Champagne v. State

KRAUSER, C.J. Having been found guilty by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Howard County of theft of property, specifically, a laptop computer, with a value of $500 or more, appellant, Devin James Champagne, claims that the evidence did not support a finding that the value of the stolen laptop computer was $500 or more at the time it was stolen. We agree and therefore vacate the judgment of the circuit court and, for the reasons set forth below, direct that a verdict of guilty of theft of property worth less than $500 be entered and that appellant then be sentenced on that conviction. ⁶⁷⁴ FACTS On August 28, 2008, John Englehart, Sr., reported a burglary at his home in Columbia, Maryland. Among the items he reported stolen was a Dell Inspiron laptop computer. After the laptop was recovered from appellant’s home, he was charged with first- and fourth-degree burglary and theft of property (the laptop) with a value of $500 or more.

The only evidence of the laptop’s value was the testimony of Englehart, who, at trial, testified as follows: [Prosecutor]: What was the approximate value of that laptop computer? [Englehart]: I think I bought it originally for probably about — with all the — the loaded software and all on it for about sixteen, eighteen hundred dollars. [Prosecutor]: When had you — or how old was it, if you k,now? [Englehart]: About — about three years. [Prosecutor]: About three years old? [Englehart]: Mmm-hmm. When the jury returned a guilty verdict on the count alleging theft of property with a value of $500 or more but was unable to reach a verdict on either the first- or fourth-degree burglary counts, the State entered a nolle prosequi as to each of those counts. Appellant was thereafter sentenced to a term of ten years’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to a sentence he was currently serving for violating his probation in an unrelated case. DISCUSSION Because appellant concedes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict him of the theft of the computer, the sole issue, on appeal, is whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the value of the laptop at the time of the theft was $500 or more. 1 Appellant claims ⁶⁷⁵ that, although the jury heard evidence as to what Englehart paid for the computer three years before it was stolen, “there was no effort to determine the fair market value of the three-year-old computer, nor was there any effort to show what Mr. Englehart would have had to pay to replace his three-year-old computer” at the time of trial.

Consequently, the evidence was not sufficient, insists appellant, to establish that the computer was worth $500 or more at the time of the theft. The State contends otherwise, asserting that the jury was “free to make a fair inference of market value based on evidence regarding the original purchase price.” Under Maryland’s consolidated theft statute that was in effect at the time of the theft at issue, felony theft, as opposed to misdemeanor theft, was a theft of property or services with a value of $500 or more. Md.Code (2002), § 7-104(g) of the Criminal Law Article. 2 “Value” was (and still is) defined in section 7-103 of the Criminal Law Article, as “the market value of the property or service at the time and place of the crime” or, “if the market value cannot satisfactorily be ascertained, the cost of the replacement of the property or service within a reasonable time after the crime.” To determine whether the evidence was sufficient, we must decide “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533 , 823 A.2d 664 (2003) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (additional citations omitted). In making that decision, we “give great deference to the trier of facts’ opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Pinkney v. State, 151 Md.App. 311, 329 , 827 A.2d 124 (2003). ⁶⁷⁶ The present market value of stolen property may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.

Wallace v. State, 63 Md.App. 399, 410 , 492 A.2d 970 (1985) (“[T]he test for the value of stolen goods is market value, but proof of market value ‘may be indirect as well as direct.’ ” (quoting Vucci v. State, 13 Md.App. 694, 701 , 284 A.2d 646 (1971))) (citations omitted). Moreover, a property owner’s testimony regarding the original purchase price is “circumstantially relevant to the present market value” of that property. Id. at 410-11, 492 A.2d 970 . Thus, Englehart’s testimony as to the original purchase price was relevant to the determination of the