... (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that the Insured was killed by asphyxiation as a result of his voluntary participation in a sexual activity ⁵⁷⁴ known as autoerotic asphyxiation. For purposes of this case, the parties agree that there is no indication that the Decedent died as a result of homicide, suicide, foul play, or natural ca.uses, and that the suffocation was an unintended consequence of the autoerotic activity.

Autoerotic asphyxiation, also known as autoerotic hanging, “is the practice of inducing cerebral anoxia, usually by means of self-applied ligatures or suffocating devices, while the individual masturbates to orgasm....” 2 Ligatures around the neck, and other suffocation devices, are used for the purpose of “limiting the flow of oxygen to the brain during masturbation in an attempt to heighten sexual pleasure.” Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1450 (5th Cir.1995). Nerve centers in the brain are stimulated by asphyxia, which “produces a state of hypercapnia (an increase in carbon dioxide in the blood) and a concomitant state of hypoxia (a decrease in oxygen in the blood), all of which result in an increased intensity of sexual gratification.” Padfield v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1121, 1125 , 2002 U.S.App. Lexis 9422 (9th Cir.2002); see Conn.

Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.Civ.App.1981). ⁵⁷⁵ According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (Fourth Edition), known as DSM-IV, autoerotic asphyxiation, or “hypoxyphilia,” is a mental disorder in the category of Sexual Masochism. The DSM-IV indicates that the practice involves “sexual arousal by oxygen deprivation obtained by means of chest compression, noose, ligature, plastic bag, mask, or chemical.... ” DSM-IV, § 302.83, at 529.

Those who practice autoerotic asphyxiation typically utilize some type of escape mechanism to protect against suffocation in the event of a loss of consciousness. Nevertheless, the DSM-IV indicates that “accidental deaths sometimes occur” as a consequence of the practice, primarily due to “equipment malfunction, errors in the placement of the noose or ligature, or other mistakes.... ” DSM-IV, § 302.83, at 529. The DSM-IV estimates that “two hypoxphilia-caused deaths per million population are detected and reported each year.” Id. In an article published in 1996, titled “The Autoerotic Asphyxiation Syndrome In Adolescent and Young Adult Males,” submitted by appellants to the court below, the author describes autoerotic asphyxiation as an “abnormal sexual behavior,” and notes that it is “probably the most bizarre and dangerous” of the “paraphilias.... ” According to the author, those who engage in the practice do not seek to become so strangled as to lose consciousness.

Rather, as the author explains, “sexuoerotic arousal and attainment of orgasm depend on self-strangulation and asphyxiation up to, but not including, loss of consciousness.” (Emphasis added). The author notes that sexual sensation is enhanced “through interference with the blood supply to the brain, causing cerebral anoxia,” but the degree of that anoxia is only meant to reach the point at which it “is subjectively perceived as giddiness, lightheadedness, and exhilaration, which reinforces the mastubatory sensation.” The article indicates that constriction of the neck is the most common methodology used to attain the desired sexual arousal. It is not, however, the exclusive method. Other ⁵⁷⁶ mechanisms include the placement of a plastic bag over the head, the use of chemical vapors, and “passing electrical current through the body....” Of significance here, the author states: Neck constriction, being most common, is accomplished by placing some form of ligature around the neck that is designed to give the victim control of the pressure and provide an escape mechanism.

Transient cerebral hypoxia during autoerotic manipulation combined with physical helplessness and self-endangerment to the degree that life is threatened, enhances sexual gratification—but it also weakens the victim’s self control and judgment, occasionally resulting in accidental death from the failure of or the victim’s inability to operate previously arranged self-rescue 'mechanisms. (Emphasis added). Thus, the author observes that “the asphyxiator’s sexual practice is usually first discovered when he dies from accidental hanging.” (Emphasis added). In describing those who engage in the practice, the author points out that it “is seen in all races, in all parts of the world, and in all socioeconomic levels.” Although asphyxiators are typically adolescents or young adult males, adults also engage in the activity, and the adult asphyxiators are generally heterosexual.

According to the author, “Adults tend to be more sophisticated in their mastubaiory ritual and are aware’ of the death orientation of the practice. This is probably due to elaboration over time.” The author observes: “Most often, the adult or adolescent asphyxiator has no known history of deviant sexual behavior. This practice is revealed only when the victim dies in an accidental hanging death. ” (Emphasis added). The article refers to one authored by R. Hazelwood, P. Dietz, and A. Burgess, entitled “The Investigation of Autoerotic Fatalities,” Journal of Police Science and Administration (1981), at 104.

