Christ v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources

ELDRIDGE, Judge. The dispute in this case concerns the validity of a Maryland Department of Natural Resources regulation, COMAR 08.18.-02.05A, prohibiting the operation of personal watercraft in Maryland waters by any individual who is less than 14 years old. 1 The challenge to the regulation presents two issues: (1) whether Maryland Code (1974, 1990 Repl.Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), § 8-704 of the Natural Resources Article, 2 grants to ⁴³² the Department the authority to adopt a prohibition against the operation of a particular type of vessel by persons under a certain age; (2) if the regulation is authorized by the statute, whether the delegation by the General Assembly to the Department of such broad authority violates the separation of powers requirement of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 3 I. The relevant facts underlying this action are not in dispute. The COMAR 08.18.02.05A age restriction was promulgated by the Department in August 1990, after the Department concluded that public concern over the use of personal watercraft on Maryland’s crowded waterways had greatly increased. 4 ⁴³³ Prior to the implementation of the regulation, Charles R. Christ, Jr., had been free to operate his personal watercraft on Maryland waters.

When the regulation went into effect, however, Mr. Christ, who was then under 14 years of age, was precluded from using his personal watercraft in the State. Charles R. Christ, Jr., by his father, brought this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, seeking both a declaratory judgment that COMAR 08.18.02.05A was invalid and a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the regulation. 5 Christ argued in the circuit court that the regulation was not authorized by statute. He also argued that, if authorized, such delegation to the Department by the General Assembly violated the constitutional requirement of separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. According to Christ, an age restriction for operating a particular type of vessel involves a “fundamental policy ⁴³⁴ making decision” that “has to be retained, and can only be done by the General Assembly.” The Department filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the regulation was valid.

After a hearing, the circuit court issued an opinion rejecting both of the plaintiffs arguments, stating that “the Department has not acted in an unconstitutional manner or exceeded its statutory authority,” and concluding that the action should be “dismissed.” Specifically, the circuit court held that the language of § 8-704(b-l)(l) of the State Boat Act, directing the Department to “adopt regulations governing” the “operations of any vessels,” clearly included regulations concerning who may operate vessels. The circuit court additionally rejected Christ’s separation of powers argument, holding that “[t]he contention that the regulation is unconstitutional because the State legislature delegated authority to the Department for action on an issue which can only be controlled by the legislature is without merit. Age regulation for the operation of vessels on the waterways of the State is not so fundamental as to require action by the legislature itself.” A judgment was entered on the circuit court’s docket ordering “that this case is dismissed.” Christ timely noted an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal, and this Court issued a writ of certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, 329 Md. 168 , 617 A.2d 1085 .

II

Before turning to the merits of the dispute in this case, it is necessary to address a procedural matter. As mentioned above, the circuit court, disagreeing with the plaintiffs contention that the regulation was invalid, dismissed the declaratory judgment action. This was clearly in error. Although, for the reasons set forth later in the opinion, we find ourselves in agreement with the circuit court’s conclusions concerning the validity of the regulation, the judgment dismissing the case must be vacated. ⁴³⁵ This Court has emphasized, time after time, that dismissal “is rarely appropriate in a declaratory judgment action.” Popham v. State Farm, 333 Md. 136 , 140 n. 2, 634 A.2d 28 , 30 n. 2 (1993), quoting Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 465 , 494 A.2d 934, 936 (1985).

See, e.g., Turnpike Farm v. Curran, 316 Md. 47, 49 , 557 A.2d 225, 226 (1989); Boyds Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 309 Md. 683 , 687 n. 2, 526 A.2d 598 , 600 n. 2 (1987); Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 Md. 352, 355, 356 , 488 A.2d 166, 167-168 (1985); State v. Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9, 17 , 481 A.2d 785, 789 (1984); Koontz v. Ass’n of Classified Emp., 297 Md. 521, 529 , 467 A.2d 753, 758 (1983); Carroll Co. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 294 Md. 144, 155-156 , 448 A.2d 345, 351 (1982); East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453 , 461 n. 3, 445 A.2d 343 , 347 n. 3 (1982); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 90-92 , 400 A.2d 1091, 1095 (1979), and cases there cited. It is proper to dismiss a declaratory judgment action only where there is a lack of jurisdiction or where a declaratory judgment is not an available or appropriate type of remedy. See, e.g., Popham v. State Farm, supra, 333 Md. at 140-141 n. 2, 634 A.2d at 30 n. 2 (declaratory judgment ordinarily is not available when the issue has become moot); Turnpike Farm v. Curran, supra, 316 Md. at 49 , 557 A.2d at 226 (declaratory judgment action is not available, and should be dismissed, where there is a pending action between the parties presenting the same issue); Boyds Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County, supra, 309 Md. at 688-700 , 526 A.2d at 600-607 (declaratory judgment action, to be entertained by the court, must present a justiciable controversy); State v. Burning Tree Club, supra, 301 Md. at 18 , 481 A.2d at 789 (declaratory judgment action should be dismissed where the plaintiff lacks standing); Koontz v. Ass’n of Classified Emp., supra, 297 Md. at 529-530 , 467 A.2d at 758 (declaratory judgment action was properly dismissed where the dispute had become moot).

