Carroll County v. Raymond I. Richardson Foundation, Inc.

KARWACKI, Judge. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Bowling Brook Home for Boys (the Home) in Middleburg, Maryland is a “school” so that it may be operated on land zoned agricultural by the Carroll County Zoning Ordinance (1965, as amended through 1985). Article 6, § 6.2(i) of that ordi ⁴³⁶ nance lists as one of the principal permitted uses under the agricultural classification, “Schools and colleges, including nursery schools or day care centers.” The Circuit Court for Carroll County (Gilmore, J.) ruled that the Home met that definition, reversing a contrary decision by the County Board of Zoning Appeals. We agree with the Circuit Court and affirm its judgment.

The Raymond I. Richardson Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit charitable organization, operates the Bowling Brook Home for Boys. The Home was established in 1957 on a portion of a 263 acre horse farm owned by the Foundation. The Home’s current facilities consist of a manor house, an administrative office building, staff living quarters, a maintenance barn, a sports clubhouse, a baseball field and a basketball court. The Foundation’s plans to abandon those facilities and to construct a new expanded physical plant for the Home at another site on the 263 acre tract precipitated this zoning dispute.

Michael Sunday, director of the Home, testified before the Board of Appeals: “Bowling Brook Home for Boys is a residential facility that provides educational, counseling, vocational training to young men with troubled backgrounds, ages 15V2 to 18, who have been deemed by the courts to be removed from their home so that we can provide care, assistance and guidance to these young men.” The program at the Home is licensed by the State Juvenile Services Administration and is a highly structured one. Mr. Sunday described the daily regimen: [TJhey get up at six o’clock in the morning, make their beds, take their showers, prepare themselves for breakfast. A number of the boys also prepare breakfast. After breakfast, the boys go out to a work program from 8 to 12, supervised by one of our staff members.

Upon return, at twelve o’clock we have lunch and following lunch, we have on-grounds educational program from one o’clock to four o’clock, which is staffed by a certified teacher from the State of Maryland. From 4:15 to 5:45, an hour and a half, we have a group meeting every day, ⁴³⁷ which is used to identify problems, to resolve problems and to have all the young men in the group involved in the helping process with each other. Following the group meeting at 5:45 we move into supper at six o’clock and following supper and the chores around supper, from 7 to 8:30 or 7 to 9, we have a supervised recreational period for these young men. Following the recreational period, we have another group meeting, which we term a riffraff, which is more than say a counseling session.

It’s more of a planning session for the following day and that’s from 9 to 10. Following that, there is a short free period for snacks and maybe listening to some music or a game of pool and then they’re in bed by eleven o’clock The average length of stay of residents in the program is five and a half to six months. 1 Mr. Sunday pointed out that most of the boys in the Home are boys referred by the Juvenile Services Administration who have been adjudicated delinquent, in need of assistance or in need of supervision by the juvenile courts of this State pursuant to Md. Code (1984 RepLVol.), §§ 3-801 through 3-835 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That administration has classified the Home as a “juvenile care facility — group home.” 2 ⁴³⁸ Mr. Sunday elaborated on the educational component of the Home’s program: The educational component, though we only have one certified teacher in the classroom, our group leader who handles the group sessions, is a certified educator. Our vocational supervisor is a Master degree person with an education degree and I feel like not just the classroom but the total program is an educational process.

With some young men, for example, that would come into our educational program, we coordinate with the school that they may be targeted to return to, that school will send us materials which [we] will monitor____ [L]ast spring, we had a young man graduate from his high school while he was still in our program, or upon the day after he was released from our program. I think more than anything else, sir, most of our boys have been failures in school and another focus of oúr educational program is to whet their appetite for learning and to have them understand that in order for them to be successful out there, they are going to have to learn every day of their lives and if not, they are going to struggle. [W]hat we do is we have to by State law develop an I.E.P., 3 which is an individual education plan for each ⁴³⁹ unit, which needs to be reviewed by the case worker, the parents, youth and the people involved with our facility. Also we have an educational coordinator, who is not a paid staff member out of Bowling Brook, but is a member of the Carroll County Board of Education of the public school system, Mr. Larry Weis from the Bowling Brook Service Center. He also oversees and coordinates our educational programs.

