Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Young

Le Grand, C. J., delivered the opinion of this court. The bill filed in this case was for an injunction. It, in substance,- states, that a small piece of land running parallel with Wilb creek, and lying between the inner basin and the guard-bank, which was so prepared and arranged by complainant, partly for the purpose of strengthening the guard-bank, partly for the purpose of a lock-house lot, and partly for the purpose of erecting thereon work-shops, buildings and sheds: that it is the only spot of ground the company has reserved to itself about Cumberland for these purposes, and that it is absolutely necessary for the proper management and working of the canal,- and that it acquired the title to the land by agreement with the owners,-and has been in the quiet and uninterrupted possession of the same, since about the year 1839. It then alleges that the appellee had entered upon and possessed himself of it, and commenced erecting thereon a work-shop, and declared his object to be, the establishment of a boat-yard on it.

It avers, further, that the injury consequent upon the forcible ousting of the company from the land could not be compensated in damages, and that the use of the plot is absolutely necessary to the daily operations of the canal. The answer of the appellee states that he took possession of the' property, and commenced to improve it, and that whilst- so engaged the injunction was served upon him. It denies that the company “has any right, title or interest in the property purchased by the appellee, by possession, improvement, or agreement with the owners thereof,” and, that it is absolutely necessary for the proper management and working of the canal, and avers that there are other pieces of land along-the canal which will answer for the purposes set forth in the bill, as- well as the land in dispute.- ⁴⁸⁹ There was, under an order of the court, below, considerable testimony taken in regard to the alleged title of the company, and the exercise by it of dominion over the lot in question; The testimony in regard to the kind of possession of the company is conflicting, and that showing tide, far from conclusive or satisfactory. The company has not, by evidence, shown that it has a title to the property.

It admits in the bill, that all its title is derived from an agreement with the owners, and an uninterrupted possession since about 1839. Both of these facts are emphatically denied by the answer. And the only evidence which it lias exhibited in proof of title is, a proposition of M. N. Falls to deed certain property on certain conditions, and of conversations which took place in regard to the draft of a conveyance and its execution, between Messrs. McKaig and Thurston and its agents and officers.

There is no proof whatever that any of these conveyances were ever executed, and the question therefore is: — will an injunction lie to restrain a party in possession who claims title, and who expressly denies all title on the part of the complainant, either legal or equitable? We think the authorities are clear on this subject and speak but one language. The right, which a court of equity exercises to arrest proceedings by a permanent writ of injunction, is one of great importance but ought not to be employed unless the case imperatively demands it, and this is never so, when the object is to restrain a mere trespass which can be compensated for in damages, or where