Maryland case law › Childress v. Director of Patuxent Institution

Childress v. Director of Patuxent Institution

236 Md. 656 (1964) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: Denied✓ Good law
SummaryIn this per curiam application for leave to appeal from a determination of defective delinquency, the applicant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted that the trial court was erroneously informed that his last conviction was for burglary. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally sufficient and that any misstatement regarding the nature of the prior conviction was immaterial and not prejudicial because the actual conviction—breaking into a shop and stealing goods worth $5.00 or more under Code (1964 Supp.), Art. 27, sec. 33, a penitentiary misdemeanor—satisfied the prerequisites of the defective delinquency statute, Code (1957), Art. 31 B, sec. 6(a)(2). The Court also noted that the applicant had a long record of prior convictions and rejected his contention that he should have been convicted of 'petty larceny' as beside the point. The application was deni
Questions presented
  • Whether the evidence was legally insufficient to support the determination of defective delinquency.
  • Whether the court was erroneously informed that the applicant's last conviction had been for burglary, and if so, whether that error was prejudicial.
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Per Curiam. In this application for leave to appeal from a determination of defective delinquency, the applicant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient is without merit. He further contends that the court was erroneously informed that his last conviction had been for burglary. In fact, the conviction was for breaking into a shop and stealing goods worth $5.00 or more 657 under Code (1964 Supp.), Art. 27, sec. 33, creating a penitentiary misdemeanor.

The error, if it can be deemed an error, was quite immaterial and not prejudicial, since the crime for which he was convicted met the prerequisites of the statute. Code (1957), Art. 31 B, sec. 6(a)(2). He also had a long record of prior convictions. See Gee v. Director, 231 Md. 610, 611 .

His contention that he should have been convicted of “petty larceny” is beside the point. See Hammond v. Director, 229 Md. 643, 644 . Application denied.