Carsey v. Carsey

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. This appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County stating the ownership interest of the parties 1 in certain real and personal property presents for resolution two issues: 1. Did the trial court err in finding there to be no “marital property” upon which to base a monetary award, pursuant to Maryland Family Law Code Ann., § 8-201 et seq. (the Marital Property Act)? 2.

Was the trial court empowered to order 2 the transfer of all assets to appell[ee]? We answer the first question in the negative and affirm. The facts, which are unique, will be briefly set forth in order to bring definition to the issues presented. On May 19, 1982, Julian Nance Carsey, appellant, “chucked it all”, leaving the State, his job as president of the Charles County Community College, his home, and his wife of fourteen years, Nancy S. Carsey, appellee, and went traveling in the Southwest and Mexico, eventually settling in El Paso, Texas.

He took with him virtually all of the parties’ liquid resources, including the parties’ joint income tax refund check and appellee’s retirement account and a check payable to appellee for part-time work she had performed, all of which he endorsed with appellee’s name. He did leave appellee two notes and a tape. The first note, dated May 15, 1982 and addressed, “To Whom It May Concern”, read: ⁵⁴⁷ I hereby irrevocably, and for the future, relinquish all claims to any estate of J.N. & N.S. Carsey. I also disclaim any responsibility for liabilities related to that estate.

This includes cash values of extant life insurance or annuity policies. All properties assigned jointly or under my name singularly are Nancy S. Carsey’s privilege to dispose of as she wishes. The second note, in addition to informing appellee of the physical and emotional mess he was in, referred her to the tape describing the family’s finances. In addition to joint obligations of which appellee presumably was aware, the tape informed her for the first time of the existence of an executive plan 2a with a balance of between $8000 and $9000 which appellant had with Maryland National Bank and appellant’s personal postal loan also in the amount of approximately $9000.00.

Appellee filed a Complaint, in the Circuit Court for Charles County, for divorce a mensa et thoro and for appointment of a trustee for appellant on July 15, 1982. The complaint stated, relevant to the appointment of a trustee: [t]he plaintiff believes and therefore avers that if she is not appointed Trustee to act for and in the place of defendant concerning his interest in real estate and personal property, the plaintiff will be effectively barred from actuating the stated intentions of the defendant and will incur serious and irreversible financial loss and hardship. Appellee apparently pursued and was successful in sorting out the financial situation with which she was left. Having learned of appellee’s pending divorce proceedings, appellant filed a Counter Complaint for Divorce A Vinculo Matrimonii and Division of Marital Property and Other ⁵⁴⁸ Relief.

The divorce was granted to appellant on no-fault grounds and the division of marital property reserved for further proceedings, 3 at which evidence was presented 4 and both parties were fully heard. Rejecting appellant’s argument, the court in its order ruled: [T]he note did constitute an offer and that offer was accepted by the Plaintiff. This Court further determines that there was insufficient proof of mental incapacity on the part of the defendant at the time of said note, so as to relieve the defendant from obligations of being bound by the terms of the agreement, It, therefore, ordered: that there is no “marital property” to be distributed between the parties, and ... that ... Nancy S. Carsey, be and she is hereby declared to be the sole owner of all marital property and, as well, whatever non-marital property ...

Julian N. Carsey, left in the State of Maryland at the time of his departure. Because it found, at least implicitly, that all otherwise marital property had been “excluded by valid agreement,” the trial judge did not determine, even though there obviously was a dispute in this regard, “which property is marital property.” Md.Family Law Code Ann., § 8-203(a). He did direct counsel for appellant and appellee, as trustees for appellant, to “execute whatever Deeds, documents of ⁵⁴⁹ transfer, conveyances, and any and all other instruments to vest in the name of Nancy S. Carsey, alone, all marital property acquired by the parties during their marriage as well as any non-marital property remaining in the State of Maryland at the time of the departure of Julian N. Carsey on May 19, 1982.” I. Md.Family Law Code Ann. § 8-201(e)(l) defines marital property as “the property, however titled, acquired by one or both parties during the marriage.” It does not include such property that is “excluded by valid agreement.” § 8-201(e)(2)(iii). Astutely assessing the implications of the court’s finding of a valid agreement, appellant endeavors to convince us, as he endeavored to convince the court below, that there was no valid agreement.

His approach is multifaceted; he asserts that there is no valid agreement because the note: (1) being simply a statement of intention, Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 539 , 369 A.2d 1017 (1977), lacked specificity as to its terms, Strickler Engineering Corp. v. Seminar, Inc., 210 Md. 93, 101 , 122 A.2d 563 (1956), (2) lacked consideration; and (3) was made by one who was not legally competent to make it. We will not set aside the lower court’s judgment on the evidence, giving due regard to the court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, unless clearly erroneous. Md.Rule 1086. The trial court rendered a lengthy and detailed opinion from the bench, the pertinent portion of which is set out below: Failure of consideration or mutual mistake of fact or fraud in the inducement or some other thing that would enable you to set the contract aside.

None of that, none of those extraneous matters appear here. The only two things that are argued, first his mental condition wasn’t such to make a contract. And second, that the contract wasn’t supported by adequate consideration. ⁵⁵⁰ Now, if one looks at this note, which is Plaintiff’s exhibit one, the intention of the person preparing that note is abundantly clear. It is much clearer, in fact, than if it had been drawn by an attorney.

It is a model of brevity and clarity and exactitude. It says take the property, take all my debts, it is yours to keep. You really can’t do any better than that. Now, if there were nothing but that, however, the argument could be made well, he didn’t have any clear idea about what exactly it was he was giving away, all this property, and a little bitty note like that to cover it, why that is not, that is not realistic.

The man who has got this kind of property ought to go to Mr. Digges and have a twenty-five page contract, one loophole on each page drawn up, and that way if he wants to get out of it there is no problem. But when you add to Plaintiff’s exhibit number one the transcript of Plaintiff’s exhibit number two, you see that he not only had a good idea of what he had, but he also had in mind the balances on accounts, the location of the property. He was trying to say I think I left you with a can of worms. I don’t know whether you will be able to do anything with it or not, but here are some of the things you might be able to do which will help you.

I don’t know that they will, but obviously, he was giving her the benefit of some of the things that he had run through in his mind that he might do to improve the financial position. His reassurance to her that he had done the taxes correctly and that there weren’t any—nobody was going to sandbag her from the tax collector’s office. All these things indicate to me that although he had problems and although he may have been drinking more whiskey or booze than he thought he should and although he had determined to do something which most men would find way less than honorable, he still was absolutely clear about what he was doing and about what effect it would have on him and his property and how she would have to ⁵⁵¹ manage it. Not only is this absolute proof that he was sane and competent and knew what he was doing and how it would relate to him, but, also, he had a clear perception of what she had to do to respond to what he was offering her.

Now, faced with that, the vague testimony about his super ego, interesting as it may be, doesn’t persuade the Court that he was lacking the mental capacity or the requisite mental condition or ability to make a contract. Now, I have already observed in these comments that in response to that offer she was in no position to even inform him in writing how she felt about