Calvo v. Montgomery Cnty.

ARGUED BEFORE: Barbera, C.J. Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Getty, JJ. Adkins, J. "Each case involving the going and coming rule and its exceptions must turn on its own particular facts." Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo , 329 Md. 40 , 46, 617 A.2d 572 (1993). Rina Calvo was injured in a car accident while driving from her home to a mandatory work training on a Saturday-normally her day off.

We consider whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County should have granted summary judgment in judicial review proceedings of an order of the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission"). In so doing, we shed light on a complicated and factually-intensive exception to the going and coming rule: the special mission or errand doctrine. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Calvo has been employed by Montgomery County ("County") as a bus driver for approximately 20 years. Her regular work schedule is Monday through Friday, and she is based at the Silver Spring Depot.

On May 6, 2015, Calvo received a letter notifying her that she was scheduled to attend an "important mandatory training" set for Saturday, May 16, 2015, at the Gaithersburg Depot. The notice stated that Calvo was not required to be in uniform to attend the "customer service class," 1 and that the training was set to run from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The County required all employees to attend this training annually. En route to the training, Calvo was rear-ended by another car while waiting at a traffic light.

Calvo filed a claim with the Commission, seeking compensation for injuries sustained in the rear-end collision. At the Commission hearing on October 30, 2015, Calvo testified about her injury, as well as the mandatory nature of the training. She believed that if she missed the training she would probably get suspended or be prevented from going back to work "full duty." 2 Before the Commission, the parties argued the applicability of the special mission exception. The Commission awarded compensation after finding that Calvo "sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment ...." The County sought judicial review of the Commission's Order in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and requested a jury trial.

Shortly thereafter, the County filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that the "going and coming rule" prohibited recovery-because accidental injuries sustained while going to or coming from work do not ordinarily arise out of and in the course of employment, and none of the exceptions to the rule applied. Calvo opposed the Motion, maintaining that compensation was proper under the special mission exception, or because she was a traveling employee. After a hearing, the Court granted the County's motion. The Court concluded that as a matter of law, Calvo's accident fell within the going and coming rule, and that Calvo was not a traveling employee.

The Court considered that Calvo was not compensated for her travel, it was an "annual, regular training" that was "part and parcel of her job," and it was not "out of the ordinary." It found that the training was "bus driver stuff," which involved "go[ing] over the rules of the road," and that the change in location, work on a day off, and the difference in distance did not bring Calvo's case within the special mission exception. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment Calvo v. Montgomery Cty. , No. 1036, 2017 WL 2666161 , at ⁸ (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 21, 2017). The intermediate appellate court agreed that there was no dispute of material fact and concluded that the going and coming rule controlled.

Id. at ⁴, 6. We granted certiorari to resolve the following question: 3 Did the Circuit Court err in concluding as a matter of law that Calvo's injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, and granting summary judgment? Our answer is yes. STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland Rule 2-501(a) permits a party to seek summary judgment at any time "on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In reviewing a summary judgment motion, a court should not attempt to resolve factual issues, but only determine if there is a dispute of material fact sufficient to try the case.

Baltimore Cty. v. Kelly , 391 Md. 64 , 73, 891 A.2d 1103 (2006). Even if "the relevant facts are undisputed, 'if those facts are susceptible to inferences supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant of summary judgment is improper.' " Ashton v. Brown , 339 Md. 70 , 79-80, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) (quoting Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore , 312 Md. 662 , 677, 541 A.2d 1303 (1988) ). We review a grant of summary judgment without deference, and construe the facts, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rockwood Cas.

Co. v. Uninsured Emp'rs' Fund , 385 Md. 99 , 106, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005). DISCUSSION The Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") is intended to protect workers and their families through compensation for a loss of earning capacity due to workers' injuries that arise out of and in the course of employment. See Howard Cty. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls , 288 Md. 526 , 531, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980).

The Act "is to be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes as remedial social legislation." Tornillo , 329 Md. at 48 , 617 A.2d 572 ; Roberts v. Montgomery Cty. , 436 Md. 591 , 603, 84 A.3d 87 (2014). Maryland Code (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.), § 9-501 of the Labor and Employment Article ("LE") provides that "each employer of a covered employee shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to ... the covered employee for an accidental personal injury sustained by the covered employee ...." An "accidental personal injury" is an "accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment[.]" LE § 9-101(b). LE § 9-737 permits a party to seek judicial review of Commission orders in circuit court.

