Causey v. Gray

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal seeks a review of three orders of the Circuit Court for Ann Arundel County: (1) overruling a motion of the appellants raising a perliminary objection of want of jurisdiction in equity (Saclise, J.), (2) overruling a demurrer of the appellants to the bill of complaint filed by the appellees (Childs, J.), and (3) overruling a motion by the appellants for a rehearing and suspension of the final decree filed in the suit (Childs, J.). The bill of complaint, filed by Dorothy Gray and Alice V. Peters, appellees in this Court and owners of Lot 59, against Eugene W. Causey and Joyce Causey, his wife, appellants, owners of Lot 58, Genevieve K. von Ascheberg and River Club Estates, Inc. (defendants below but not appellants here) alleged that the plaintiffs owned Lot 59 with a frontage of 127.84 feet in a development called River Club Estates on Rhodes River, having acquired it by a duly recorded deed dated March 16, 1964, from Paul Johannes, a certified copy of the deed being filed as an exhibit. It was further alleged that Mrs. von Ascheberg, a widow, had originally owned the tract of which Lot 59 was a part and had in 1950 conveyed the tract to River Club Estates.

Airs, von Ascheberg had caused the tract to be laid out into lots and roads and the original plat was duly recorded. Paul Johannes, the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs, liad acquired Lot 59 from River Club Estates on January 15, 1963. The defendants, the Causeys, had acquired Lot 58 from River Club Estates on May 15, 1963. The dwelling on Lot 58 was constructed by Johannes and was occupied by the Causeys in September, 1963.

Lot 58 adjoins the plaintiffs’ Lot 59 on the south. ³⁸² Prior to the conveyance of Lot 59 to the plaintiffs by Johannes, the Causeys and Johannes are alleged to have entered into an oral arrangement whereby it was agreed that they would dredge in front of their respective properties and fill in a portion of the frontage of those properties. They also agreed that a drain pipe was to be located on Lot 59 near the division line of Lot 58 to extend through the fill area. Johannes and the Causeys agreed to a division of costs between them and each paid the costs in accordance with the agreement. The dredging and the land fill were completed and the Causeys built a wooden retaining wall with a pier extending from the wall, as shown on a plat filed as plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7.

It was further alleged that the plaintiffs were informed that Johannes and the Causeys agreed upon a division line through the newly created land between Lots 58 and 59 as a S. 16° 00' 40" W line for a distance of 44.09 feet from the end of the division line between the two lots to a pipe set, but notwithstanding this agreement in regard to the division line, the Causeys now claim that the division line is an extension of the fixed division line between Lots 58 and 59 (S. 47° 59' 40" W) for a distance of 45.40 feet to a pipe found. It was alleged that the extension of the boundary line as claimed by the Causeys does and will wrongfully deprive the plaintiffs of the full use of their waterfront lot and their natural riparian rights incident to their ownership of their lot. The claim of the Causeys is also alleged to be in breach of their agreement with Johannes in regard to the division line. It was further alleged that the plaintiffs had sought to settle the dispute in regard to the division line on an equitable basis by offering to create a new line with a bearing of S. 34° 31' 55" W. It was also alleged that Mrs. von Ascheberg had wrongfully claimed the fill area and the area marked “Marsh” on Exhibit 7 as belonging to her and had either individually or through River Club Estates attempted to take charge of the area, convey it by deeds and place restrictions on it, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ claim to riparian rights.

It was finally alleged that in order to prevent a multiplicity of actions, the Court should assume jurisdiction for the pur ³⁸³ pose of settling the rights of the parties with respect to the location of boundary lines and riparian rights. The plaintiffs prayed for a declaratory decree: (a) fixing a proper division line through the fill area; (b) settling the riparian rights of the plaintiffs in so far as challenged by Mrs. von Ascheberg and River Club Estates; and (c) granting other and further relief. All of the defendants raised a preliminary objection pursuant to Maryland Rule 323 a (1) for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the jurisdiction of the cause of action was exclusively at law and not in equity in that disputed boundary lines and questions of title to land in possession of the alleged wrongful possessor were involved. The Circuit Court (Sachse, J.) overruled the motion raising the preliminary objection on July 11, 1966.

The defendants then filed a combined demurrer and answer to the whole bill of complaint. The demurrer set forth the following grounds: 1. The Statute of Frauds is a complete defense to the alleged oral agreement or agreements. 2. The bill of complaint shows on its face that the plaintiffs are not riparian owners. 3.

There is no allegation that the line allegedly agreed upon was uncertain or in dispute. 4. The bill of complaint shows on its face that the Causeys were in possession of the land claimed by the plaintiffs. The answer admitted certain allegations, denied others, and asserted several defenses. The Chancellor (Childs, J.) took testimony and concluded that the alleged oral agreement had not been established by the evidence.

