Chadderton v. State

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A Carroll County grand jury returned an indictment charging the appellant, Daniel Lee Chadderton, with first degree murder. Thereafter, the State’s Attorney for Carroll County filed a "Notice of Intention to Seek Sentence of Death,” asserting that appellant murdered Mary Ruth Myers pursuant "to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration to commit the murder.” Subsequently, the state’s attorney filed a "Suggestion for Removal” on the ground that "the State cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County . . . .” Over appellant’s objection, the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Garrett County. After a trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Garrett County (Thayer, J., presiding), the appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

Because the jury was unable to agree that the death sentence should be imposed, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal appellant raises six issues: "I. The jury in Appellant’s case was improperly selected.

II

Appellant’s trial was improperly removed to Garrett County.

III

The trial court erred in failing to strike a prospective juror for cause.

IV

The trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach and bolster the credibility of its own witnesses. ⁸⁸ V. The trial court erred in excluding evidence of Appellant’s good character.

VI

The evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction.” I. In the course of selecting the jury, the trial judge, over appellant’s objection, excused for cause all prospective jurors who announced that they had conscientious scruples against capital punishment,. A typical question addressed to the prospective jurors went: "Do you feel so strongly about the imposition of the death penalty that your attitude would prevent you from making an impartial decision on the issue of guilt or not?” If the individual answered "Yes,” he or she was excused from serving on the jury. The appellant contends that the course followed by the trial judge denied him the right to a properly selected jury. In making this argument, the appellant recognizes that the Supreme Court of the United States in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), rehearing denied, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 393 U.S. 898 (1968), approved the method of jury selection followed by the trial judge below, at least for the selection of jurors participating in the guilt or innocence phase of the trial as distinguished from the sentencing stage of the proceedings.

Appellant first asserts that he "was denied the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, as that concept has developed in Supreme Court cases decided since Witherspoon. ” The appellant cites Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), in support of his assertion. In our view, appellant’s reliance upon these cases to support his argument is simply misplaced. Ballew stands solely for the proposition that a trial on criminal charges before a five member jury deprives an accused of a right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu ⁸⁹ tion. Taylor held that an accused’s right to a jury trial, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is violated by the systematic exclusion of women from jury service.

In Duren , the Supreme Court simply confirmed its holding in Taylor . The holding in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, is not considered or even mentioned by name in Ballew, Taylor, or Duren . That these cases could somehow be said to overrule Witherspoon , as contended by appellant, is beyond rational comprehension. We have been referred to no case and we have found none which could be said to modify the Witherspoon holding or even suggest that it does not state the law regarding jury selection as it stands today.

In Witherspoon , the petitioner had argued that there is " 'competent scientific evidence that death-qualified jurors are partial to the prosecution on the issue of guilt or innocence.’ ” 391 U.S. at 517 . The Supreme Court disposed of this assertion by stating that "The data adduced by the petitioner, however, are too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt. We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction. In light of the presently available information, we are not prepared to announce a per se constitutional rule requiring the reversal of every conviction returned by a jury selected as this one was.” 391 U.S. at 517-518 .

Counsel for appellant sets out in his brief various studies 1 ⁹⁰ which he contends have updated the data which the Supreme Court found to be "too tentative and fragmentary”; and on the basis of these studies and findings contends that data to support his proposition regarding jury selection are no longer tentative or fragmentary as found by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon . We have reviewed the data submitted by appellant and considered his discussions and arguments in support of his thesis. It is our opinion, however, that they do not invalidate or undermine the findings of the Supreme Court in its Witherspoon holding. While counsel for appellant has made a vigorous and commendable effort to escape the mandate, of Witherspoon , we find that he has not succeeded.

Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, is dispositive of appellant’s first issue.

II

Relying primarily upon Article 20 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, appellant contends that he "was constitutionally entitled to be tried in Carroll County, where the offense was committed”; and that it was error to remove the case to Garrett County upon the suggestion of the State’s Attorney for Carroll County that the state "cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County and requests that this case be transmitted for trial to another court having jurisdiction.” Article 20 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That the trial of facts, where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People.” Appellant argues that "[tjhere is no ambiguity in the lan ⁹¹ guage of Article 20 and it therefore must be interpreted as it is written: an accused has the absolute right to a trial where the facts of the accusation arise.” This flat assertion by the appellant is not supported by any Maryland precedential authorities. In Stewart v. State, 21 Md. App. 346 (1974), aff'd, 275 Md. 258 (1975), in an opinion authored by the late Judge C. Awdry Thompson, reference was made to a law review article, W. Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Causes, 43 Mich.L. Rev. 59, 60 (1944). Judge Thompson stated: "In a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional provisions for venue in all the states, Blume at 87 interpreted Art. 20 to be an 'indefinite’ venue and vicinage provision, which established legislative autonomy over venue in Maryland: 'The constitutions of Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia either require a jury of the "vicinage,” "country,” or "vicinity,” or merely declare it essential to try facts where they arise [Md.]. In these states the courts have shown a tendency to hold that trial in, or a jury of, the county where the crime was committed is not required.

Venue in criminal cases is largely, if not entirely, under legislative control.’ Id. at 93. Thus, in Maryland, there is no constitutional right to be tried in the county where the crime was committed.” 21 Md. App. at 350-351 . Appellant recognizes the existence of Article IV, Sec. 8 of the Constitution of Maryland, but asserts that it only "appears to give the State the right of removal in capital cases.” It is clear, however, that the provisions of Article IV, Sec. 8, go far deeper than simply giving an appearance of the state’s right of removal in capital cases. Paragraph (b) of that article provides: "In all cases of presentments or indictments for offenses that are punishable by death, on sug ⁹² gestión in writing under oath of either of the parties to the proceedings that the party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the proceedings may be pending, the court shall order and direct the record of proceedings in the presentment or indictment to be transmitted to some other court having jurisdiction in such case for trial.” As long ago as 1888, the Court of Appeals announced in McMillan v. State, 68 Md. 307 , 309-310: "Sec. 8, Art. 4, of the Constitution was altered in some respects by the ratification of the amendment proposed in the Act of 1874, ch. 364.

We do not doubt the right of the State to remove a criminal case under the provisions of the amended section; and we think that the State’s