A party may request review on the record before the Commission, which we have described as similar to "judicial review of the final action of most state administrative agencies ...." Kelly , 391 Md. at 67 , 891 A.2d 1103 . Alternatively, a party may select a "new evidentiary hearing and decision before a jury ...." Id. at 67-68 , 891 A.2d 1103 ; LE § 9-745(d). The latter is what the County requested, and so our review is "much like" that due a motion for summary judgment following "an original civil complaint brought in a circuit court." Id. Regardless of the method of appeal, the Commission's decision is "presumed to be prima facie correct[,]" and "the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof." LE § 9-745(b).

To prevail in judicial review, the appellant must overcome the statutory presumption. Kelly , 391 Md. at 76 , 891 A.2d 1103 ; LE § 9-745(b)(1). After the Commission issues an award to a claimant, "the burden of proof, which was borne by the claimant before the Commission, switches to the employer before the circuit court." Kelly , 391 Md. at 75 -76 , 891 A.2d 1103 . A successful claimant has no burden of production in judicial review-the Commission's decision may serve as the claimant's prima facie case.

Id. at 76 , 891 A.2d 1103 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Bark , 79 Md. App. 68 , 80, 555 A.2d 542 (1989) ). The parties raise perennial questions about the fact/law dichotomy inherent in review of summary judgments. Calvo contends that whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment, the special mission exception, and her status as a traveling employee are questions of fact. Calvo maintains that summary judgment was improper because the County did not offer additional evidence in its motion for summary judgment, and the Commission's factual determinations are presumed correct.

She relies on Kelly , 391 Md. at 80 , 891 A.2d 1103 , for the proposition that a circuit court may not enter summary judgment against a claimant who prevailed before the Commission. The County argues that summary judgment was proper because there is no material dispute of fact, the going and coming rule bars compensation as a matter of law, and the facts do not permit any other inferences. The County does not disagree that the Commission's decision is presumed prima facie correct but maintains that the presumption only applies if the issue on appeal is a question of fact, not of law. The County agrees that an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers receives deference but observes that a court may always consider whether the agency made an error of law.

LE § 9-745(b)(1) provides that the Commission's decisions are presumed correct, but the presumption "does not extend to questions of law." Wal Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes , 416 Md. 346 , 357, 7 A.3d 13 (2010) ; Beyer v. Decker , 159 Md. 289 , 291, 150 A. 804 (1930). Although the Commission is entitled to deference in its interpretation of the statute it administers, we may still consider whether its legal conclusions were erroneous. Holmes , 416 Md. at 359 , 7 A.3d 13 ; W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Emp'rs' Fund , 414 Md. 195 , 204, 994 A.2d 956 (2010). The question of whether evidence before the Commission is legally sufficient to support its decision is a question of law.

Moore v. Clarke , 171 Md. 39 , 45, 187 A. 887 (1936). When the Commission's decision involves "consideration of conflicting evidence as to essential facts, or the deduction of permissible but diverse inferences therefrom, its solution of such conflict is presumed to be correct ...." Id. If the undisputed facts do not permit a conclusion, or any permissible inferences consistent with the Commission's award, the case will be resolved solely as a question of law. Id. at 46 , 187 A. 887 ; see also Hygeia Ice & Coal Co. v. Schaeffer , 152 Md. 231 , 235, 136 A. 548 (1927).

Cases involving the going and coming rule and its exceptions hinge on the specific facts of each case. Tornillo , 329 Md. at 46 , 617 A.2d 572 ; see also Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry , 165 Md. 191 , 198, 167 A. 51 (1933) ("The question, therefore, whether a case is an exception to the general rule, depends upon its own particular facts."). But, as we explained in Harrison v. Cent. Constr.

