Carl Messenger Service, Inc. v. Jones

ALPERT, Judge. This is an expedited appeal from an interlocutory ruling, certified pursuant to Rule 2-602 by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The parties submitted an agreed statement of facts as required by Rule 1029 b. On July 1, 1983, Jeffrey Krimmel, an employee of appellant Carl Messenger Service, Inc. (CMS), and appellee James Jones (Jones) were involved in an automobile accident in Baltimore City.

On March 18, 1986, Jones filed a ³ two count action, sounding in negligence, against CMS. 1 CMS was not served with Jones’s complaint until September 23, 1986. On November 17 of that year, CMS, to its own use and to the use of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF) filed a counterclaim against Jones on the basis of the July 1,1983 accident. The counterclaim sought recovery for property damage to CMS’s vehicle. 2 Jones filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim as barred by the statute of limitations. The court granted that motion and entered judgment on the counterclaim in Jones’s favor.

Finding there was no just reason for delay, the court then entered a final judgment on the counterclaim pursuant to Rule 2-602(b). CMS took this appeal on that judgment. We are asked to determine whether a counterclaim (to a timely original claim), filed after the period of limitations, is barred when the counterclaim arises from the same occurrence as the original claim. For the reasons that follow, we are without jurisdiction to make that determination.

This court will generally hear no appeal until the entire case has been completed. See Canterbury Rid’g Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 Md.App. 635, 651 , 505 A.2d 858 (1986). The purpose of that rule is to prevent piecemeal appeals and to avoid the “confusion, delay and expense which would be caused by having two or more appeals in the same suit.” Id. at 649 , 505 A.2d 858 . The policy considerations which support the rule against multiple appeals are strong ones. ⁴ Nevertheless, a narrow exception exists.

Rule 2-602 provides: Judgments Not Disposing of Entire Action (a) Generally.—Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether raised by original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action: (1) is not a final judgment; (2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the parties; and (3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties. (b) When Allowed.—If the court expressly determines in a written order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the order the entry of a final judgment: (1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties; or (2) pursuant to Rule 2-501(e)(3), for some but less than all of the amount requested in a claim seeking money relief only. Thus, pursuant to Rule 2-602(b)(l), a court may direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all of the claims or parties, in an action. Such a judgment could then be appealed and stand as an exception to the general rule that appeals will not lie before the completion of the entire case.

Importantly, an order that merely resolves an issue within a claim rather than an entire claim may not be certified pursuant to Rule 2-602(b). Washington Sub. San. Comm’n v. Frankel, 302 Md. 301, 308-9 , 487 A.2d 651 (1985); Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dept., Inc., 302 Md. 281, 286-87 , 487 A.2d 288 (1985); Canterbury Rid’g Condo., 66 ⁵ Md.App. at 646, 505 A.2d 858 .

Thus, we must determine whether the summary judgment disposing of CMS’s counterclaim adjudicated an entire and distinct “claim” as required by the rule. If it did not, the trial court was without authority to certify this appeal. In East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453 , 445 A.2d 343 (1982), the Court of Appeals embraced the prevailing federal view 3 that “a complaint and counterclaim constitute all one claim if they involve the same facts or the same cause of action....” 293 Md. at 461 , 445 A.2d 343 . While the court went on to find that the “counterclaim” before it was, in fact, a mere defense or denial to the