That study describes the characteristics of most autoerotic asphyxiation “death scenes.” Of particular relevance, the authors note: ⁵⁷⁷ 1. Evidence of asphyxia produced by strangulation either by ligature or hanging, in which the position of the body or presence of protective means such as padding about the neck, indicate that the death was not obviously intended. 2. Evidence of a physiological mechanism for obtaining or enhancing séxual arousal and dependent on either a self-rescue mechanism or the victim’s judgment to discontinue its effects. 6. No apparent suicide intent.

(Emphasis added). As we noted, when the beneficiaries sought to recover the death benefits under the Policy, MAMSI denied payment, claiming that: 1) the Insured’s death was not the result of an accident; and 2) the Insured’s death was the result of intentional self-injury. Consequently, on October 16, 2000, the beneficiaries instituted suit against MAMSI, alleging breach of the insurance contract. The Policy provides for the payment of death benefits if the Insured sustained a covered loss, which is defined to include loss of life “because of an injury caused by an accident.” The terms “accident” and “injury” are not defined, however.

The Policy also includes various “Exclusions,” one of which bars coverage if death results from “intentional self-injury.” The Policy states, in pertinent part: ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISMEMBERMENT BENEFITS Benefit Payable If an Insured suffers a covered loss because of an injury caused by an accident, the loss must occur within 90 days after the date of the accident.... A covered loss means: • loss of life.... ⁵⁷⁸ Exclusions No benefit will be paid for any loss that results from or is caused directly, indirectly, wholly or partly by: • intentional self-injury, suicide or attempted suicide, while sane or insane;.... * * * • a physical or mental sickness or treatment of that sickness Following the motions hearing on February 20, 2001, the court granted the Insurer’s summary judgment motion. The court reasoned: [I]t appears to this Court as both counsel agree that the policy involved in this case is unambiguous. It provides for the payment of benefits if an insured suffers a covered loss because of an injury caused by an accident.

A covered loss is loss of life. So, therefore, if death occurs because of an injury caused by an accident, then there would be the payment of benefits from the Defendant to the Plaintiff. However, if death was not due to an injury caused by an accident, then the policy does not provide coverage. The Court believes that this case, the policy language is for legal purposes basically the same as the policies that covered death as a result of accidental means.

I have a great deal of difficulty finding any difference between that language and the language used in this case. The issue was dealt with in Consumers Life Insurance Company versus Smith [ 86 Md.App. 570 , 587 A.2d 1119 , cert. denied, 323 Md. 185 , 592 A.2d 178 (1991)], and there, the Court found that when somebody got drunk and drove an automobile and ran into a tree or something of that nature, then the bodily injury was caused by accident. The Court made the distinction between accidental death and death by accidental means, and the Court used the language, the direct and proximate cause of the death of the insured was an automobile accident. He did not die from intoxication.

Had he died from intoxication, then at least in my opinion, there would have been no coverage in that case, and had he died from intoxication, the Court believes that ⁵⁷⁹ the facts in that case would have been analogous to the facts in this case. In this case, the insured intended to cut off his air supply. The cutting off of the air supply caused his death. The Court believes that that is not a death caused because of an injury caused by an accident.

He intended the act that resulted in his death. So the Court is going to grant the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, the Court believes that when you intend to cut off your air supply, you are causing a self-injury and that the exclusion would also apply to exclude benefits in this case. Therefore, the Court will enter Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant.

We shall include additional facts in our discussion. DISCUSSION I. Maryland Rule 2-501 (e) establishes a two-part test that governs summary judgment. The trial court must decide whether there are any genuine disputes of material fact and, if not, whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 675-76 , 766 A.2d 617 (2001); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737-38 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993); Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg’l Med.

Ctr., 106 Md.App. 470, 488 , 665 A.2d 297 (1995), cert. denied, 341 Md. 172 , 669 A.2d 1360 (1996). Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial, however. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Ross, 365 Md. 351, 359 , 779 A.2d 380 (2001). We review, de novo, an order granting summary judgment.

Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 504 , 801 A.2d 148 , No. 20, September Term, 2001 (2002); Green v. H & R Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 502 , 735 A.2d 1039 (1999). Our task is to determine if the trial court reached the correct legal result. Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31 , 697 A.2d 861 (1997); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., ⁵⁸⁰ 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067 (1996). This requires us to undertake the same analysis as the trial court; we evaluate the identical material from the record, and decide the same legal issues presented to the circuit court.

Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76, 83 , 712 A.2d 24 , cert. denied, 351 Md. 286 , 718 A.2d 234 (1998). Ordinarily, we will uphold the grant of summary judgment “only on the grounds relied upon by the trial court.” Blades v. Woods, 338 Md. 475, 478 , 659 A.2d 872 (1995); see Gross v. Sussex, 332 Md. 247 , 254 n. 3, 630 A.2d 1156 (1993); Hoffman v. United Iron and Metal Co., 108 Md.App.117, 132-33, 671 A.2d 55 (1996). When, as here, both sides file cross motions for summary judgment, it does not follow that the circuit court must grant one of the motions. See Regal Savings Bank v. Sachs, 352 Md. 356, 372 , 722 A.2d 377 (1999).

All inferences are resolved in favor of the non-moving party, Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712 , 633 A.2d 84 (1993), and undisputed facts may give rise to conflicting inferences that are not appropriate for resolution by summary judgment. Moreover, even if the facts are undisputed, the appellate court must still determine whether the trial court accurately interpreted the applicable law and correctly applied it to the undisputed facts. Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210 , 783 A.2d 194 (2001).

At this juncture, we pause to summarize the tenets that govern the construction of insurance contracts. It is well settled that “the interpretation of an insurance policy is governed by the same principles generally applicable to the construction of other contracts.... ” Mitchell v. AARP, 140 Md.App. 102, 116 , 779 A.2d 1061 (2001); see Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 359 Md. 298, 305 , 753 A.2d 533 (2000); Philadelphia Indemn.

Inc. Co. v. Maryland Yacht Club, Inc., 129 Md.App. 455, 467 , 742 A.2d 79 (1999). The court bears responsibility for ascertaining the scope and limitations of an insurance policy, to determine whether there is coverage. Fister, 366 Md. at 210 , 783 A.2d 194 ; Cole, 359 Md. at 305 , 753 A.2d 533 ; Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., ⁵⁸¹ 324 Md. 44, 56 , 595 A.2d 469 (1991). That process begins with the review of the text of the policy.

See Cole, 359 Md. at 305 , 753 A.2d 533 ; Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 348 Md. 157, 165 , 702 A.2d 767 (1997); Chantel Assoc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 338 Md. 131, 142 , 656 A.2d 779 (1995). As with any contract, we consider the policy as a whole.

Consumers Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 86 Md.App. 570, 574 , 587 A.2d 1119 , cert. denied, 323 Md. 185 , 592 A.2d 178 (1991). In addition, we “examine the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution.” Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas.

Co., 302 Md. 383, 388 , 488 A.2d 486 (1985). In “ ‘deciding the issue of coverage under an insurance policy, the primary principle of construction is to apply the terms of the insurance contract itself.’ ” Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Lowe, 135 Md.App. 122, 137 , 761 A.2d 997 (2000) (quoting Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins.

Co., 330 Md. 758, 779 , 625 A.2d 1021 (1993)). As with other contracts, “we analyze the plain language of [an insurance] contract according to the words and phrases in their ordinary and accepted meanings as defined by what a reasonably prudent lay person would understand them to mean.” Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 135 Md.App. at 137 , 761 A.2d 997 ; see Mitchell, 324 Md. at 56 , 595 A.2d 469 . Generally, we construe the words of an insurance policy in a way that is consistent with their customary and accepted meanings, Fister, 366 Md. at 210 , 783 A.2d 194 .

But, if there is evidence that the parties intended to ascribe a special or technical meaning to certain words used in an insurance contract, those words are construed in accordance with that understanding. See Dutta v. State Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 556 , 769 A.2d 948 (2001). Moreover, when the terms of an insurance contract “are derived from explicit statutory guidelines,” Fister, 366 Md. at 210 , 783 A.2d 194 , then the interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions is “the paramount consideration ....” Id. ⁵⁸² If the court deems the provisions of an insurance policy unambiguous, the meaning of the terms is determined by the court as a matter of law.