Corp. , 135 Md. 170 , 180, 108 A. 874 (1919) : [t]he question as to whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is ordinarily, like negligence or probable cause, a mixed question of law and fact; but when the facts have been ascertained and agreed upon by the parties, or are undisputed and there is no dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts, the question becomes one of law and may be decided by the Court. Contrary to Calvo's arguments, Kelly does not establish that summary judgment is never permissible against a prevailing claimant during judicial review of a Commission decision. See 391 Md. at 77 -78 , 891 A.2d 1103 . In Kelly , the employer sought judicial review of a Commission Order that awarded compensation after finding that a car accident at work aggravated an employee's old injury.

Id. at 69-70 , 891 A.2d 1103 . In circuit court, the employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case presented a complex medical question and the employee failed to provide sufficient medical evidence connecting his need for treatment with the car accident. Id. at 72 , 891 A.2d 1103 . The employee maintained that a factual dispute over causation existed and opposed summary judgment on the basis of the Commission record and the presumption of correctness.

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment. Id. at 72-73 , 891 A.2d 1103 . We determined that summary judgment was improper. The prevailing employee was entitled to rely on the Commission's determination of causation, and the employer was required to produce evidence establishing the lack of causation because, as the losing party, it bore the burdens of proof and production at summary judgment.

Id. at 77 , 891 A.2d 1103 . We held that there was sufficient evidence before the Commission to support the conclusion that the car accident aggravated the employee's old injury. Id. at 80 , 891 A.2d 1103 . We explained that " '[t]he general rule in Workmen's Compensation cases is that where there is any evidence from which a rational conclusion may be drawn, as opposed to the theory of prayer for a directed verdict, the trial court must leave to the jury all considerations as to the weight and value of such evidence.' " Id.

(quoting Jewel Tea Co. v. Blamble , 227 Md. 1 , 4, 174 A.2d 764 (1961) (emphasis in original) ). Kelly teaches us that summary judgment is improper against a prevailing party when the moving party does not carry its burden, or if there is any evidence that can rationally permit the Commission's factual determination. Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of whether the Circuit Court improperly granted summary judgment for the County.

Arises Out Of And In The Course Of Employment A claimant who seeks compensation must prove that the injury "both arose out of and in the course of the employment." Montgomery Cty. v. Wade , 345 Md. 1 , 9, 690 A.2d 990 (1997) (emphasis in original). " 'Arises out of' refers to the causal connection between the employment and injury." Livering v. Richardson's Rest. , 374 Md. 566 , 574, 823 A.2d 687 (2003). We have adopted the positional risk test to determine if an injury arose out of employment. Id. at 575 , 823 A.2d 687 .

Under this test, " '[a]n injury arises out of the employment if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed [the employee] in the position where he [or she] was injured.' " Id. (quoting A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 3.05 (2002) ) (emphasis in original). In analyzing whether the injury occurred "in the course of employment" we consider "the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment." Id. at 576-77 , 823 A.2d 687 . "An injury is in the course of employment 'when it occurs during the period of employment where the employee reasonably may be in performance of his or her duties and while fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incident thereto.' " Id. at 577 , 823 A.2d 687 (quoting Wade , 345 Md. at 11 , 690 A.2d 990 ).

To determine whether Calvo's injury arose out of her employment, we consider whether Calvo would have been injured but for her employer's requirement that she attend the Saturday training. Id. The Circuit Court found that Calvo's injury did not arise out of her employment. The Court of Special Appeals applied the positional risk test, observing that the parties do not dispute that the travel was "sufficiently work-related" and that but for Calvo's obligation to attend the training, she would not have been traveling the route.

Calvo , 2017 WL 2666161 , at ⁶. The parties do not dispute that Calvo ordinarily did not work on Saturdays, and that the training was mandatory. But for the County's requirement that she attend, Calvo would not have been driving when and where she was injured. Therefore, under the positional risk test, Calvo satisfies the "arises out of" requirement.

Livering , 374 Md. at 575 , 823 A.2d 687 ; see also 1 Clifford B. Sobin, Maryland Workers' Compensation § 6:1, at 158 (2017 ed.). Whether Calvo's injury occurred in the course of her employment depends on the time, place, and circumstances of her injury relative to her employment. Livering , 374 Md. at 576 -77 , 823 A.2d 687 . To fall within the Act, her injury must have occurred during her employment when she was in the performance of her duties or doing something incident to those duties.

