Chase v. Mayor of Baltimore

HARRELL, Judge. Appellants, Sharon E. Chase, personal representative of the estate of Carlean Burley, and Darlene Burley, guardian and next friend of Richard Sturdivant, 1 filed this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against appellees, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (“the City”), and its employee, Kevin D. Williams, an emergency medical technician for the Baltimore City Fire Department. 2 Appellants alleged that on 1 March 1995, Mr. Williams, acting in his capacity as a paramedic for the Baltimore City Fire Department, negligently intubated Carlean Burley’s esophagus, instead of her trachea, while attempting to resuscitate her during a cardiac arrest. Appellants alleged that the negligent intubation directly and proximately caused Carlean Burley’s death. ⁴³⁰ On 26 January 1998, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on the bases that either of two Maryland statutes provided qualified immunity to Mr. Williams, acting as a Baltimore City Fire Department paramedic, and that appellants had not presented any evidence of gross negligence on the part of Mr. Williams to defeat such immunity. Appellants filed their opposition on 25 February 1998, arguing that appellees were not entitled to immunity under either statute.

They further asserted that, assuming one or both of the statutes did provide immunity, appellants had generated a triable dispute of material fact on the issue of gross negligence, and therefore it was inappropriate for the court to dispose of the case on summary judgment. Following a hearing on 9 March 1998, the circuit court ruled that both statutes applied and granted immunity to Mr. Williams, and therefore the immunity applied vicariously to the City. The court further ruled that the facts as alleged could not support a finding that Mr. Williams’s actions amounted to gross negligence. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of appellees on 11 March 1998.

Appellants filed this timely appeal. They presented the following questions for our review, which we have reorganized and rephrased slightly: I. Whether the circuit court erred when it held that the “Good Samaritan Act,” Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 5-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, granted Mr. Williams qualified immunity and required appellants to prove gross negligence, despite the fact that the City charged for the services rendered to the deceased.

II

Whether the circuit court erred when it held that the “Fire and Rescue Company Act,” Md.Code (1973, 1998 RepLVol.), § 5-604 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, applied to grant immunity to City fire department personnel.

III

Whether the circuit .court erred when it held as a matter of law that Mr. Williams’ actions did not ⁴³¹ amount to gross negligence despite expert opinion evidence to the contrary. FACTS 3 On 1 March 1995, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Carlean Burley, age 66, telephoned her daughter, Irma Jones, and said that she was not feeling well. Ms. Jones went to Ms. Burley’s house, located at 314 North Hilton Street, Baltimore, Maryland. When she arrived, Ms. Burley was complaining of shortness of breath.

Other family members arrived shortly thereafter and placed a 911 call. Contact was made with Baltimore City Medic Unit No. 12 at 2:53 a.m. The ambulance departed the station house at 2:55 a.m., and arrived at 314 North Hilton Street at 2:57 a.m. A fire engine unit, Engine 30, also responded to the call, as was apparently customary.

Upon arrival at Ms. Burley’s home, Mr. Williams and Baltimore City Fire Fighter Tyrone Morris, the driver of the ambulance, conducted an initial assessment of Ms. Burley by checking her respiration, pulse rate, and level of consciousness. Mr. Williams placed Ms. Burley on oxygen, put her on a stretcher, and put her into the ambulance for transport to St. Agnes Hospital. An EKG was taken and an IV was started. Mr. Williams next completed a second assessment of Ms. Burley’s pulse and respiratory rates.

He concluded preliminarily that Ms. Burley was in respiratory distress and was suffering from pulmonary edema. Mr. Williams then contacted the hospital by radio for a physician consultation. After completing the consultation and releasing Fire Engine Unit 30 from the scene, Mr. Williams noticed at 3:10 a.m. that Ms. Burley had become unconscious. He determined that she had gone into cardiac arrest, had no pulse, and needed cardio ⁴³² pulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”), medication, and immediate intubation. 4 He then called Fire Engine Unit 30 back to the scene to assist him with these services. 5 .