Cole, 359 Md. at 305 , 753 A.2d 533 . A policy term is considered “ambiguous if, to a reasonably prudent person, the term is susceptible to more than one meaning.” Id. at 306 , 753 A.2d 533 . The test to determine ambiguity “is not what the insurer intended its words to mean.... The criterion is ambiguity from the standpoint of a layman.... ” G. J. Couch, 2 Couch Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (2d ed.1959), § 15:84, at 416-418; see Consumers Life, 86 Md.App. at 575 , 587 A.2d 1119 .

When a term in an insurance policy is found ambiguous, “a court will construe the ambiguous term against the drafter of the contract.” Cole, 359 Md. at 317 , 753 A.2d 533 ; see Fister, 366. Md. at 218 n. 11, 783 A.2d 194 ; Bushey v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 362 Md. 626, 632 , 766 A.2d 598 (2001); Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life Ins., 315 Md. 761, 766-67 , 556 A.2d 1135 (1989). If a term is ambiguous, we may use “extrinsic sources such as dictionaries,” to ascertain the meaning. Cole, 359 Md. at 317 , 753 A.2d 533 ; see Consumers Life, 86 Md.App. at 575 , 587 A.2d 1119 .

Nevertheless, Maryland does not subscribe to the doctrine that insurance contracts are automatically construed “most strongly against the insurer.” Bushey, 362 Md. at 632 , 766 A.2d 598 ; see Mitchell, 324 Md. at 56 , 595 A.2d 469 . Neither side has suggested that the Policy here is ambiguous. Nevertheless, two key terms—“accident” and “injury”— are not defined in the Policy. Moreover, it is apparent that the parties do not interpret or apply those terms in the same way.

In filing cross motions for summary judgment, the parties agreed below that there were no disputes as to material fact. Nevertheless, having lost below, appellants now seem to retreat from that position. In this regard, what the Court said in Mears v. Town of Oxford, 52 Md.App. 407, 423 , 449 A.2d 1165 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 652 (1982), is pertinent: ⁵⁸³ Appellant cannot have it both ways, arguing that he should be granted summary judgment because there are no genuine disputes of material facts but that his opponent should not be granted summary judgment because there are genuine disputes over material facts. In any event, appellants now seem to attach significant weight to the fact that the Insured “incorporated several ‘escape mechanisms’ into his elaborate system.” They argue that the use of the escape mechanisms gives rise to an inference favorable to them, but not drawn by the circuit court, that the Decedent did not intend to injure himself, and only suffered injury and death because the release mechanisms malfunctioned.

Appellants thus suggest that appellee’s concession that the Insured did not intend to commit suicide does not go far enough; they urge that the escape mechanisms inferentially show that the Insured did not even intend to injure himself. Therefore, for purposes of summary judgment, when looking at the facts in the light most favorable to them, appellants contend that the court should have found a factual dispute as to whether the death was the result of an accident or an intentional, self-inflicted injury. To support their claim that the court failed to draw the inferences in their favor, appellants point to a comment by the trial judge at the hearing, in which the judge suggested that there was no evidence that the Decedent “ever attempted to use any of those release systems.” Appellants have misconstrued the court’s comment and, in doing so, they have overlooked the purpose of such a hearing. It is apparent that the judge was engaged in a dialogue with counsel for the purpose of elucidating the issues; he was inquiring, as he should, so that he could gather and understand all pertinent information about the issues pending before the court.

There is no indication from the comment that the judge had any fixed or immutable idea of what occurred, nor that he had decided that the escape mechanisms had no significance. Nor is there any indication that the comment in question was the basis for the court’s eventual ruling. ⁵⁸⁴ In our view, appellants’ assertion as to the escape mechanism does not give rise to a dispute of material fact. It is now, as it was below, uncontroverted that the Decedent sought to utilize escape mechanisms, and they did not work as contemplated. Moreover, MAMSI has agreed that the Insured did not intend to kill himself.

It follows that the Insured did not intend to inflict a fatal injury upon himself. As the Insurer sees it, however, the Decedent’s use of the escape mechanisms supports another inference: the Insured appreciated the grave risk of his conduct. MAMSI asserts: The existence of the escape mechanisms leads to a reasonable inference that the Insured recognized he was engaging in an' activity that could foreseeably lead to his death. Further, MAMSI contends that death was the foreseeable result of such conduct.