Id. at 577 , 823 A.2d 687 ; Wade , 345 Md. at 11 , 690 A.2d 990 . The parties do not dispute that Calvo was traveling from her home to the Gaithersburg Bus Depot for training when she was injured. Rather, they dispute the legal character of this journey. The County contends that the going and coming rule controls.

Under this rule, employees' injuries sustained while going to or coming from work are not ordinarily in the course of employment. Roberts , 436 Md. at 606 , 84 A.3d 87 ; Tornillo , 329 Md. at 44 , 617 A.2d 572 . Such injuries are not usually compensable because employees are responsible for ensuring their presence at work, and during the commute, they generally face the same hazards as other commuters. Roberts , 436 Md. at 606 , 84 A.3d 87 .

Thus, the risks are not usually "directly attributable to a person's particular employment." Morris v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cty. , 339 Md. 374 , 380, 663 A.2d 578 (1995). Applying this rule, the County reasons that Calvo should not receive compensation because she was traveling to work. We have, however, recognized several exceptions to the going and coming rule. 4 See Tornillo , 329 Md. at 44 , 617 A.2d 572 . Calvo offers two reasons for why the Circuit Court should not have granted summary judgment.

First, she argues that the special mission or errand exception to the going and coming rule applies, and therefore her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. She also contends that she was a traveling employee. Because applying the traveling employee rule would bar the applicability of the going and coming rule, we address this argument first. 5 The Traveling Employee Calvo argues that whether she was a traveling employee is a material question of fact. She contends that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the nature of her journey did not make her travel incidental to her employment.

Calvo maintains that if she was indeed a traveling employee, then the going and coming rule would not apply at all, and the positional risk test applies to determine whether her injury occurred in the course of her employment. The County contends that the going and coming rule applies, and that Calvo was not a traveling employee because she was on her way to work, rather than staying at a different site for work, traveling between work sites, or on her employer's premises. A traveling employee is "an employee who is required to travel away from ... [an] employer's premises in order to perform his [or her] job." Gravette v. Visual Aids Elecs. , 216 Md. App. 686 , 686-87, 90 A.3d 483 (2014). The seminal traveling employee case in Maryland is Mulready v. Univ.

Research Corp. , 360 Md. 51 , 756 A.2d 575 (2000). There, an employee for an American company was on a business trip in Canada when she slipped and fell in her hotel shower. Id. at 53-54 , 756 A.2d 575 . The parties agreed that Mulready was acting in the course of her employment at the time of her injury.

We considered whether Mulready's injuries arose out of her employment. Id. at 54-55 , 756 A.2d 575 . We adopted the positional risk test and reasoned that Mulready should receive compensation because her injury arose from an activity that was "reasonably incidental" to travel required by her employer. Id. at 66 , 756 A.2d 575 .

We explained: Absent facts indicating a distinct departure by the employee on a personal errand that would not be in the contemplation of the parties, an injury to a traveling employee generally is compensable so long as it occurred as a result of an activity reasonably incidental to the travel that the employer required. Thus even injuries suffered by traveling employees as a result of common perils of everyday life or as a result of purportedly personal acts generally are compensable. Inasmuch as, under ordinary circumstances, a traveling employee's eating and bathing are reasonably incidental to the travel required by the employer, injuries resulting from these acts are compensable. Id.

Although Calvo argues that her status as a traveling employee is a factual question, we fail to see any support for that theory. The traveling employee rule applies to situations in which "the employee suffered the injury on premises , distant from the employee's home where the employee was staying in order to carry out the employer's business." Id. at 61-62 , 756 A.2d 575 (emphasis added); see also Gravette , 216 Md. App. at 692 -93 , 90 A.3d 483 . The requirement that Calvo report from her home to a different, but not very distant, work location does not transform her into a traveling employee. Her injury did not occur on the premises of a different location where her employer required her to stay to perform work functions.

