Caton Ridge, Inc. v. Bonnett

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A decree in equity, issued by Judge W. Albert Menchine of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, allowed a mechanic’s lien in favor of Gerson Bonnett and Charles F. Brandt, co-partners, trading as Bonnett and Brandt, appellees, upon a one-story, masonry nursing and convalescent home owned by Catón Ridge, Inc. (Catón), appellant. The appellees, as architects, prepared the plans and supervised the construction of the building. The decree also overruled Caton’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings.

Catón appeals from the decree and also from an earlier order overruling its demurrer. ■ By an agreement dated January 16, 1963, Caton engaged the appellees to prepare plans and specifications and to supervise the construction of the nursing home in .Catonsville, Maryland. The contract provided that the architects’ services were to consist of ■the necessary conferences, the preparation of preliminary studies, working drawings, specifications, etc., and “the general administration of the construction contracts, and supervision of the construction of the building.” The contract price for the services to be performed by appellees was $16,000 of which $14,800 was paid in various installments as provided in the contract. The failure of Catón to pay the remaining $1,200 caused appellees to file a mechanic’s lien to recover that balance, and thereafter they filed a bill of complaint to enforce •the lien. Catón demurred to the bill of complaint on the ground that the laws of this State do not entitle an architect to a mechanic’s lien.

The demurrer was overruled on February 26, 1966, after a hearing, and Catón filed its answer alleging that appellees had performed some of their work defectively, that the building had not been completed, and that appellees were not en ²⁷¹ titled to payment until completion. Catón also claimed that under the contract with appellees, arbitration was a condition precedent to legal action by either party and that there had been no arbitration. Appellees submitted interrogatories to Catón on July 12, 1965, and Catón filed its answers thereto, as well as interrogatories to appellees on August 16, 1965. Counsel for appellees desired to have a hearing on the merits scheduled in October 1965, but at the request of counsel for Catón, he agreed to a postponement of the hearing until December 1965.

In a letter to appellees’ counsel, Caton’s counsel stated that efforts were being made by Catón to resolve a dispute with the contractor, and that settlement of said dispute might also resolve the problems in this case. Although Catón had not received answers to its interrogatories, it was agreed on November 16, 1965, that the case would be heard on its merits on December 29, 1965. Appellees’ answers to Caton’s interrogatories submitted to them on August 16, 1965, were filed on December 14, 1965. A copy of appellees’ answers was delivered to counsel for Catón on December 15, 1965.

A letter containing exceptions to some of the answers of appellees and a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative to stay proceedings, was allegedly mailed on December 23, 1965, by Caton’s counsel to the clerk of the court. The exceptions and motion were entered on the docket on December 27, 1965, thirteen days after the answers were filed. The letter containing the exceptions and motion was neither offered nor admitted in evidence, but was included in the transcript by agreement of counsel. This agreement stated, in part, “that there was no evidence in the case and the plaintiffs do not admit that said letter was actually mailed on December 23, 1965.” The motions were heard immediately prior to the hearing on the merits.

On that date, Caton’s president and principal witness, Joseph H. Loveman, was in Michigan for the Christmas-New Year holiday with the full knowledge and approval of counsel for Catón. The chancellor found that the answers to Caton’s interrogatories were clearly inadequate, but that Catón failed to demand prompt answers to its interrogatories, and that although Caton’s exceptions to the appellees’ answers were ²⁷² lawfully justified, they dealt with subjects already within the knowledge of Catón. The chancellor refused to allow a continuance, finding that, in the light of the agreement of counsel to proceed on the merits, Catón waived the benefits of the discovery rules, and accordingly the chancellor overruled the motions. A hearing on the merits followed, but no witnesses were called for Catón.

The question of an architect being entitled to a mechanic’s lien has never been presented to this Court. The Maryland mechanic’s lien law, Code (1957, 1966 Cum. Supp.), Article 63, Section 1, which this Court has no power to extend to cases beyond its obvious designs and plain requirements, Giles v. First National Realty, 238 Md. 203 , 208 A. 2d 582 , Freeform Pools v. Strawbridge, 228 Md. 297 , 179 A. 2d 683 , gives a lien in general terms for work done for or about the building erected or repaired, and for materials furnished for or about the same. It specifically permits a lien for certain types of work on the property around the building, i.e., grading, filling and landscaping.

It is to be construed in favor of those for whom it was enacted, and there can be no lien for anything that does not fall within its provisions. Giles v. First National Realty, Freeform Pools v. Strawbridge, both supra. In the majority of jurisdictions which have statutes giving a lien in general terms for work, labor, and materials furnished in the erection of a building, the general rule is that an architect who furnishes plans and specifications for, and supervises the construction of a building is entitled to a lien thereon. Phillips, Mechanics’ Liens, Section 158 (2d ed. 1883); 36 Am.

Jur., Mechanics’ Liens, Section 54, pp. 49-50. Cases are collected in 60 A.L.R. 1257 . There is no need to review the cases on point cited by the text writers and annotators, for there are dicta in favor of the prevailing rule in the decisions of this Court which resound with the resonance of which Judge Oppenheimer spoke in Murray, Etc. v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 395 , 216 A. 2d 897 , cert. denied 385 U. S. 816 (1966). The first note was struck in Evans Co. v. Internat.

Trust Co., 101 Md. 210 , 60 Atl. 667 . The statute applicable at that time provided for a mechanic’s lien to secure compensation for labor only. All but one contract (Bevan’s) was found to be for both labor and materials and not within ²⁷³ the terms of the statute. The excepted contract provided that Bevan, an artisan, should cut, carve and furnish the models and completely erect in place and finish all the exterior marble work on the building.

The Court was in harmony with the prevailing view when it stated that the law may be held to give a lien in a case falling within its general scope and reason where there is no attempt to define specifically the persons entitled to a lien. In permitting the lien the Court stated: “Bevan was not a mere procurer of labor; nor a mere superintendent or manager of laborers. He was employed for the work specified in his contract because of his skill and knowledge in that class of work; and he did the work in the sense of giving it intelligent direction and being responsible for its due execution. His contract of employment brings him within the terms and the reason of the statute as one furnishing work.” 101 Md. at 221-22 .

The decision in House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160 , 51 A. 2d 669 , at first measure, appears to be in discord with the general