Thus, the Insurer maintains that the Insured’s death was not the result of an accident. It states: Under the circumstances of this case, the asphyxiation of the Insured was not an event that took place without his foresight or expectation. It was purposefully induced as part of the practice of autoerotic hanging. Stated differently, the Insured’s asphyxiation was not unforeseen, unusual, or unexpected.

Accordingly, the Insured’s death was not the result of an injury caused by accident. As we noted, undisputed facts may give rise to conflicting inferences. Here, the undisputed fact that the Decedent sought to utilize escape mechanisms gave- rise to multiple inferences, but they are not necessarily inconsistent or incompatible. From appellee’s perspective, the escape mechanisms suggest that the decedent was aware of at least some risk associated with his conduct.

If not,.it is hard to conceive of why the Insured would have sought to use the escape devices. Nevertheless, appellee has not established whether the Insured appreciated the gravity of the risk. It- may be that the Decedent believed the risk of death or serious injury was small, but thought it was better to be safe than sorry. Conversely, he might have believed the risk of harm was substan ⁵⁸⁵ tial.

Because it is probably impossible to ascertain what the Insured thought, the understanding of a reasonable person, similarly situated, may take on significance. From appellants’ perspective, the escape mechanisms suggest that the Insured did not intend to die, or to injure himself in such a way as to lead to death. He did intend, however, to restrict temporarily the flow of oxygen to his brain, and he died from the process set in motion by that conduct. The question arises as to whether the knowing deprivation of oxygen, even briefly, constitutes an “injury” under the Policy, in light of the circumstances attendant here.

Based on the language of the Policy, the Insurer asserts that “the issue is whether the injury (i.e., asphyxiation) resulting in death was caused by an accident, not whether the resulting death was accidental.” Even if the Insured’s death was unintentional, the Insurer maintains that the Insured intentionally induced asphyxiation, which was itself an injury. According to MAMSI, the Insured’s voluntary use of suffocation devices, such as a noose, plastic bag, and ligatures, with the deliberate purpose of reducing the flow of oxygen to the brain, constituted “an intentional infliction of self-injury.” Therefore, the Insurer contends that the “death was due to an injury, asphyxiation, which was purposefully induced by the Insured as part of the practice of autoerotic hanging.” II. Appellants focus primarily on Consumers Life Ins. Co., 86 Md.App. 570 , 587 A.2d 1119 , to support their position that they are entitled to recover under- the Policy.

There, the insured died as a result of a vehicular collision that occurred when he was driving while intoxicated. At the time of death, the insured was covered under a group life and accidental death policy. It provided for double indemnity benefits in the event of death from “an accidental, bodily injury which results directly and' independently of all other causes,” and not from any of the excepted risks, such as intentional, self-inflicted injury. Id. at 572 , 587 A.2d 1119 .

Although the insurer paid ⁵⁸⁶ the ordinary benefit, it refused to pay the double indemnity. Consequently, the beneficiary filed suit, and both sides later filed cross motions for summary judgment. In support of its position, the insurer argued that driving while intoxicated constituted a criminal act “involving substantial risk of harm.” Id. at 577 , 587 A.2d 1119 . Moreover, the insurer maintained that serious bodily injury and death “were the readily foreseeable consequences of such conduct and [were] ... not accidental within the contemplation of the insurance policy.” Id.

After the trial court granted the beneficiary’s motion, the insurer appealed. On appeal, we considered whether the term “accidental bodily injury” included a fatal injury sustained when the insured “engaged in proscribed behavior, i.e., driving while legally intoxicated.” Id. at 571-72 , 587 A.2d 1119 . Writing for the Court, Judge Davis said that “the word ‘accident’ is not ambiguous to a reasonably prudent person.” Consumers Life Ins. Co., 86 Md.App. at 574 , 587 A.2d 1119 .