Calvo simply does not qualify as a traveling employee under applicable legal standards. Calvo argues that two of our other cases, Livering v. Richardson's Rest. , 374 Md. 566 , 823 A.2d 687 (2003), and Roberts v. Montgomery Cty. , 436 Md. 591 , 84 A.3d 87 (2014), provide a basis to conclude that her injury occurred in the course of her employment because travel to the training was incident to her employment. In Livering , 374 Md. at 580 -81 , 823 A.2d 687 , we held that an employee's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment when-while on her day off-she was injured at the restaurant where she worked while checking her schedule. In that instance, Livering's visit to restaurant on her day off was an effort to accommodate her employer's practice of frequently changing the work schedule.

Livering had no phone, so she confirmed her schedule by either visiting the restaurant or calling in from elsewhere. Id. We applied the positional risk test to determine that Livering's injury arose out of her employment. Id. at 575-76 , 823 A.2d 687 .

Relying on cases "involving off-duty or post-termination injuries sustained while on-premises to collect wages or personal property[,]" id. at 577-79 , 823 A.2d 687 , we determined that Livering's injury was compensable because checking her schedule was incident to her employment and she was injured on her employer's premises. Id. at 580 , 823 A.2d 687 . In Roberts , 436 Md. at 606 , 84 A.3d 87 , we considered whether to apply the going and coming rule or the positional risk test to determine if a firefighter's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Roberts was a firefighter on light duty who had been temporarily assigned to a station different from his regular duty station.

Id. at 595-96 , 84 A.3d 87 . He was injured during his shift while traveling from one site, where he had been engaged in physical training, to his regular duty station to pick up his mail. Id. at 596-97 , 84 A.3d 87 . We determined that the positional risk test controlled whether Roberts's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment because he was "en route from a work-related activity to a site where he was to engage in a work-related act," and his employer was aware that Roberts routinely picked up his mail.

Id. at 607 , 84 A.3d 87 . Because this travel was incident to his employment, the going and coming rule did not apply. Id. at 607 & n.15, 84 A.3d 87 . Calvo's reliance on these cases is misplaced, as both Roberts and Livering are materially distinct from the present circumstances.

The County employed Calvo as a bus driver, required her to attend training at a different work site, and Calvo was injured while driving from her home to the site. Unlike the claimant in Livering , Calvo was not on her employer's premises engaging in an activity incident to her employment like checking her schedule, picking up a paycheck, or collecting tools. See 374 Md. at 579 -80 , 823 A.2d 687 . And the facts do not show that Calvo was traveling between work-related sites, on duty, or compensated for her trip.

See Roberts , 436 Md. at 607 , 84 A.3d 87 . The Circuit Court did not err in granting summary judgment for the County on the question of whether Calvo was a traveling employee. Calvo has better luck with her next argument-that the special mission or errand exception to the going and coming rule applies to this case. The Special Mission Exception We have recognized the special mission exception since Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry , 165 Md. 191 , 167 A. 51 (1933).

See Director of Fin. for the City of Baltimore v. Alford , 270 Md. 355 , 360, 311 A.2d 412 (1973). "[A] journey not normally covered under the Act ... 'may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself.' " Wade , 345 Md. at 15 , 690 A.2d 990 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.11 (1996) ). The rule "provides that an employee is acting in the course of employment when travelling on a special mission or errand at the request of the employer and in furtherance of the employer's business, even if the journey is one that is to or from the workplace." Barnes v. Children's Hosp. , 109 Md. App. 543 , 555-56, 675 A.2d 558 (1996). The applicability of the exception turns on the particular facts of the case.

Reisinger-Siehler , 165 Md. at 198 , 167 A. 51 . To support her theory that the special mission or errand exception applies, Calvo points out that she was required to attend a mandatory training on a day she did not normally work, the training was infrequent and distinct from her normal role as a bus driver, and her attendance benefitted the County. The County argues that although Calvo was traveling to a different location and on a different day, she was attending a routine annual training, she was not compensated for her travel, there was no element of urgency, and no hazards out of the ordinary. Therefore, the County reasons, the special mission exception should not apply, and the going and coming rule bars compensation.

The Court of Special Appeals provided a thorough analysis of how a trip may fit within the special mission exception in Barnes , 109 Md. App. at 557 -59 , 675 A.2d 558 . Barnes was the hospital's director of computer and information systems. She worked Monday through Friday, from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and was also "on call" at all times. She regularly received calls during her off hours, and although she usually resolved issues by phone, occasionally she would have to go in to address a problem.