Where a controversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgment, however, the trial court must render a declaratory judgment. The court’s rejection of the plaintiffs ⁴³⁶ position on the merits furnishes no ground for dismissal. In East v. Gilchrist, supra, 293 Md. at 461 n. 3, 445 A.2d at 347 n. 3, this Court, in language directly applicable to the present case, pointed out that “where a plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that a particular legal provision is valid (or invalid), and the court’s conclusion regarding the validity of the provision is exactly opposite from the plaintiffs contention, nevertheless the court must, under the plaintiffs prayer for relief, issue a declaratory judgment setting forth the court’s conclusion as to validity.” Judge Prescott for the Court in Shapiro v. County Comm., 219 Md. 298, 302-303 , 149 A.2d 396, 399 (1959), stated that, under Maryland’s declaratory judgment statute, “it is immaterial that the ultimate ruling may be unfavorable to the plaintiff. The test of the sufficiency of the [complaint] is not whether it shows that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration of rights or interest in accordance with his theory, but whether he is entitled to a declaration at all; so, even though the plaintiff may be on the losing side of the dispute, if he states the existence of a controversy which should be settled, he states a cause of suit for a declaratory decree.” See, e.g., Broadwater v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 467 , 494 A.2d at 937 (“[T]he trial judge should have declared the rights of the parties even if such declaration might be contrary to the desires of the plaintiff”); Woodland Beach Ass’n v. Worley, 253 Md. 442, 448 , 252 A.2d 827, 830 (1969) (“a declaration should be given even if it is not the declaration sought by the plaintiff and, indeed, is entirely ... contrary to the theory of the plaintiff on which declaratory relief is sought”). 6 Under our cases, where a circuit court erroneously dismisses a declaratory judgment action, the dismissal must ⁴³⁷ be vacated, and an appropriate declaratory judgment must be entered.

Broadwater v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 469-470 , 494 A.2d at 938 ; Carroll Co. Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., supra, 294 Md. at 155-156 , 448 A.2d at 351 ; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, supra, 285 Md. at 92 , 400 A.2d at 1095 .

III

The plaintiffs position that COMAR 08.18.02.05A was not authorized by the General Assembly is based on two theories. First, the plaintiff argues that the language of the State Boat Act, Code (1974, 1990 Repl.Vol.), § 8-704(b-l)(l) of the Natural Resources Article, directing the Department to adopt regulations governing the “operations of any vessels,” does not encompass age restrictions for operating certain types of vessels. Second, the plaintiff maintains that the age restriction conflicts with the overall spirit of the State Boat Act, in which, according to the plaintiff, the Legislature indicated its preference for educating young boaters rather than prohibiting their operation of certain vessels. Regulations promulgated by an administrative agency must, of course, be “consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which the agency acts.” Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74 , 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987).

See, e.g., Maryland State Police v. Warwick, 330 Md. 474, 481 , 624 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1993); Insurance Comm’r v. Bankers, 326 Md. 617, 623 , 606 A.2d 1072, 1075 (1992). We agree with the circuit court that COMAR 08.18.02.05A, prohibiting those under 14 years of age from operating personal watercraft, was authorized by the State Boat Act. In the State Boat Act, § 8-704(b-l)(l) of the Natural Resources Article, the General Assembly broadly granted to the Department the authority to adopt regulations governing the “operations of any vessels” which are subject to the Act. In numerous situations where the General Assembly has delegated similar broad power to an administrative agency to adopt legislative rules or regulations in a particular area, this Court ⁴³⁸ has upheld the agency’s rules or regulations as long as they did not contradict the language or purpose of the statute.