I feel as far as meeting the State regulations and the certifiable monitoring that the student — insures that we adhere to — that we are meeting the time frame for the educational services that we are providing. Mr. Sunday also stressed that “[m]ost of the young men that come to our facility are functioning usually below their grade level in math and reading, and we do a lot of remedial work to try to bring them up to level____” Although only one teacher monitors the daily three hour education session, four members of the Home’s staff are certified teachers who interact with the boys. A vocational program is also a part of the curriculum. ⁴⁴⁰ In construing the meaning of a word in a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention. Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 816 , 490 A.2d 1289 (1985); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Sybert, 295 Md. 347, 361 , 456 A.2d 20 (1983); Smelser v. Criterion Ins.

Co., 293 Md. 384, 388-89 , 444 A.2d 1024 (1982); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92 , 400 A.2d 1091 (1979). The primary source of legislative intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself. Auto. Trade Ass’n. v. Harold Folk Enter., 301 Md. 642, 653 , 484 A.2d 612 (1984); Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 556 , 451 A.2d 658 (1982); Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189 , 448 A.2d 353 (1982); State v. Berry, 287 Md. 491, 495 , 413 A.2d 557 (1980).

When the legislature has not defined a term, it should ordinarily be given its usual and natural meaning. DeJarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 717 , 475 A.2d 454 (1984); Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474 , 403 A.2d 788 (1979); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, supra, 285 Md. at 84, 400 A.2d 1091 ; Williams v. Loyola College, 257 Md. 316, 328 , 263 A.2d 5 (1970). Of course, where statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous, no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation.

State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 132, 137 , 486 A.2d 174 (1985); Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 619 , 458 A.2d 758 (1983). Tucker v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). We apply this precept to the use of the term “schools” by the County Commissioners of Carroll County when they legislated that “Schools and colleges, including nursery schools or day care centers” are a principal permitted use on land classified agricultural under the county’s zoning ordinance.

Clarke v. County Comm’rs for Carroll County, 270 Md. 343, 349 , 311 A.2d 417 (1973). Since the ordinance does not contain a definition of “school,” the word should be given its usual meaning. ⁴⁴¹ “School” is defined in Webster’s New World Dictionary 1274 (1984) as “a place or institution for teaching and learning; [an] establishment for education----” Black’s Law Dictionary 1206 (5th ed. 1979) similarly defines “school” as “[a]n institution or place for instruction or education.” We also think the concluding phrase of § 6.2 of the ordinance, “including nursery schools or day care centers,” is significant. The Court of Appeals observed in Group Health Ass’n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 111 , 453 A.2d 1198 (1983), that “[o]rdinarily the word ‘including’ means comprising by illustration and not by way of limitation.” Therefore, other non-traditional types of schools are not excluded merely because they were not specifically provided for in the ordinance. In some jurisdictions, day care centers and nursery schools are not considered schools for zoning purposes.

See cases collected in Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 1087 , 1104-10 (1975). Maryland’s appellate courts have considered the definition of the word “school” in several different contexts. In Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258 Md. 224 , 265 A.2d 467 (1970), and in McClure v. McClure, 15 Md.App. 226 , 289 A.2d 610 (1972), the term was used in separation agreements. In Wooddy , the parties’ son Eddie Lee suffered from Down’s syndrome and was enrolled at a training school for such children.

The Court of Appeals considered this type of training school a “special school” within the scope of the separation agreement’s provision for “special schooling.” The cost of the boy attending a recreational camp, however, was not considered tuition for “special schooling” within the meaning of that term as used in the separation agreement. Wooddy v. Wooddy, supra, 258 Md. at 229-30 , 265 A.2d 467 . In McClure , “schooling” was not adequately defined by the parties in their separation agreement. This Court held that expenses for room and board at a boarding school were not encompassed within the provision requiring the husband to pay the cost of the children’s “schooling.” 15 Md.App. at 231-32 , 289 A.2d