Id. at 551 , 675 A.2d 558 . One Saturday, the hospital comptroller contacted Barnes while she was on a shopping trip with family members and asked her to come in and complete the monthly accounts receivable report, which was due that day. Barnes intended to drive her family home before heading to work, but realized she needed gasoline to reach the hospital. While en route to drop her family off, Barnes stopped to get gas, slipped on a puddle of oil and fell, sustaining injuries.

Id. The Commission determined that Barnes's injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, and the Circuit Court affirmed the decision after a bench trial. Id. at 550 , 675 A.2d 558 . The Court of Special Appeals reversed.

It explained that whether a mission is sufficiently "special" to fall within the exception requires the analysis of multiple factors. Id. at 557 , 675 A.2d 558 . First, a court should consider the " 'relative regularity or unusualness of the particular journey.' " Id. (quoting 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.13, at 4-208.24 (1992) ).

If the trip is " 'relatively regular' in the context of the employee's normal duties," then there is a " 'strong presumption' " that the going and coming rule applies. Id. (quoting 1 Larson & Larson, supra at § 16.13, at 4-208.24, 4-208.26). Second, a court examines " 'the relative onerousness of the journey compared with the service to be performed at the end of the journey.' " Id. at 558, 675 A.2d 558 (quoting 1 Larson & Larson, supra , at § 16.13, at 4-208.26).

This analysis looks to the relationship between the journey and the service to be performed. Traveling a long distance to perform a minor service, supports application of the mission exception because it appears that the journey is part of the service. Whether a journey is onerous may also depend on the length of the journey and the circumstances under which it is made, such as time of day, whether it is a regularly scheduled work day, or travel conditions. Id.

Finally, "the 'suddenness' of the call to work or whether it was made under an 'element of urgency' are also relevant factors." Id. (quoting 1 Larson & Larson, supra , at § 16.13, at 4-208.26, § 16.16, at 4-208.39). This factor may support a conclusion that the mission was special, but is not dispositive. Id. at 558-59, 675 A.2d 558 .

The Court of Special Appeals applied the "usualness" and "onerousness" tests to the facts of Barnes's case, concluding that her trip was a special mission. Id. at 559 , 675 A.2d 558 . Barnes was asked to come in on a day she did not normally work, and there was no evidence that Barnes made regular trips in to work on Saturday. Id. at 559-60 , 675 A.2d 558 .

Thus, the Court explained, Barnes's trip was "irregular or unusual in the context of her duties." Id. at 560 , 675 A.2d 558 . Barnes's trip was clearly in furtherance of the hospital's business interests, and it was onerous because she came in on her day off. Id. Although preparing the report was a routine task, the Court considered that there was an element of urgency because the report was due that day, the employee who usually did the task was absent, and the hospital asked Barnes to come in on her day off to specially complete it.

Id. at 560-61 , 675 A.2d 558 . The Barnes Court rejected the hospital's argument that the routine nature of the task barred application of the special mission exception because the exception "contemplates situations in which either the journey or the mission is special, not simply where the task to be performed is special." Id. at 561-62 , 675 A.2d 558 (emphasis in original). Relying on cases from other jurisdictions, the Court explained that the exception applies because the employee makes a special trip at the employer's request, even if the task itself is normal in relation to the employee's duties. Id. at 562-64 , 675 A.2d 558 .

Thus, Barnes's journey to the hospital was a special mission. 6 On the other hand, Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Jakelski , 45 Md. App. 7 , 410 A.2d 1116 (1980), illustrates when the special mission exception does not apply. Jakelski was a police officer who made regularly scheduled appearances in court once a month to testify about the traffic citations he had issued. Id. at 8 , 410 A.2d 1116 . Jakelski got into a car accident while driving to court.

He had been scheduled to appear at 2:00 p.m., and after testifying, report to his regular shift beginning at 3:30 p.m. Id. The Court of Special Appeals determined that Jakelski's trip was not a special mission. Id. at 11 , 410 A.2d 1116 .