When Engine 30 returned to the scene, Mr. Williams intu-bated Ms. Burley in the ambulance. He testified during his deposition hearing as to the following: first, he readied Ms. Burley for intubation and prepared the medical instruments for the procedure. He then used a laryngoscope to sweep the patient’s tongue and visualize the vocal cords. 6 Visualizing the cords, he inserted the tube through the cords and then checked for breath sounds in the lungs and abdomen to assess that he had placed the tube in its proper place in the windpipe. Finally,, he secured the tube in place 7 and departed for the hospital at 3:20 a.m.

He re-checked the tube one time after departing for the hospital by listening with his stethoscope for breath sounds in the lungs and abdomen. He claimed that during that time, although he checked the epigastric area for breath sounds, he did not hear any. 8 He did not recheck the tube at any other point during the transport to the hospital, nor upon reaching the hospital. ⁴³³ The ambulance arrived at St. Agnes Hospital at 3:25 a.m. Mr. Williams maintained ventilation of Ms. Burley while others removed the stretcher carrying Ms. Burley from the ambulance. He then turned the patient over to hospital personnel.

Kevin Scruggs, M.D., attended Ms. Burley upon her arrival in the emergency room. He submitted an affidavit, attached to appellants’ response to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, stating that he heard breath sounds over Ms. Burley’s epigastrium 9 and that his C02 (carbon dioxide) 10 detector showed no reading. He reintubauted Ms. Burley and confirmed proper placement of the new tube using the C02 detector. Ms. Burley was then admitted to the hospital’s Coronary Care Unit.

She died the next morning, 2 March 1995, at 11:05 a.m. The death certificate states the immediate cause of death as acute myocardial infarction, as a consequence of coronary artery disease, as a consequence of non-insulin dependent diabetes. Allegations in the complaint, and in an affidavit of Frederick E. Kuhn, MD, who attended Ms. Burley upon her admission to the Coronary Care Unit, state the myocardial infarction was aggravated due to anoxic encephalopathy, or lack of oxygen to the brain. Additional factual background will be supplied as necessary in the discussion of appellant’s issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing a lower court’s grant of summary judgment, the standard is simply whether that court was correct as a matter of law. Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 737 , 625 A.2d 1005 (1993). See also Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990); King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985). A grant of summary judgment is proper when the movant clearly has demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of ⁴³⁴ material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Md. Rule 2-501(e); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md.App. 325, 332 , 517 A.2d 786 (1986). “The court must consider ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits’ submitted by the parties----In determining whether a factual dispute exists, all inferences are to be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Castiglione, 69 Md.App. at 332 , 517 A.2d 786 (citation omitted). DISCUSSION Our immediate tasks in this case involve statutory construction. In Edgewater Liquors, Inc. v. Liston, 349 Md. 803 , 709 A.2d 1301 (1998), the Court of Appeals stated: “In construing the meaning of a word in a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention.” Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986); see also Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444 , 697 A.2d 455 (1997); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1 (1995).

Legislative intent generally is derived from the words of the statute at issue. “We are not constrained, however, by ... ’the literal or usual meaning’ of the terms at issue.” “Furthermore, we do not read statutory language ‘in isolation or out of context [but construe it] in light of the legislature’s general purpose and in the context of the statute as a whole.’ ” In analyzing a statute, we approach statutory construction from a common sense perspective. Accordingly, we avoid construing a statute so as to lead to results that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. Id. at 807-808 , 709 A.2d 1301 (some citations omitted). Additionally, the Court of Appeals cautions: The plain-meaning rule does not force us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and isolation.

When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are ⁴³⁵ printed in the Annotated Code. We may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. ... Thus, in State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327 , 524 A.2d 51 (1987)____[a'jlthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning — what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme”.... See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381 [, 390, 524 A.2d 77 ] (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning.

Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). Furthermore, this Court, in Barr v. Barberry Bros., Inc., 99 Md.App. 33, 40 , 635 A.2d 64 (1994), noted that “when substantive changes are made it indicates an ‘intent to change the meaning of that statute.’ We also perceive that the opposite, i.e., no substantive change, reflects a legislative intent that the meaning of the statute is not meant to be changed.” (quoting C & R Contractors v. Wagner, 93 Md.App. 801, 809 , 614 A.2d 1035 (1992)). /. THE GOOD SAMARITAN ACT With these principles in mind, we turn to the first qualified immunity statute pointed to by appellees and relied on by the circuit court in its grant of summary judgment. Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § 5-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (The Good Samaritan Act), states in pertinent part: ⁴³⁶ (a) A person described in subsection (b) of this section is not civilly liable for any act or omission in giving any assistance or medical care if: (1) The act or omission is not one of gross negligence; (2) The assistance or medical care is provided without fee or other compensation; and (3) The assistance or medical care is provided: (i) At the scene of an emergency; (ii) In transit to a medical facility; or (iii) Through communications with personnel providing emergency assistance.

(b) Subsection (a) of this section applies to the following ... (2) A member of any State, county, municipal, or volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad ... if the member ... (iii) Is certified or licensed by this State as an emergency medical services provider.... The circuit court, in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, stated: It is the opinion of the Court, that both statutes apply.

The paramedics, in this case, are employees of the Mayor & City Council and it is that entity that assesses a fee, if any, for the services rendered by them. The fact that a paramedic here was paid a salary, does not remove him from the protections of the “Good Samaritan Act” as found in Section 5-603, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Appellants argue that the Good Samaritan Act does not afford immunity in this case to Mr. Williams, and therefore the City, because, on 20 May 1995, the City of Baltimore directed a bill to Ms. Burley in the amount of $100 for “Ambulance Service — Advanced Life Support Transport” rendered on 1 March 1995. This charge, appellants argue, is contrary to subsection (a)(2) of the Act and removes the potential immunity from this case.

Appellees asserted, below and in their brief to this Court, four opposing arguments: (1) that Mr. Williams, the party seeking immunity under the ⁴³⁷ statute, did not charge the fee; rather, the fee was charged by the City, against whom there are no claims other than vicarious liability for the allegedly negligent acts of Mr. Williams; (2) that the fee charged by the City was not for assistance or medical care within the meaning of the statute, but rather, it was for “advanced life support transportation” (emphasis added); (3) that the fee charged by the City does not cover fully the City’s expenses in providing such emergency services, nor does it result in a profit; therefore the charge is not the type of fee contemplated by the statute; and, (4) that the fee was not paid by Ms. Burley, her estate, or her survivors. For the following reasons, we agree with appellants and conclude that the trial court erred when it held that the Good Samaritan Act statute granted any immunity to Mr. Williams or his employer. We first address appellees’ argument that the $100 fee was not charged by Mr. Williams, the person asserting the immunity, but rather was charged by the City. Appellees support their argument with this Court’s decision in Tatum v. Gigliotti, 80 Md.App. 559 , 565 A.2d 354 (1989), aff'd, 321 Md. 623 , 583 A.2d 1062 (1991).

In Tatum , we considered the 1981 codification of the Good Samaritan Act, which provided, in part, “[a] person licensed by the State ... who renders medical aid, care, or assistance for which he charges no fee or compensation ... is not liable for any civil damages.... ” Md.Code (1981), Art. 43, § 132(a) (emphasis added) (recodified as amended at Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § 5-603(a)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). Tatum concerned whether an emergency medical technician’s receipt of a salary destroyed his immunity under the “charges no fee or compensation” provision of the statute. Holding that it did not, we focused on the act of charging a fee to the victim, rather than the direct provider’s receipt of compensation in the way of salary for being available to provide and actually providing those services. In summarizing our ruling, we stated, “[w]e hold, then, that absent a charge to the victim by the person who is seeking immunity, salaried personnel do not receive ‘compensation’ within the meaning of this section.” ⁴³⁸ Tatum, 80 Md.App. at 568 , 565 A.2d 354 .

Appellees point to this specific language as support for their argument