Chance v. LaPausky

⁸⁵ Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The County of San Diego filed a petition for support of a child under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). The petition ultimately reached the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the jurisdiction in which appellee resides. The petition was filed by San Diego County as the provider of public support for Tracy M. LaPausky, daughter of Rodney Michael LaPausky and his former wife, Christine Irene Chance, in whose stead San Diego has brought the action under § 8 of the Uniform Act, Md. Ann. Code art. 89C. “Whenever the State or a political subdivision thereof furnishes support to an obligee it has the same right to invoke the provisions hereof as the obligee to whom the support was furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement of expenditures so made and of obtaining continuing support.” Appellee answered the petition but denied that he owed the child a duty of support or that he had refused or had neglected to support the child.

He alleged that upon his divorce May 16, 1974, Christine Chance was provided both the custody and the obligation of support and maintenance of the child. At a hearing before Judge William Buchanan, Sr. on October 24, 1978, he submitted a certified copy of the decree from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The decree stated that Christine I. LaPausky “ ... shall have the guardianship and custody of TRACY MARIE LAPAUSKY, the minor child of the parties in this proceeding, be chargeable with her support and maintenance, accounting from the date of this Decree, ... all subject to the further Order of this Court in the premises.” (emphasis added). Appellee contended that there is no enforceable duty of support “imposed or imposable” upon him in this State, which is prerequisite to indebting him to San Diego.

The statute reads: “Duties of support applicable under this article are ⁸⁶ those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown.” Md. Ann. Code art. 89C, § 7. The term “duty of support” is defined in subsection (g) of § 2 of the Uniform Act: “(g) ‘Duty of support’ includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial separation, separate maintenance or otherwise.” The trial judge denied the petition, stating that “I am going to give full faith and credit to my own state’s decree.” The Attorney General has appealed on behalf of San Diego contending that the “[ljower court’s conclusion that the existence of a Maryland divorce decree precludes action brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is erroneous.” That contention and appellant’s arguments tiptoe around the issues that we must decide, but never quite come to grips with them. The State argues that: “The remedies in Article 89C are available even though a Maryland Court has granted a decree divorcing the resident obligor. ”, which is a generally proper conclusion but does not address the problem at hand.

Before URESA provides a remedy, there must be an imposed or imposable duty upon appellee to support. Md. Ann. Code art. 89C, § 7. Only if the responding state finds a duty of support may it order the obligor to furnish support or reimbursement therefor and subject the property of the obligor to such order. Md. Ann. Code art. 89C, § 23.

There is no question that these remedies are available ⁸⁷ if a court decree has expressly imposed an obligation of support, or even if, sub silentio, it leaves a statutory obligation to support as an imposable possibility. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 72A (charging both parents with a joint and several support obligation). However, a divorce or other decree may circumscribe that obligation for either or both parents, thus leaving no § 7 obligation “imposed or imposable.” State ex rel. Arvayo v. Guerrero, 21 Ariz.

App. 178 , 517 P. 2d 526 (1973) (interpreting the wording and intent of the Uniform Act). Where the decree avoiding the support obligation is not appealed