For example, in Jacobson v. Md. Racing Comm’n, 261 Md. 180, 186 , 274 A.2d 102, 104-105 (1971), where the pertinent statute gave the Racing Commission the “full power to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions under which all horse races shall be conducted,” the contention that the legislative delegation of power did not reach a rule regulating the transfer of race horses was characterized by this Court as an argument which “approaches the frivolous.” Other cases in which the Court has upheld agency regulations under broad, general grants of authority to adopt rules or regulations include, e.g., Falik v. Prince George’s Hosp., 322 Md. 409 , 588 A.2d 324 (1991) (broad grant of authority to the Workers’ Compensation Commission to regulate fees for medical services); Department of Transportation v. Armacost, supra, 311 Md. at 67-69 , 532 A.2d at 1057-1058 (statutory provisions directed administrative officials to adopt rules and regulations “for the establishment of [a motor vehicle] emissions inspection program,” rules and regulations “ ‘as required for purposes of implementation, administration, regulation, and enforcement of the provisions of the subtitle,’ ” and rules and regulations “ ‘establishing emission standards to be used for the inspection of motor vehicles’ ”); Sullivan v. Bd. of License Comm’rs, 293 Md. 113, 123 , 442 A.2d 558, 563 (1982) (“we think the broad authority vested in boards of license commissioners under ... the Act to adopt reasonable rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively administer the law and to foster and promote temperance in the public interest is ... necessary”); Automobile Trade Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 22-23 , 437 A.2d 199, 202 (1981) (Insurance Commissioner was authorized to adopt rules and regulations “appropriate and necessary” to implement the provisions of the Credit Life and Credit Health Insurance subtitle of the Insurance Code); Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 552 , 121 A.2d 816, 820 (1956) (legislative body “may delegate to [administrative] officials the power to carry ordinances into effect, ⁴³⁹ even though such delegation requires the exercise of a certain amount of discretion”). The crux of the plaintiffs argument concerning absence of statutory authority is that “there is no specific delegation of authority by the General Assembly to the Department permitting the Department to promulgate regulations which prohibit the use of vessels by an entire class of citizens of the State.” (Plaintiffs brief at 10). As the above-cited cases demonstrate, however, such specificity is not required.

The broad authority to promulgate “regulations governing the ... operations of any vessels” plainly encompasses a regulation prohibiting the operation of certain motor vessels by persons under 14. In any particular area of legislative concern, whether there should be a broad general delegation of regulatory authority to administrators, or a more specific delegation, is a choice for the General Assembly. As Chief Judge Murphy recently stated for the Court in Falik v. Prince George’s Hosp., supra, 322 Md. at 417 , 588 A.2d at 328 , “[i]n a long line of cases, we have upheld broad delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies, particularly where it is impracticable for the legislature to set specific guidelines to govern the day-to-day exercise of the rule-making power.” See also Sullivan v. Bd. of License Comm’rs, supra, 293 Md. at 122-123, 442 A.2d at 563 (“it is manifestly impractical for the legislature to set specific guidelines to govern the day-today exercise of the rule-making power”); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 441 , 370 A.2d 1102, 1119 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 , 98 S.Ct. 2207 , 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978) (“It would obviously be impractical for the Legislature to set specific guidelines to govern all situations where exceptions to the [time schedule for complying with the statute] would be reasonable”); Comptroller v. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 232 , 107 A.2d 93, 97 (1954) (“it would be impossible for the Legislature to deal directly with the multitude of details in the complex conditions upon which it legislates”). ⁴⁴⁰ The plaintiff invokes a provision of the State Boat Act directing the Department to “[p]romote safety of life and property through an educational program directed to boat owners, boat operators, and others concerning the inherent hazards of vessels ...” (§ 8-703(a)(2)). The plaintiff also relies on another section of the statute which states in relevant part as follows (§ 8-712.2(a)(l)): “Except as otherwise provided ... on or after July 1,1988 a person born on or after July 1, 1972 may not operate on the waters of the State a vessel for pleasure that is required to be numbered in accordance with this subtitle or a vessel for pleasure as required to be numbered in accordance with the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 without first-obtaining a certificate of Boating Safety Education.” In the plaintiff’s view, these provisions reflect a legislative intent that the Department achieve the goal of boating safety “through education” rather than by a regulation prohibiting those under a particular age from operating certain types of vessels.

We agree that the above-quoted provisions show a legislative intent that boating safety be promoted through education. There is no inconsistency, however, between educational programs to promote boating safety and regulations imposing restrictions upon who can operate certain vessels. The chief provision relied on by the plaintiff, namely § 8-703(a)(2) directing the Department to promote safety through an educational