After reviewing various dictionary definitions of the word “accident” as an aid to the Court, we held that the insurer was liable, “notwithstanding that the insured may have been injured as a result of violating the law, ‘[since] it does not appear that the policy was obtained in contemplation of such violation and the danger consequent thereon.’ ” Id. at 578 , 587 A.2d 1119 (quoting Appleman, supra, § 511 at 394-95). The Court reasoned: The direct and proximate cause of death of the insured was an automobile accident; he did not die from intoxication. Moreover, no evidence was presented to the trial court in the instant case that the decedent intended to injure himself or commit suicide. The police and autopsy reports state that the decedent died in an “accident.” The fact that the decedent ingested alcohol does not make his death intentional, planned, foreseen or expected....

Moreover, while intoxication may be dangerous and expose the drinker to a risk, it does not bar recovery under an accidental life insurance provision. “Intentional, unnecessary exposure to ⁵⁸⁷ risks, as well as the negligent creation of risks to one’s own safety may not prevent the result from being accidental.” Id. at 580-81, 587 A.2d 1119 (citation omitted). Of particular relevance here, the Court rejected the insurer’s contention that the decedent put into motion “a chain of events that are the natural and foreseeable consequences of the initial action.” Id. at 578 , 587 A.2d 1119 . As the Court observed, “[t]he logical extension” of such an argument “could arguably be applied to the most hazardous or the most inane pursuits.” Id. at 578 , 587 A.2d 1119 . Appellee relies, inter alia, on Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 256 Md. 320 , 260 A.2d 338 (1970). There, the insured died as a result of a self-administered heroin overdose, and the decedent’s beneficiary sought to recover under a life insurance policy. The policy provided for a double indemnity benefit if the insured’s death resulted from “bodily injuries [sustained] solely through violent, external and accidental means.” Noting that heroin “carries with it a well known and substantial risk,” id. at 322 , 260 A.2d 338 , the Court of Appeals upheld the insurer’s refusal to pay double indemnity benefits. In reaching that result, the Court focused on the intentional, illegal act, which involved serious foreseeable risk.

Id. at 324 , 260 A.2d 338 . See also State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Treas, 254 Md. 615, 620 , 255 A.2d 296 (1969) (denying automobile liability coverage to motorist who struck and killed a pedestrian; policy insured bodily injury “caused by accident,” but victim’s death resulted from intentional act of motorist, and “the possibility of injury to |the victim] could not be said to be unforeseen, unusual, or unexpected”); Harleysville Mut. Cas.

Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 150 , 235 A.2d 556 (1967) (denying liability coverage to an excavator for injury to property caused by an accident, when excavator deliberately burned piles of wood and rubber tires to clear land, and the smoke and soot from the burning piles caused damage to the homes of neighboring property owners; the damage was not “an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation,” and therefore was not caused by an accident). ⁵⁸⁸ Both Gordon and Consumers Life Ins. Co. are distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Consumer’s Life, the conduct in issue was alcohol consumption, but the decedent did not die from an alcohol overdose. Rather, the decedent was killed as a direct result of a vehicular crash; alcohol was a factor in the crash.

Here, the Decedent deliberately put a noose around his neck, and that is ultimately what killed him. In Gordon , the illegality of the heroin use was clearly an important aspect of the Court’s decision. In contrast, this case involves deviant behavior, but the conduct is not illegal.

III

Our task is to determine whether the circuit court was legally correct in concluding that the Insured’s death was not the result of an “accident,” and that the Insured died from an “intentional self-injury.” In the first instance, if the death was not the result of an accident, the Policy is not even triggered, and it would then be unnecessary to evaluate the applicability of any of the exclusions. In the context of this case, however, it is difficult to compartmentalize the analysis of these overlapping and interrelated issues. Therefore, we shall analyze them together. As we do so, we have come to appreciate the words of the Court in Gordon, supra, 256 Md. at 325 , 260 A.2d 338 : “[Cjonfusion ... reigns in this field.... ” Indeed, the courts are often put in the position of having to “split hairs so finely ...” and “slosh through the bog,” 3 id., focusing on the “precise” language of the contract and the “historical” facts of the ⁵⁸⁹ case to determine whether the beneficiaries of a given policy are entitled to recover.

Id. In tackling the task that confronts us, we are guided by two cases that the parties have overlooked: Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201 , 783 A.2d 194 (2001), and Cole v. State Farm Mut. Ins.

Co., 359 Md. 298 , 753 A.2d 533 (2000). These cases help to focus our analysis, and we turn to consider them. In Cole , the insured was shot and killed as she sat in the passenger seat of her van, while the vehicle was parked in a driveway. The victim’s