He concluded that the equity court had jurisdiction, that riparian rights were involved and that the trial court should proceed to apportion the land fill in an equitable manner, in accordance with the established rules, and declare the proper division line for the riparian rights of the owners of Lots 58 and 59. The Chancellor set forth his findings and conclusions in a well-considered written opinion, overruled the demurrer and passed the final decree of May 16, 1967, on the ³⁸⁴ merits in which he declared that Lots 58 and 59 shown on the Amended Plat of River Club Estates border on the waters of Rhodes River in Anne Arundel County and have full riparian rights, established the division line between those two lots over any land fill, decreed that the owners of Lot 59 (the appellees) pay the owners of Lot 58 (the Causeys) $42.30 for certain improvements and divided the costs equally between the parties. In order to understand more fully the factual situation, the contentions of the respective parties and the decree of the Chancellor, a plat has been prepared and the reporter is directed to print the plat as part of this opinion. 1 (See p. 394 infra.) The Chancellor in applying the rule of apportionment stated in Baltimore v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 104 Md. 485 , 65 A. 353 (1906), and Mutual Chemical Co. v. Baltimore, 33 F. Supp. 881 , infra properly determined the division line as follows: “Using the plat of River Club Estates, it will be noted that the two lots face upon a shallow cove running from lot 58 through lot 59 inclusive. Three lines which subtend this cove, disregarding its minor deviations, would consist of the following: (a) a line connecting the shore line termini of lot 59; (b) a line which extends the 108.38 foot line of lot 58 southerly; (c) a line which extends the 75.71 foot line of lot 56 northerly to intersect the extension of (b).

See attached diagram. The resulting lines are nearly of equal length. Next, the center of a circle was located which circle would pass through the center points of the above three lines. The center of such a circle was scaled and determined to lie in the river approximately 190 feet from the western conterminus of the dividing line between lots 58 and 59 on a bearing therefrom South 39 degrees West.

Insofar as the lots on this cove are concerned, lines running from their termini at the shore line to the center of the circle so de ³⁸⁵ scribed would proportionately divide land-fill placed between the original property lines and the water. The Court accordingly will decree this line to be the true division line across the filled area. This will leave undisturbed the defendants’ dock, and encompass only some eight and one-half feet of the bulkhead.” After the filing of the decree, the Causeys on June 14, 1967, filed a petition for rehearing and suspension of the operation of the decree reciting that counsel for the defendants had suggested in argument that there might be an ordinance of Anne Arundel County applicable to the fixing of a boundary and that thereafter Section 35-28 of the Anne Arundel County Code was found and promptly disclosed to the Chancellor in chambers, but that the court in its opinion did not make it clear that this ordinance was considered in reaching its decision and further that the plaintiffs had not met the burden of producing sufficient evidence upon which the court could equitably apportion the riparian tracts. It was also alleged that the acquiescence by Johannes, as predecessor in title to the plaintiffs, in the divisional line created by the extension of the boundary line between the two lots, prevented a change in the division line by application of the doctrine of estoppel.

It was prayed that there be a hearing on the petition, that the decree be stayed and reconsidered and, in the alternative, that the location of the division line be reconsidered. The Chancellor on June 14, 1967, without further argument or a hearing filed a written memorandum stating why, in his opinion, the provisions of the Ordinance were not applicable and that there had been a proper determination of the division line on the evidence and authorities. The petition for a rehearing was denied the same day. A timely appeal was taken by the Causeys from both the decree of May 16, 1967, and the order of June 14, 1967.

An appeal was also taken from the order of July 11, 1966, overruling the motion raising a preliminary objection. On July 16, 1967, the Causeys filed a petition for the transmission of the record on appeal without the transcript on the ground that the transcript was not needed in that the merits of the final decree would not be challenged in this Court but only the actions of the Chancellor in overruling the motion raising ³⁸⁶ a preliminary objection, in overruling the demurrer and in the denial of the petition for a rehearing. The Chancellor filed an order on July 18, 1967, directing that the record be transmitted to this Court without a transcript of the testimony on condition, as set forth in the petition, that there would be no challenge to the merits raised in this Court. The Causeys, as appellants, raised before us three questions already mentioned: 1.

Did the Chancellor err in denying the motion of the appellants raising the preliminary objection that the equity court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter? 2. Did the Chancellor err in overruling the demurrer to the bill of complaint ? 3. Did the Chancellor abuse his discretion in denying the relief prayed for in the petition for rehearing ? We have concluded that these questions should be answered in the negative and that we should affirm the orders of the lower court. 1.

The Causeys earnestly argue that the equity court will not determine a question of title to land if the defendant is in possession of the disputed land because the remedy at law by way of an action of ejectment or of trespass quare clausum jregit is a full, complete and adequate remedy which eliminates the necessity for intervention by the chancery court. It is further contended that the present case is primarily a boundary dispute involving the determination of a question of title and hence there is no equitable jurisdiction. As Judge Childs aptly stated in his opinion in the lower court: “This argument is an oversimplification of the problem.” It is correct, as the Causeys argue, that ordinarily the equity courts will not decide matters of title when the defendant is in possession of the land involved in the dispute. See Barnes v. Webster, 220 Md. 473, 475 , 154 A. 2d 918, 920 (1959), and cases cited in the opinion in that case.

This general rule, however, is not applicable when there is a dispute in regard to new land, either created by accretion or man-made, added to fixed land on navigable waters. When the riparian rights of the owners of the fixed land bordering navi ³⁸⁷ gable waters is involved, equitable apportionment cannot be obtained in a court of law. For this reason, the remedy at law is not adequate and the equity courts in this State have entertained equitable jurisdiction to afford this equitable relief. See Classen v. Chesapeake Co., 81 Md. 258 , 31 A. 808 (1895).

It should be kept in mind that the “title” of private owners to “riparian land” is created quite differently from the title to fixed land. It is well established that the title to land under navigable water is in the State of Maryland, subject to the paramount right of the United