Carter v. Mullin

Constable, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question involved in this appeal is, whether or not, under the powers in the will of Thomas W. Slater, the trustees had power to make sale of the leasehold property, the subject of this case. By will' Thomas W. Slater left a large estate to three trustees. After, by different clauses thereof, bequeathing certain definite sums to the trustees for certain trusts therein set out, he devised and bequeathed all the rest and residue of his estate to the trustees to execute the trusts, therein set out, for the benefit of his son and his son’s children, upon the contingencies therein set out.

The trustees named were also named as executors. In March, 3 896, upon application, the parties thereto being all the parties in interest who were in esse at the time, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City assumed jurisdiction of the trusts, and an auditor’s account was passed, setting apart certain portions of the estate, to be'held by the trustees in divisions, under the different clauses of the will. Held under the residuary clause was the leasehold property which is the subject, of the sale in this case. In April, 1913, the trustees, the appellees herein, entered into an agreement with Julian S. Carter for the sale of the said leasehold property, subject to the ratification thereof ³²⁹ by the Court.

Said sale was reported and duly ratified without objection. In said report it was stated that Julian S. ■Carter was acting as the agent of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Thereafter, upon the purchaser refusing to pay the purchase price upon the tender of a deed by the trustees, the trustees filed a petition praying that the purchaser be compelled to comply with the terms of sale. Julian S. Carter and the Manor Real Estate and Trust Company answered, •disclosing that the said Carter was acting as agent for the Manor Real Estate and Trust Company in the purchase, and '■claiming that the trustees had no power under the will of Thomas W. Slater to make sale of the said property, and, therefore, the Court was without jurisdiction io ratify the same; and denying that the Court could ratify the sale under its general chancery jurisdiction, since the requirements of ihe Act of 1868, Chapter 273, or of section 198 of Article 16 of the Code (Bagby’s Code, sec. 228, Art. 16) had not been complied with.

The Court, thereupon, decreed, that ihe said Carter and the Manor Real Estate and Trusi Company pay the amount of purchase money, and the trustees ■convey the property; and upon the failure of the purchaser to comply, before a certain day, that the writ of fieri facias issue. This appeal was thereupon prosecuted. So much of the residuary clause, as is important for the purpose of a determination of this question, is as follows: "In trust and confidence nevertheless that they will invest the same, so far as the same may be uninvested, and collect and invest the rents, issues and profits thereof in such manner as to increase the corpus, or principal thereof.” Tn a subsequent clause there is this provision: “Eor the purpose of enabling the trustees hereinbefore named, the better 10 exe•cute the several' trusts, hereinbefore provided, I hereby authorize and empower them to invest the trust funds in their hands in such good and sufficient securities as they, or a majority of them shall select, and the same to sell again and convey for the purposes of re-investment or distribuí ion ³³⁰ as often as in their judgment, or that of a majority of them, it shall he wise to do so.” This Court has so recently, in two carefully considered cases, reviewed the authorities on the question here involved and announced the law