Citizens National Bank v. Custis

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of tbe Court. On a former appeal in this case ( 153 Md. 235 ), we considered questions other than those which arise on tbe record now presented. Tbe issues on tbe second trial were whether ¹⁷⁵ the negotiable instrument sued on was actually signed by the alleged maker and, if so, whether it was intended as a promised gift or was executed for a valuable consideration. The two- exceptions, in the record are concerned with evidence and prayers relating to those issues.

A verdict was rendered by the jury in favor of the plaintiff for $10,000, the sum mentioned in the sealed note on which the suit was brought, and from the judgment entered on the verdict an appeal has been taken by the defendant, as executor of the will of John T. M. Sturgis, the person by whom the instrument is alleged to' have been signed. It was held on the first appeal that by virtue of the Negotiable Instruments Act (Code, art. 13, sec. 25), the instrument in suit is a negotiable promissory note although it bears a seal. Because of its negotiable character under the act we said: “By the express terms of this statute, the note now before the court is deemed prima facie to have been issued for st valuable consideration, and the maker to have become a party to the note for value, but absence or total or partial failure of consideration is a matter of defense as between the parties or as to any person not a holder in due course. (Code, art. 13, sec. 43.)” At the retrial, for which the case was remanded, the plaintiff, in the presentation of her case in chief, did not rely solely upon the presumption of a consideration for the note, but offered evidence to prove that it was given as compensation for services.

The first exception was reserved because of the court’s refusal to strike out the testimony produced by the plaintiff, subject to exception, on that issue. By one of the defendant’s prayers, to which the second exception refers, it was proposed that the ease be withdrawn from the jury on the theory that the absence of any valid consideration for the note was shown by the undisputed evidence. The note recited that it was for “value received.” Seven witnesses testified to their personal observations, or to declarations of Mr. Sturgis, the alleged maker of the note, in regard to services rendered for him by Mrs. Cuatis, the plaintiff, during a long period of time. Because of his infirmities, Mr. Sturgis ap ¹⁷⁶ pears to have required such assistance as that which is said to have been furnished by Mrs. Custis, who lived with her husband in an adjacent home.

As described generally by the witnesses, her services to Mr. Sturgis consisted in waiting on him and attending to his comfort. It wa<s testified that she was washing his feet, when Mrs. Powell, one of the witnesses, called, and Mr. Sturgis said: “Mrs. Custis is not doing this for nothing. * * * I could wash my feet but I have kidney trouble. * * * I will see that she gets paid and not in the hundreds, it will be in the thousands and also I will remember her in my will.” A sufficient reference has been made to the testimony for the plaintiff to indicate its nature and effect. It tended to prove that the plaintiff rendered valuable and long continued services to the defendant’s, testator, for which he felt obligated to pay, and for which the note in question was intended as compensation. The decedent was in a position to estimate the value to1 him of the ministrations which he thus accepted from one with whom he had no family relationship1.

His resources were ample for the payment of the note by which his appreciation of the service was given practical expression. It would not be proper to hold that the note was without consideration because the reward it provided might be regarded as unnecessarily generous. As this court said in Brewer v. Bowers, 118 Md. 687 : “In the absence of fraud or some inequitable advantage