Carl M. Freeman Associates, Inc. v. Murray

Scanlan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants, Carl M. Freeman Associates, Inc., 1 and Amprop, Inc., 2 appeal from a judgment of the Prince George’s County Circuit Court which awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages to the appellee, John J. Murray, in his suit for malicious prosecution brought against Freeman Associates, Amprop and Donald E. Green, an employee of Freeman Associates. The case was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict in appellee’s favor for $15,000 in compensatory damages and $3^,000 in punitive damages. Following appellants’ motion for a new trial or remittitur, the trial judge (Honorable James H. Taylor) granted a remittitur of $10,000 as to punitive damages only.

This appeal presents two questions for our decision. 3 ⁴²¹ These are: (1) Whether this Court can reverse the award of compensatory damages below on the grounds that the jury’s verdict was grossly excessive? (2) Whether the award of punitive damages against the appellants was unwarranted, in that there was no showing of actual malice on their part or on the part of their agent? For the reasons stated in the remainder of this opinion, we conclude that the answer to both questions must be in the negative, and we affirm the judgment. THE FACTS In July 1971, Amprop owned an apartment complex in Prince George’s County, known as Seven Oaks Farms, a complex which Freeman Associates then managed for Amprop.

At that time, Freeman Associates had in its employ as a security guard at Seven Oaks Farms, Donald E. Green. At that time also, the appellee was a tenant in the same apartment complex. In the early evening of July 24, 1971, several persons, all in their early twenties, had gathered outside of an apartment in the complex. Some of them were drinking beer, but there is no indication in the record that anyone in the group was drunk, acting disorderly or using loud or profane language.

Mr. Green, the security guard, approached the group and told them to go inside the apartment, a request with which they complied. A little while later, a few members of the group went out on the balcony of one of the apartments. Subsequently, Mr. Green approached these persons and ordered them to go inside. Again, they complied with Green’s request.

They did ask him who was complaining about their activity and Green replied that no one had complained, but that they were bothering him. There was no further conversation or contact between Mr. Green and the other parties on the evening of July 24,1971. The next day, Green obtained the names of the residents of the apartment from the mailbox and applied for arrest ⁴²² warrants for all those persons listed thereon, charging them with being intoxicated in a public place and causing a disturbance. The appellee was one of those listed as living in the apartment.

Because of this, he received a notice on August 10, 1971, that a warrant had been issued for his arrest for an offense that he had allegedly committed on the evening of July 24th. This puzzled the appellee because on the evening in question he had been a guest in the home of his uncle in Chicago, Illinois. Indeed, he had been in Chicago from July 21st through August 2nd, 1971, and had not returned to the State of Maryland during that period. The appellee, nevertheless, obeyed the notice he had received and appeared at the sheriffs office in Prince George’s County.

There, he was fingerprinted, photographed and charged with being intoxicated in a public place and causing a disturbance. He was detained for 3V2 hours before he was permitted to post bond and depart. Ultimately, after he and his counsel had conferred with an Assistant State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County, the charges against him were nol-prossed. At trial, the Assistant State’s Attorney, who testified as a witness for the appellee, said the determination to nol-pros the charges was based on the fact that no crime had been committed and, indeed, he regarded the incident as “ridiculous” and “foolish.” The Assistant State’s Attorney reached that conclusion after talking with Green, the security guard of Freeman Associates who swore out the warrant for the appellee's arrest.

At the trial of the case certain significant stipulations were agreed to, including stipulations: that “the plaintiff, John J. Murray, was innocent of the charge of disorderly intoxication;” that “Donald E. Green was the agent of Carl M. Freeman Associates, Inc. on or about July 24,1971;” that Green “was employed as a security guard on or about July ' 24, 1971 at an apartment development in which the appellee was a tenant;” that “Donald E. Green was acting within the scope of his employment when he brought charges against the plaintiff, John J. Murray, for disorderly intoxication;” and that making arrests and swearing out warrants or ⁴²³ complaints “was within the scope of the employment of Donald E. Green.” At the time of the incident involved in this case, Murray was a petty officer in the United States Navy. He had no prior criminal record, had never been charged with a crime and had not been disciplined during the course of his Navy career. He testified that he became extremely nervous and upset and worried about the effect of an arrest on his job in the Navy and on his security clearance. There was testimony that the appellee had become more nervous and stuttered more since his arrest.

In contesting the charges against him, appellee expended $250.00 for legal services and lost four days from his work. There was testimony that when an arrest is made in Prince George’s County, copies of the arrest record, photographs and fingerprints are maintained by the police and copies thereof sent to the F.B.I., even though the charges are dismissed. The Assistant State’s Attorney testified that there was nothing that the appellee could do to expunge those records. A clerk in the District Court for Prince George’s County testified that the arrest records are open to the public, even though charges are dropped and that employers and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation do come in to look at the court records.

THE AWARD OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES WILL NOT BE REDUCED Appellants argue vigorously that, because the plaintiff was able to show out-of-pocket expenses of only $250.00 for attorney’s fees and a few days of lost wages, the jury’s award of $15,000 in compensatory damages was grossly excessive. They ask that we reduce that award. However, as the appellants themselves seem to concede, such a request is one to which we cannot accede. The Court of Appeals has frequently reiterated its determined disinclination to review the amount of a jury’s award of damages in a tort action.

The late Judge Finan, after reviewing the cases and citing fourteen prior, representative decisions, stated in ⁴²⁴ Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, 257 Md. 215, 218, 262 A. 2d 531 (1970) that: “We know of no case where this Court has ever disturbed the- exercise of the lower court’s discretion in denying a motion for a new trial because of the inadequacy or excessiveness of damages.” Judge Finan’s observation remains true. In D. C. Transi t System v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 588 , 287 A. 2d 251 (1972), the Court again adverted to the controlling cases, including Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, supra, and, citing Rephann v. Armstrong, 217 Md. 90, 93 , 141 A. 2d 525 (1958), said: “The trial court refused a new trial sought on the ground that the verdicts were excessive, and it is not our function or right, even were we disposed to do so, to pass on his action in this respect.” The Court then went on to turn aside D. C. Transit’s attack on the size of a verdict rendered in a malicious prosecution case. Id. at 589-590. In other jurisdictions, including our neighbor, the District of Columbia, there appears to be a judicial policy that large verdicts in actions for malicious prosecution should be viewed with more concern and examined more critically for excessiveness than verdicts in other tort actions.

Mills v. Levine, 114 A. 2d 546 , (D.C. Mun. App. 1955), affirmed in part, 233 F. 2d 16 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 858 (1956). No such policy or rule prevails in Maryland, however. Therefore, even if we were to conclude that an award of $15,000 for compensatory damages in this case was excessive in the light of the evidence presented, we would be barred by a legion of decisions of the Court of Appeals from reversing or reducing the judgment.

Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman at 218, and see the cases cited therein. 4 ⁴²⁵ MALICE IS INFERRED AND SUPPORTS THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES Appellants’ second contention is that there was insufficient proof of malice on their part to support an award of punitive damages. We disagree. The appellants have stipulated that the security officer, Mr. Green, was acting within the scope of his employment when he applied for an arrest warrant