Chambers v. Seghetti

WENNER, Judge. Antonia M. Chambers appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Wesley A. Seghetti. On appeal, appellant presents us with but one issue: whether a sufficient material factual dispute existed to preclude a grant of summary judgment. As we shall hold that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by limitations, we need not reach that issue.

Facts On 8 October 1993, appellant filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, seeking damages from appellee for injuries suffered by her in an automobile accident that occurred on 2 July 1991. Although conceding that he owned the automobile involved in the accident, appellee’s answers to interrogatories revealed that it was being driven on a personal errand by his minor son at the time of the accident. Appellant filed an Amended Complaint on 2 August 1994, charging appellee with negligent entrustment. Appellee responded with a motion for summary judgment which was granted.

This appeal followed. Discussion Md.Code Ann. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 5-101 provides that “[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” As we have said, the accident giving rise to this brouhaha occurred on 2 July 1991, and appellant’s initial complaint was filed on 8 October 1993. Upon learning that appellee’s son had been driving appellee’s automobile at the time of the accident, appellant filed an Amended Complaint on 2 August 1994, charging appellee with negligently entrusting the automobile to his son. If an amended complaint sets forth a new cause of action, “then limitations is measured from the time of the ⁵³⁹ accrual of the cause to the date the amended declaration is filed.... ” Myers v. Aragona, 21 Md.App. 45, 51 , 318 A.2d 263 , cert. denied, 272 Md. 746 (1974).

We acknowledged in Priddy v. Jones, 81 Md.App. 164 , 567 A.2d 154 (1989), that ‘so long as the operative factual situation remains essentially the same, no new cause of action is stated by a declaration framed in a new theory or involving different legal principles.’ Id. at 170 , 567 A.2d 154 , quoting Crowe v. Houseworth, 272 Md. 481, 485 , 325 A.2d 592 (1974). “Merely changing the legal theory does not constitute a new and different cause of action; the material operative facts, not the legal theory, determine the cause of action.” Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md.App. 1, 15 , 478 A.2d 713 (1984). In Priddy , appellant was injured after slipping and falling on a marble floor. While appellant’s first complaint charged appellee with having negligently left the floor in a wet and slippery condition, her amended complaint charged appellee with having failed to construct and maintain the premises in a safe condition. Speaking for