Maryland case law › Carr's Beach Amusement Co. v. Annapolis Roads Property Owners Ass'n

Carr's Beach Amusement Co. v. Annapolis Roads Property Owners Ass'n

222 Md. 392 (1960) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedPrescott✓ Good law
HoldingCarr's Beach Amusement Company operated a public bathing beach and amusement park on fifteen acres of waterfront property in Anne Arundel County.

Prescott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Carr’s Beach Amusement Company, Inc. (Carr’s), the defendant-appellant, leases some fifteen acres of water-front property in Anne Arundel County, upon which it operates a public bathing beach and amusement park. As a result of suit being instituted against it by complaining owners of nearby residential properties, it was enjoined from “operating and maintaining their loudspeakers or public address systems at 395 such excessive levels of sound volume as to penetrate the private homes of the individual plaintiffs herein so as to disturb the comfortable enjoyment of their said homes by the said plaintiffs or any of them, and subject to the further order of this Court.” The position taken by the appellant is rather unusual and extraordinary. It concedes that if the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction, the form and scope of the chancellor’s decree are correct.

It almost concedes that its conduct of the amusement park has, in a legal sense, constituted a nuisance, stating that it will, “not simply concede but strongly suggests that a public beach and amusement park such as Carr’s beach * * * would be, under any circumstances, a matter of some inconvenience and annoyance from the point of view of nearby residents.” It admits it is familiar with the rule stated in the case of Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, et al., 173 Md. 641 , 197 A. 146 (which will be mentioned later), but goes on to argue that the “plaintiffs came to the alleged nuisance,” and, if this be considered with all of the other circumstances of the case, and the principle of balancing conveniences and inconveniences (some law books now refer to this principle in terms of the gravity of the harm weighed against the utility of the activity causing the harm. 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 1.24; Restatement, Torts, Sections 826-828), had been properly applied, then the court should not have issued its injunctive decree. In other words, its contention is, that even if it has been conducting its business so as to maintain a legal nuisance, this Court should sanction a continuation of that nuisance under the particular circumstances of this case. That part of appellant’s argument which deals with the plaintiff’s “coming to the nuisance” may be disposed of summarily. The only complaint against the operation of the defendant’s business is the excessive sound volume emanating from the loud-speakers and public address systems.

At least two of the plaintiffs (and perhaps more of the predecessors in interest of the plaintiffs) had built and occupied substantial and costly homes before Carr’s was established. The predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, Beall, built his home in 396 1928, and, at that time, though Carr’s was in existence, there was testimony that it was conducted in an orderly and quiet manner. Thus, it is seen that, at least, some of the plaintiffs had constructed and occupied their dwellings long before there were any disturbing noises from Carr’s, and, therefore, did not “come to the nuisance,” so, whatever may have been the legal effect, if any, had they in fact done so, need not be discussed nor considered further. The only other reasons advanced by the appellant as to why the principle of balancing conveniences and inconveniences should be applied are that it has some $135,000 invested in its enterprise, and the operation of the amusement park is a public benefit, which it insists will be lost if the injunction stands, as it will be forced out of business.

We do not deem it necessary to make a lengthy or comprehensive exposition of the above principle; for, obviously, the instant case does not present a proper factual background for its application. Generally speaking, it is simply that in cases in which some element of estoppel enters or where the question is affected by a public interest, if the inconvenience or loss resulting to a complainant from the continuance of a nuisance will be slight as compared with the inconvenience to

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