Jakelski was required to regularly testify in traffic court as part of his job, and the journey was not irregular or unusual. Id. at 12 , 410 A.2d 1116 . The Court observed that "if the court appearance had been an isolated obligation, the journey to testify might well have been a special errand or mission," but because it was a "regular duty, periodically to be performed," the exception did not apply, and the going and coming rule barred compensation. Id. at 13 , 410 A.2d 1116 .

Considering these cases, as well as other Maryland precedent, the first requirement of the exception is that employer must require the employee carry out the special mission. See Alford , 270 Md. at 363 -64 , 311 A.2d 412 ; Reisinger-Siehler , 165 Md. at 192 -93 , 167 A. 51 ; Coats & Clark's Sales Corp. v. Stewart , 39 Md. App. 10 , 13, 383 A.2d 67 (1978) ; see also Huffman v. Koppers Co., Inc. , 94 Md. App. 180 , 187, 616 A.2d 451 (1992) ("Employees feel obligated to go on the special mission because of the apparent underlying implication that if they do not go, their employment may be jeopardized."). The parties do not dispute that the County required Calvo to attend the training because of her employment. The fact that the training was mandatory, as the training notice states, suggests that Calvo's attendance benefitted her employer.

Applying Barnes and Jakelski , the question of whether Calvo was on a special mission hinges on two factors: (1) the regularity or unusualness of the journey in the context of Calvo's normal duties, and (2) the onerousness of the journey. See Barnes , 109 Md. App. at 559 -60 , 675 A.2d 558 ; Jakelski , 45 Md. App. at 11 -13 , 410 A.2d 1116 ; see also 2 Arthur Larson, Lex K. Larson & Thomas Robinson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 14.05[3], at 14-10-14-11 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2017). Here, the parties do not dispute that the customer service training took place annually. Calvo points out that her training took place much less frequently than Jakelski's court appearances.

The County maintains that Jakelski is dispositive because the required training occurred with regularity-annually-and the factors in Barnes do not support Calvo's position. We are not persuaded. Jakelski is an uneasy fit as precedent here. Once per month does not readily compare with once per year when we consider that the material question at hand is the regularity or unusualness of Calvo's journey in the context of her normal duties .

Barnes , 109 Md. App. at 557 , 675 A.2d 558 . The mandatory nature of the training does not mean it was regular in relation to her employment. The Commission considered the following facts: (1) Calvo regularly drove a bus Monday through Friday; 7 (2) her regular trip to work was to the Silver Spring Bus Depot; (3) she was assigned to attend training on a Saturday, when she did not work; and (4) the training took place at a different location than her usual work site. With regard to regularity or unusualness, we consider the journey to the training in the context of Calvo's normal duties.

Journeys made daily, at regular intervals, or that are part of the employee's regular duties weigh against application of the special mission exception. See 2 Larson, supra , at § 14.05[3], at 14-10; Barnes , 109 Md. App. at 557 , 675 A.2d 558 ; Jakelski , 45 Md. App. at 11 , 410 A.2d 1116 . Determining regularity or unusualness requires heavy reliance on the particular facts and the inferences that may be drawn from those facts. For example, Jakelski's trips to court were regularly scheduled and part of his ordinary duties as a police officer.

Jakelski , 45 Md. App. at 12 , 410 A.2d 1116 . On the other hand, Barnes's trip took place on a day she did not normally work. While she was on call during her off hours, Barnes usually addressed problems by phone, and only infrequently went in to work. Barnes , 109 Md. App. at 560 , 675 A.2d 558 .

The Court's determination that Barnes's trip was not regular in the context of her duties focused on the journey , not the task to be performed. Id. at 564 , 675 A.2d 558 . In reaching this conclusion, the Barnes Court relied on cases from other jurisdictions that had awarded compensation under the special mission exception to employees who performed tasks "within the scope of their ordinary duties" when the employee made an unusual journey to perform the task at a time when the employee did not typically work. 8 Id. at 562-64 , 675 A.2d 558 . Like Barnes , and unlike Jakelski , Calvo was required to work on a day she did not normally work.

See id. at 551 , 675 A.2d 558 . That the task might have been part of her employment is not dispositive-Barnes's duties occasionally